[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [RFC PATCH 4/5] tools: add xenfs tool
On 11.09.2019 13:34, Juergen Gross wrote: > On 11.09.19 12:07, Jan Beulich wrote: >> On 11.09.2019 11:57, Juergen Gross wrote: >>> On 11.09.19 11:30, Jan Beulich wrote: >>>> On 11.09.2019 08:20, Juergen Gross wrote: >>>>> --- a/tools/misc/Makefile >>>>> +++ b/tools/misc/Makefile >>>>> @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ INSTALL_SBIN-$(CONFIG_X86) += xen-lowmemd >>>>> INSTALL_SBIN-$(CONFIG_X86) += xen-mfndump >>>>> INSTALL_SBIN-$(CONFIG_X86) += xen-ucode >>>>> INSTALL_SBIN += xencov >>>>> +INSTALL_SBIN += xenfs >>>> >>>> Why SBIN? Is there anything wrong with allowing unprivileged >>>> users r/o access? Or is this because in order to access the >>>> hypercall interface one needs to be root? If so, we may want >>>> to consider relaxing/avoiding/bypassing this in some sensible >>>> way. >>> >>> Installing to bin is fine with me, but relaxing the root restriction >>> might be more difficult and/or questionable. >>> >>> I was thinking of "mounting" the xen-sysfs to either Xenstore or >>> the kernel's sysfs (probably the latter, as Xenstore in a stubdom >>> would need to enable access to xen-sysfs for that stubdom ,too). >>> >>> This would then enable accessing some or all entries from non-root. >> >> Right, going through the kernel's sysfs is what I too was >> considering (I don't think xenstore is appropriate for this). >> The main issue I'd see with this is the split brain permissions >> handling. I'd prefer for there to be just one party determining >> who is allowed to see what, but even if the hypervisor told the >> kernel, there would still be a dependency upon the kernel also >> respecting the request. While not much of a problem as long as >> all of this is Dom0-only, with DomU-s in mind this would need >> taking care of. > > Hmm, why? I think we agree that DomUs should get access only to either > global data (read-only) which doesn't do any harm, I guess opinions tend to differ here: There may well be people thinking that certain things shouldn't be seen by everyone. > or to data related > only to them (so per-domain data). Maybe driver-domains or device model > stubdoms would need access to data related to the domains they are > serving. > > Whether a domU lets a user access that data or not should only be > decided by the domU (applies to dom0, too). Like above, there may be different views here as well. Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
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