[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v5 10/10] AMD/IOMMU: restrict interrupt remapping table sizes
On 06/08/2019 14:11, Jan Beulich wrote: > There's no point setting up tables with more space than a PCI device can > use. For both MSI and MSI-X we can determine how many interrupts could > be set up at most. Tables allocated during ACPI table parsing, however, > will (for now at least) continue to be set up to have maximum size. > > Note that until we would want to use sub-page allocations here there's > no point checking whether MSI is supported by a device - 1 or up to 32 > (or actually 128, due to the change effectively using a reserved > encoding) IRTEs always mean an order-0 allocation anyway. Devices which are not MSI-capable don't need an interrupt remapping table at all. Per my calculations, the Rome SDP has 62 devices with MSI/MSI-X support, and 98 devices which are CPU-internals that have no interrupt support at all. In comparison, for a production Cascade Lake system I have to hand, the stats are 92 non-MSI devices and 18 MSI-capable devices (which isn't a valid direct comparison due to how VT-d's remapping tables work, but is a datapoint on "similar looking systems"). I'm happy to leave "no IRT's for non-capable devices" for future work, but at the very least, I don't think the commit message wants phrasing in exactly this way. > > --- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_init.c > +++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_init.c > @@ -1315,11 +1317,8 @@ static int __init amd_iommu_setup_device > } > > amd_iommu_set_intremap_table( > - dte, > - ivrs_mappings[bdf].intremap_table > - ? virt_to_maddr(ivrs_mappings[bdf].intremap_table) > - : 0, > - iommu_intremap); > + dte, ivrs_mappings[bdf].intremap_table, > + ivrs_mappings[bdf].iommu, iommu_intremap); Ah - half of this looks like it wants to be in patch 6, rather than here. > } > } > > --- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_intr.c > +++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_intr.c > @@ -69,7 +69,8 @@ union irte_cptr { > const union irte128 *ptr128; > } __transparent__; > > -#define INTREMAP_MAX_ENTRIES (1 << IOMMU_INTREMAP_ORDER) > +#define INTREMAP_MAX_ORDER 0xB > +#define INTREMAP_MAX_ENTRIES (1 << INTREMAP_MAX_ORDER) > > struct ioapic_sbdf ioapic_sbdf[MAX_IO_APICS]; > struct hpet_sbdf hpet_sbdf; > @@ -80,17 +81,13 @@ unsigned int nr_ioapic_sbdf; > > static void dump_intremap_tables(unsigned char key); > > -static unsigned int __init intremap_table_order(const struct > amd_iommu *iommu) > -{ > - return iommu->ctrl.ga_en > - ? get_order_from_bytes(INTREMAP_MAX_ENTRIES * sizeof(union > irte128)) > - : get_order_from_bytes(INTREMAP_MAX_ENTRIES * sizeof(union > irte32)); > -} > +#define intremap_page_order(irt) PFN_ORDER(virt_to_page(irt)) What makes the frameable order field safe to use? It reaches into (pg)->v.free.order which fairly obviously isn't safe for allocated pages. virt_to_page() is a non-trivial calculation, which is now used in a large number of circumstances. I don't have an easy judgement of whether they are hotpaths, but surely it would be easier to just store another unsigned int per device. Furthermore, it would work around a preexisting issue where we can allocate beyond the number of interrupts for the device, up to the next order boundary. > --- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/pci_amd_iommu.c > +++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/pci_amd_iommu.c > @@ -471,16 +471,15 @@ static int amd_iommu_add_device(u8 devfn > { > ivrs_mappings[bdf].intremap_table = > amd_iommu_alloc_intremap_table( > - iommu, &ivrs_mappings[bdf].intremap_inuse); > + iommu, &ivrs_mappings[bdf].intremap_inuse, > + pdev->msix ? pdev->msix->nr_entries > + : multi_msi_capable(~0u)); > if ( !ivrs_mappings[bdf].intremap_table ) > return -ENOMEM; > > amd_iommu_set_intremap_table( > iommu->dev_table.buffer + (bdf * > IOMMU_DEV_TABLE_ENTRY_SIZE), > - ivrs_mappings[bdf].intremap_table > - ? virt_to_maddr(ivrs_mappings[bdf].intremap_table) > - : 0, > - iommu_intremap); > + ivrs_mappings[bdf].intremap_table, iommu, iommu_intremap); > Similarly for patch 6 here. ~Andrew _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
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