[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v3] x86/HVM: p2m_ram_ro is incompatible with device pass-through
On Tue, Oct 01, 2019 at 11:07:55AM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote: > The write-discard property of the type can't be represented in IOMMU > page table entries. Make sure the respective checks / tracking can't > race, by utilizing the domain lock. The other sides of the sharing/ > paging/log-dirty exclusion checks should subsequently perhaps also be > put under that lock then. > > This also fixes an unguarded d->arch.hvm access. > > Take the opportunity and also convert neighboring bool_t to bool in > struct hvm_domain. > > Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> > Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@xxxxxxxxxx> > --- > v3: Re-base. > v2: Don't set p2m_ram_ro_used when failing the request. > > --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/dm.c > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/dm.c > @@ -255,16 +255,33 @@ static int set_mem_type(struct domain *d > > mem_type = array_index_nospec(data->mem_type, ARRAY_SIZE(memtype)); > > - if ( mem_type == HVMMEM_ioreq_server ) > + switch ( mem_type ) > { > unsigned int flags; > > + case HVMMEM_ioreq_server: > if ( !hap_enabled(d) ) > return -EOPNOTSUPP; > > /* Do not change to HVMMEM_ioreq_server if no ioreq server mapped. */ > if ( !p2m_get_ioreq_server(d, &flags) ) > return -EINVAL; > + > + break; > + > + case HVMMEM_ram_ro: > + /* p2m_ram_ro can't be represented in IOMMU mappings. */ > + domain_lock(d); > + if ( has_arch_pdevs(d) ) I would use is_iommu_enabled because I think it's clearer in this context (giving the comment above explicitly refers to having iommu mappings). > + rc = -EXDEV; EOPNOTSUPP might be better, since it's possible that future iommus support such page type? > + else > + d->arch.hvm.p2m_ram_ro_used = true; > + domain_unlock(d); > + > + if ( rc ) > + return rc; > + > + break; > } > > while ( iter < data->nr ) > --- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c > +++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c > @@ -1486,15 +1486,33 @@ static int assign_device(struct domain * > if ( !is_iommu_enabled(d) ) > return 0; > > - /* Prevent device assign if mem paging or mem sharing have been > - * enabled for this domain */ > - if ( unlikely(d->arch.hvm.mem_sharing_enabled || > - vm_event_check_ring(d->vm_event_paging) || > + domain_lock(d); > + > + /* > + * Prevent device assignment if any of > + * - mem paging > + * - mem sharing > + * - the p2m_ram_ro type > + * - global log-dirty mode > + * are in use by this domain. > + */ > + if ( unlikely(vm_event_check_ring(d->vm_event_paging) || > +#ifdef CONFIG_HVM > + (is_hvm_domain(d) && > + (d->arch.hvm.mem_sharing_enabled || > + d->arch.hvm.p2m_ram_ro_used)) || > +#endif > p2m_get_hostp2m(d)->global_logdirty) ) Is such check needed anymore? With the enabling of the iommu right at domain creation it shouldn't be possible to enable any of the above features at all anymore. Thanks, Roger. _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
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