[Xen-devel] Xen Security Advisory 288 v3 (CVE-2019-17343) - x86: Inconsistent PV IOMMU discipline

[Xen.org security team <security@xxxxxxx>]

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            Xen Security Advisory CVE-2019-17343 / XSA-288
                              version 3

                 x86: Inconsistent PV IOMMU discipline

UPDATES IN VERSION 3
====================

CVE assigned.

ISSUE DESCRIPTION
=================

In order for a PV domain to set up DMA from a passed-through device to
one of its pages, the page must be mapped in the IOMMU.  On the other
hand, before a PV page may be used as a "special" page type (such as a
pagetable or descriptor table), it _must not_ be writable in the IOMMU
(otherwise a malicious guest could DMA arbitrary page tables into the
memory, bypassing Xen's safety checks); and Xen's current rule is to
have such pages not in the IOMMU at all.

Until now, in order to accomplish this, the code has borrowed HVM
domain's "physmap" concept: When a page is assigned to a guest,
guess_physmap_add_entry() is called, which for PV guests, will create
a writable IOMMU mapping; and when a page is removed,
guest_physmap_remove_entry() is called, which will remove the mapping.

Additionally, when a page gains the PGT_writable page type, the page
will be added into the IOMMU; and when the page changes away from a
PGT_writable type, the page will be removed from the IOMMU.

Unfortunately, borrowing the "physmap" concept from HVM domains is
problematic.  HVM domains have a lock on their p2m tables, ensuring
synchronization between modifications to the p2m; and all hypercall
parameters must first be translated through the p2m before being used.
Trying to mix this locked-and-gated approach with PV's lock-free
approach leads to several races and inconsistencies.

IMPACT
======

An untrusted PV domain with access to a physical device can DMA into
its own pagetables, leading to privilege escalation.

VULNERABLE SYSTEMS
==================

Only x86 systems are vulnerable.  ARM systems are not vulnerable.

Only systems where PV guests are given direct access to physical
devices (PCI pass-through) are vulnerable.  Systems with only HVM
guests, or systems which do not use PCI pass-through, are not
vulnerable.

MITIGATION
==========

Only assigning devices to HVM guests will avoid these vulnerabilities.

CREDITS
=======

This issue was discovered by Paul Durrant of Citrix.

RESOLUTION
==========

Applying the appropriate attached patch resolves this issue.

xsa288.patch           xen-unstable
xsa288-4.11.patch      Xen 4.11.x, Xen 4.10.x
xsa288-4.9.patch       Xen 4.9.x
xsa288-4.8.patch       Xen 4.8.x
xsa288-4.7.patch       Xen 4.7.x

$ sha256sum xsa288*
7254f0ce791b5543aec68643ec47e2bcf7823650949c7eb32db5122591f12e8c  xsa288.meta
e1159cb5c1c5a01b28753739b6a78b555ebe4b920cae766db47e0f2a1a21c188  xsa288.patch
e9986ceda84e7391c27d80fd541a0e5edf1eadef302a560b4e445ca9bad4c56e  
xsa288-4.7.patch
14856543ccaa5b3db2a209d25637ed025f2eb940294d0cd07e03f56630a9e5af  
xsa288-4.8.patch
df5e4a367f58491d54c778e2997142792c881d4f7b5a2a1d3339d2a3f1abafe5  
xsa288-4.9.patch
58ba46b4814695dc34beaa5fb644931253bd0b0c6a8dc843c735beec152ae722  
xsa288-4.11.patch
$

DEPLOYMENT DURING EMBARGO
=========================

Deployment of the patches and/or mitigations described above (or
others which are substantially similar) is permitted during the
embargo, even on public-facing systems with untrusted guest users and
administrators.

But: Distribution of updated software is prohibited (except to other
members of the predisclosure list).

Predisclosure list members who wish to deploy significantly different
patches and/or mitigations, please contact the Xen Project Security
Team.


(Note: this during-embargo deployment notice is retained in
post-embargo publicly released Xen Project advisories, even though it
is then no longer applicable.  This is to enable the community to have
oversight of the Xen Project Security Team's decisionmaking.)

For more information about permissible uses of embargoed information,
consult the Xen Project community's agreed Security Policy:
  http://www.xenproject.org/security-policy.html
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Attachment: xsa288.meta
Description: Binary data

Attachment: xsa288.patch
Description: Binary data

Attachment: xsa288-4.7.patch
Description: Binary data

Attachment: xsa288-4.8.patch
Description: Binary data

Attachment: xsa288-4.9.patch
Description: Binary data

Attachment: xsa288-4.11.patch
Description: Binary data

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