[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] Patch "x86, mm, gup: prevent get_page() race with munmap in paravirt guest" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86, mm, gup: prevent get_page() race with munmap in paravirt guest to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary The filename of the patch is: x86-mm-gup-prevent-get_page-race-with-munmap-in-paravirt-guest.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> know about it. From vbabka@xxxxxxx Mon Aug 5 13:56:29 2019 From: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@xxxxxxx> Date: Fri, 2 Aug 2019 18:06:14 +0200 Subject: x86, mm, gup: prevent get_page() race with munmap in paravirt guest To: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Cc: linux-kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, linux-mm@xxxxxxxxx, x86@xxxxxxxxxx, Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>, Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Oscar Salvador <osalvador@xxxxxxx>, Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@xxxxxxx>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx>, "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@xxxxxxxxxx>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx> Message-ID: <20190802160614.8089-1-vbabka@xxxxxxx> From: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@xxxxxxx> The x86 version of get_user_pages_fast() relies on disabled interrupts to synchronize gup_pte_range() between gup_get_pte(ptep); and get_page() against a parallel munmap. The munmap side nulls the pte, then flushes TLBs, then releases the page. As TLB flush is done synchronously via IPI disabling interrupts blocks the page release, and get_page(), which assumes existing reference on page, is thus safe. However when TLB flush is done by a hypercall, e.g. in a Xen PV guest, there is no blocking thanks to disabled interrupts, and get_page() can succeed on a page that was already freed or even reused. We have recently seen this happen with our 4.4 and 4.12 based kernels, with userspace (java) that exits a thread, where mm_release() performs a futex_wake() on tsk->clear_child_tid, and another thread in parallel unmaps the page where tsk->clear_child_tid points to. The spurious get_page() succeeds, but futex code immediately releases the page again, while it's already on a freelist. Symptoms include a bad page state warning, general protection faults acessing a poisoned list prev/next pointer in the freelist, or free page pcplists of two cpus joined together in a single list. Oscar has also reproduced this scenario, with a patch inserting delays before the get_page() to make the race window larger. Fix this by removing the dependency on TLB flush interrupts the same way as the generic get_user_pages_fast() code by using page_cache_add_speculative() and revalidating the PTE contents after pinning the page. Mainline is safe since 4.13 where the x86 gup code was removed in favor of the common code. Accessing the page table itself safely also relies on disabled interrupts and TLB flush IPIs that don't happen with hypercalls, which was acknowledged in commit 9e52fc2b50de ("x86/mm: Enable RCU based page table freeing (CONFIG_HAVE_RCU_TABLE_FREE=y)"). That commit with follups should also be backported for full safety, although our reproducer didn't hit a problem without that backport. Reproduced-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@xxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@xxxxxxx> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@xxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- --- arch/x86/mm/gup.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/mm/gup.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/gup.c @@ -98,6 +98,20 @@ static inline int pte_allows_gup(unsigne } /* + * Return the compund head page with ref appropriately incremented, + * or NULL if that failed. + */ +static inline struct page *try_get_compound_head(struct page *page, int refs) +{ + struct page *head = compound_head(page); + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(page_ref_count(head) < 0)) + return NULL; + if (unlikely(!page_cache_add_speculative(head, refs))) + return NULL; + return head; +} + +/* * The performance critical leaf functions are made noinline otherwise gcc * inlines everything into a single function which results in too much * register pressure. @@ -112,7 +126,7 @@ static noinline int gup_pte_range(pmd_t ptep = pte_offset_map(&pmd, addr); do { pte_t pte = gup_get_pte(ptep); - struct page *page; + struct page *head, *page; /* Similar to the PMD case, NUMA hinting must take slow path */ if (pte_protnone(pte)) { @@ -138,7 +152,21 @@ static noinline int gup_pte_range(pmd_t } VM_BUG_ON(!pfn_valid(pte_pfn(pte))); page = pte_page(pte); - get_page(page); + + head = try_get_compound_head(page, 1); + if (!head) { + put_dev_pagemap(pgmap); + pte_unmap(ptep); + return 0; + } + + if (unlikely(pte_val(pte) != pte_val(*ptep))) { + put_page(head); + put_dev_pagemap(pgmap); + pte_unmap(ptep); + return 0; + } + put_dev_pagemap(pgmap); SetPageReferenced(page); pages[*nr] = page; Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from vbabka@xxxxxxx are queue-4.9/x86-mm-gup-prevent-get_page-race-with-munmap-in-paravirt-guest.patch _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
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