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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 1/2] xen: Drop XEN_DOMCTL_suppress_spurious_page_faults
On Tue, Aug 13, 2019 at 11:53:51AM +0100, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> This functionality is obsolete. It was introduced by c/s 39407bed9c0 into
> Xend, but never exposed in libxl.
>
> While not explicitly limited to PV guests, this is PV-only by virtue of its
> position in the pagefault handler.
>
> Looking though the XenServer templates, this was used to work around bugs in
> the 32bit RHEL/CentOS 4.{5..7} kernels (fixed in 4.8). RHEL 4 as a major
> version when out if support in 2017.
>
> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
Python part:
Acked-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Also, I confirm it isn't used in Qubes OS.
> ---
> CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>
> CC: Wei Liu <wl@xxxxxxx>
> CC: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>
> CC: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@xxxxxxxxxx>
> CC: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> CC: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h | 3 ---
> tools/libxc/xc_domain.c | 12 ------------
> tools/python/xen/lowlevel/xc/xc.c | 22 ----------------------
> xen/arch/x86/domctl.c | 4 ----
> xen/arch/x86/traps.c | 14 --------------
> xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h | 3 ---
> xen/include/public/domctl.h | 7 +------
> xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c | 1 -
> xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors | 3 +--
> 9 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h b/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h
> index 0ff6ed9e70..a36896034a 100644
> --- a/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h
> +++ b/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h
> @@ -1787,9 +1787,6 @@ int xc_domain_set_machine_address_size(xc_interface
> *xch,
> int xc_domain_get_machine_address_size(xc_interface *xch,
> uint32_t domid);
>
> -int xc_domain_suppress_spurious_page_faults(xc_interface *xch,
> - uint32_t domid);
> -
> /* Set the target domain */
> int xc_domain_set_target(xc_interface *xch,
> uint32_t domid,
> diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_domain.c b/tools/libxc/xc_domain.c
> index 05d771f2ce..64ca513aae 100644
> --- a/tools/libxc/xc_domain.c
> +++ b/tools/libxc/xc_domain.c
> @@ -2190,18 +2190,6 @@ int xc_domain_get_machine_address_size(xc_interface
> *xch, uint32_t domid)
> return rc == 0 ? domctl.u.address_size.size : rc;
> }
>
> -int xc_domain_suppress_spurious_page_faults(xc_interface *xc, uint32_t domid)
> -{
> - DECLARE_DOMCTL;
> -
> - memset(&domctl, 0, sizeof(domctl));
> - domctl.domain = domid;
> - domctl.cmd = XEN_DOMCTL_suppress_spurious_page_faults;
> -
> - return do_domctl(xc, &domctl);
> -
> -}
> -
> int xc_domain_debug_control(xc_interface *xc, uint32_t domid, uint32_t sop,
> uint32_t vcpu)
> {
> DECLARE_DOMCTL;
> diff --git a/tools/python/xen/lowlevel/xc/xc.c
> b/tools/python/xen/lowlevel/xc/xc.c
> index 188bfa34da..7e831a26a7 100644
> --- a/tools/python/xen/lowlevel/xc/xc.c
> +++ b/tools/python/xen/lowlevel/xc/xc.c
> @@ -786,22 +786,6 @@ static PyObject
> *pyxc_dom_set_machine_address_size(XcObject *self,
> Py_INCREF(zero);
> return zero;
> }
> -
> -static PyObject *pyxc_dom_suppress_spurious_page_faults(XcObject *self,
> - PyObject *args,
> - PyObject *kwds)
> -{
> - uint32_t dom;
> -
> - if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "i", &dom))
> - return NULL;
> -
> - if (xc_domain_suppress_spurious_page_faults(self->xc_handle, dom) != 0)
> - return pyxc_error_to_exception(self->xc_handle);
> -
> - Py_INCREF(zero);
> - return zero;
> -}
> #endif /* __i386__ || __x86_64__ */
>
> static PyObject *pyxc_gnttab_hvm_seed(XcObject *self,
> @@ -2436,12 +2420,6 @@ static PyMethodDef pyxc_methods[] = {
> "Set maximum machine address size for this domain.\n"
> " dom [int]: Identifier of domain.\n"
> " width [int]: Maximum machine address width.\n" },
> -
> - { "domain_suppress_spurious_page_faults",
> - (PyCFunction)pyxc_dom_suppress_spurious_page_faults,
> - METH_VARARGS, "\n"
