[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v5] x86/xpti: Don't leak TSS-adjacent percpu data via Meltdown
On 12.08.2019 12:29, Andrew Cooper wrote: On 12/08/2019 08:23, Jan Beulich wrote:@@ -747,16 +747,10 @@ void load_system_tables(void) .bitmap = IOBMP_INVALID_OFFSET, };- _set_tssldt_desc(- gdt + TSS_ENTRY, - (unsigned long)tss, - offsetof(struct tss_struct, __cacheline_filler) - 1, - SYS_DESC_tss_avail); - _set_tssldt_desc( - compat_gdt + TSS_ENTRY, - (unsigned long)tss, - offsetof(struct tss_struct, __cacheline_filler) - 1, - SYS_DESC_tss_busy); + _set_tssldt_desc(gdt + TSS_ENTRY, (unsigned long)tss, + sizeof(*tss) - 1, SYS_DESC_tss_avail); + _set_tssldt_desc(compat_gdt + TSS_ENTRY, (unsigned long)tss, + sizeof(*tss) - 1, SYS_DESC_tss_busy);Do you think it is worth having a BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*tss) < 0x67), just to confirm that the load wont fault? Not sure - it feels like going a little overboard with checks. Feel free to add one though if you're really convinced it helps, but then please with 0x68 in place of 0x67. (I'm about to leave now, so if you want me to add anything and/or commit it, it would have to wait two weeks.) Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
|
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |