[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH for-4.13] docs/xl: Document pci-assignable state
George Dunlap writes ("[PATCH for-4.13] docs/xl: Document pci-assignable state"): > =item B<pci-assignable-remove> [I<-r>] I<BDF> ... > +Make the device at PCI Bus/Device/Function BDF not assignable to > +guests. This will at least unbind the device from pciback, and > +re-assign it from the "quarantine domain" back to domain 0. If the -r > +option is specified, it will also attempt to re-bind the device to its > +original driver, making it usable by Domain 0 again. If the device is > +not bound to pciback, it will return success. > + > +Note that this functionality will work even for devices which were not > +made assignable by B<pci-assignable-add>. This can be used to allow > +dom0 to access devices which were automatically quarantined by Xen > +after domain destruction as a result of Xen's B<iommu=quarantine> > +command-line default. What are the security implications of doing this if the device might still be doing DMA or something ? (For that matter, presumably there are security implications of assigning the same device in sequence to different guests?) Ian. _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
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