> - "Do not propagate spurious page faults to this guest.\n"
> - " dom [int]: Identifier of domain.\n" },
> #endif
>
> { "dom_set_memshr",
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
> index 2d45e5b8a8..34a6f88b8a 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
> @@ -988,10 +988,6 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
> }
> break;
>
> - case XEN_DOMCTL_suppress_spurious_page_faults:
> - d->arch.suppress_spurious_page_faults = 1;
> - break;
> -
> #ifdef CONFIG_HVM
> case XEN_DOMCTL_debug_op:
> {
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
> index 23069e25ec..350903add5 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
> @@ -1452,20 +1452,6 @@ void do_page_fault(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
> error_code, _p(addr));
> }
>
> - if ( unlikely(current->domain->arch.suppress_spurious_page_faults) )
> - {
> - pf_type = spurious_page_fault(addr, regs);
> - if ( (pf_type == smep_fault) || (pf_type == smap_fault))
> - {
> - printk(XENLOG_G_ERR "%pv fatal SM%cP violation\n",
> - current, (pf_type == smep_fault) ? 'E' : 'A');
> -
> - domain_crash(current->domain);
> - }
> - if ( pf_type != real_fault )
> - return;
> - }
> -
> if ( unlikely(regs->error_code & PFEC_reserved_bit) )
> reserved_bit_page_fault(addr, regs);
>
> diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
> index 933b85901f..8523c3f5e0 100644
> --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
> +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
> @@ -339,9 +339,6 @@ struct arch_domain
> /* Is shared-info page in 32-bit format? */
> bool_t has_32bit_shinfo;
>
> - /* Domain cannot handle spurious page faults? */
> - bool_t suppress_spurious_page_faults;
> -
> /* Is PHYSDEVOP_eoi to automatically unmask the event channel? */
> bool_t auto_unmask;
>
> diff --git a/xen/include/public/domctl.h b/xen/include/public/domctl.h
> index 19486d5e32..726ce675e8 100644
> --- a/xen/include/public/domctl.h
> +++ b/xen/include/public/domctl.h
> @@ -698,11 +698,6 @@ struct xen_domctl_subscribe {
> /* XEN_DOMCTL_set_machine_address_size */
> /* XEN_DOMCTL_get_machine_address_size */
>
> -/*
> - * Do not inject spurious page faults into this domain.
> - */
> -/* XEN_DOMCTL_suppress_spurious_page_faults */
> -
> /* XEN_DOMCTL_debug_op */
> #define XEN_DOMCTL_DEBUG_OP_SINGLE_STEP_OFF 0
> #define XEN_DOMCTL_DEBUG_OP_SINGLE_STEP_ON 1
> @@ -1172,7 +1167,7 @@ struct xen_domctl {
> #define XEN_DOMCTL_get_device_group 50
> #define XEN_DOMCTL_set_machine_address_size 51
> #define XEN_DOMCTL_get_machine_address_size 52
> -#define XEN_DOMCTL_suppress_spurious_page_faults 53
> +/* #define XEN_DOMCTL_suppress_spurious_page_faults 53 - Obsolete */
> #define XEN_DOMCTL_debug_op 54
> #define XEN_DOMCTL_gethvmcontext_partial 55
> #define XEN_DOMCTL_vm_event_op 56
> diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
> index 791c1f66af..fd5ec992cf 100644
> --- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
> +++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
> @@ -712,7 +712,6 @@ static int flask_domctl(struct domain *d, int cmd)
>
> case XEN_DOMCTL_subscribe:
> case XEN_DOMCTL_disable_migrate:
> - case XEN_DOMCTL_suppress_spurious_page_faults:
> return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_DOMAIN, DOMAIN__SET_MISC_INFO);
>
> case XEN_DOMCTL_set_virq_handler:
> diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors
> b/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors
> index 194d743a71..c9ebd0f37e 100644
> --- a/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors
> +++ b/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors
> @@ -176,8 +176,7 @@ class domain
> getpodtarget
> # XENMEM_set_pod_target
> setpodtarget
> -# XEN_DOMCTL_subscribe, XEN_DOMCTL_disable_migrate,
> -# XEN_DOMCTL_suppress_spurious_page_faults
> +# XEN_DOMCTL_subscribe, XEN_DOMCTL_disable_migrate
> set_misc_info
> # XEN_DOMCTL_set_virq_handler
> set_virq_handler
--
Best Regards,
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
Invisible Things Lab
A: Because it messes up the order in which people normally read text.
Q: Why is top-posting such a bad thing?
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