[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] xen: xen-pciback: Reset MSI-X state when exposing a device
On Thu, Dec 13, 2018 at 07:54, Chao Gao wrote: >On Thu, Dec 13, 2018 at 12:54:52AM -0700, Jan Beulich wrote: >>>>> On 13.12.18 at 04:46, <chao.gao@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>> On Wed, Dec 12, 2018 at 08:21:39AM -0700, Jan Beulich wrote: >>>>>>> On 12.12.18 at 16:18, <chao.gao@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>>> On Wed, Dec 12, 2018 at 01:51:01AM -0700, Jan Beulich wrote: >>>>>>>>> On 12.12.18 at 08:06, <chao.gao@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>>>>> On Wed, Dec 05, 2018 at 09:01:33AM -0500, Boris Ostrovsky wrote: >>>>>>>>On 12/5/18 4:32 AM, Roger Pau Monné wrote: >>>>>>>>> On Wed, Dec 05, 2018 at 10:19:17AM +0800, Chao Gao wrote: >>>>>>>>>> I find some pass-thru devices don't work any more across guest >>>>>>>>>> reboot. >>>>>>>>>> Assigning it to another guest also meets the same issue. And the only >>>>>>>>>> way to make it work again is un-binding and binding it to pciback. >>>>>>>>>> Someone reported this issue one year ago [1]. More detail also can be >>>>>>>>>> found in [2]. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> The root-cause is Xen's internal MSI-X state isn't reset properly >>>>>>>>>> during reboot or re-assignment. In the above case, Xen set maskall >>>>>>>>>> bit >>>>>>>>>> to mask all MSI interrupts after it detected a potential security >>>>>>>>>> issue. Even after device reset, Xen didn't reset its internal maskall >>>>>>>>>> bit. As a result, maskall bit would be set again in next write to >>>>>>>>>> MSI-X message control register. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Given that PHYSDEVOPS_prepare_msix() also triggers Xen resetting >>>>>>>>>> MSI-X >>>>>>>>>> internal state of a device, we employ it to fix this issue rather >>>>>>>>>> than >>>>>>>>>> introducing another dedicated sub-hypercall. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Note that PHYSDEVOPS_release_msix() will fail if the mapping between >>>>>>>>>> the device's msix and pirq has been created. This limitation prevents >>>>>>>>>> us calling this function when detaching a device from a guest during >>>>>>>>>> guest shutdown. Thus it is called right before calling >>>>>>>>>> PHYSDEVOPS_prepare_msix(). >>>>>>>>> s/PHYSDEVOPS/PHYSDEVOP/ (no final S). And then I would also drop the >>>>>>>>> () at the end of the hypercall name since it's not a function. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I'm also wondering why the release can't be done when the device is >>>>>>>>> detached from the guest (or the guest has been shut down). This makes >>>>>>>>> me worry about the raciness of the attach/detach procedure: if there's >>>>>>>>> a state where pciback assumes the device has been detached from the >>>>>>>>> guest, but there are still pirqs bound, an attempt to attach to >>>>>>>>> another guest in such state will fail. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>I wonder whether this additional reset functionality could be done out >>>>>>>>of xen_pcibk_xenbus_remove(). We first do a (best effort) device reset >>>>>>>>and then do the extra things that are not properly done there. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> No. It cannot be done in xen_pcibk_xenbus_remove() without modifying >>>>>>> the handler of PHYSDEVOP_release_msix. To do a successful Xen internal >>>>>>> MSI-X state reset, PHYSDEVOP_{release, prepare}_msix should be finished >>>>>>> without error. But ATM, xen expects that no msi is bound to pirq when >>>>>>> doing PHYSDEVOP_release_msix. Otherwise it fails with error code -EBUSY. >>>>>>> However, the expectation isn't guaranteed in xen_pcibk_xenbus_remove(). >>>>>>> In some cases, if qemu fails to unmap MSIs, MSIs are unmapped by Xen >>>>>>> at last minute, which happens after device reset in >>>>>>> xen_pcibk_xenbus_remove(). >>>>>> >>>>>>But that may need taking care of: I don't think it is a good idea to have >>>>>>anything left from the prior owning domain when the device gets reset. >>>>>>I.e. left over IRQ bindings should perhaps be forcibly cleared before >>>>>>invoking the reset; >>>>> >>>>> Agree. How about pciback to track the established IRQ bindings? Then >>>>> pciback can clear irq binding before invoking the reset. >>>> >>>>How would pciback even know of those mappings, when it's qemu >>>>who establishes (and manages) them? >>> >>> I meant to expose some interfaces from pciback. And pciback serves >>> as the proxy of IRQ (un)binding APIs. >> >>If at all possible we should avoid having to change more parties (qemu, >>libxc, kernel, hypervisor) than really necessary. Remember that such >>a bug fix may want backporting, and making sure affected people have >>all relevant components updated is increasingly difficult with their >>number growing. >> >>>>>>in fact I'd expect this to happen in the course of >>>>>>domain destruction, and I'd expect the device reset to come after the >>>>>>domain was cleaned up. Perhaps simply an ordering issue in the tool >>>>>>stack? >>>>> >>>>> I don't think reversing the sequences of device reset and domain >>>>> destruction would be simple. Furthermore, during device hot-unplug, >>>>> device reset is done when the owner is alive. So if we use domain >>>>> destruction to enforce all irq binding cleared, in theory, it won't be >>>>> applicable to hot-unplug case (if qemu's hot-unplug logic is >>>>> compromised). >>>> >>>>Even in the hot-unplug case the tool stack could issue unbind >>>>requests, behind the back of the possibly compromised qemu, >>>>once neither the guest nor qemu have access to the device >>>>anymore. >>> >>> But currently, tool stack doesn't know the remaining IRQ bindings. >>> If tool stack can maintaine IRQ binding information of a pass-thru >>> device (stored in Xenstore?), we can come up with a clean solution >>> without modifying linux kernel and Xen. >> >>If there's no way for the tool stack to either find out the bindings >>or "blindly" issue unbind requests (accepting them to fail), then a >>"wildcard" unbind operation may want adding. Or, perhaps even >>better, XEN_DOMCTL_deassign_device could unbind anything left >>in place for the specified device. > >Good idea. I will take this advice. > >Thanks >Chao I am having the same issue, and cannot find a fix in either xen-pciback or the Xen codebase. Was a solution ever pushed as a result of this thread? Best, Stanislav Amazon Development Center Germany GmbH Krausenstr. 38 10117 Berlin Geschaeftsfuehrung: Christian Schlaeger, Ralf Herbrich Eingetragen am Amtsgericht Charlottenburg unter HRB 149173 B Sitz: Berlin Ust-ID: DE 289 237 879 _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
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