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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] x86: Fix boot with CONFIG_XSM enabled following c/s 7177f589ba
- To: Xen-devel <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2019 13:12:44 +0100
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- Cc: Wei Liu <wl@xxxxxxx>, Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>, Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Delivery-date: Fri, 07 Jun 2019 12:12:57 +0000
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- List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>
- Openpgp: preference=signencrypt
On 07/06/2019 13:07, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> Currently, booting staging fails with:
>
> (XEN) Using APIC driver default
> (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.13-unstable x86_64 debug=y Not tainted ]----
> (XEN) CPU: 0
> (XEN) RIP: e008:[<ffff82d08038f66e>] __x86_indirect_thunk_rax+0xe/0x10
> (XEN) RFLAGS: 0000000000010016 CONTEXT: hypervisor
> (XEN) rax: c2c2c2c2c2c2c2c2 rbx: ffff83003f4cc000 rcx: 0000000000000000
> <snip>
> (XEN) Xen code around <ffff82d08038f66e>
> (__x86_indirect_thunk_rax+0xe/0x10):
> (XEN) ae e8 eb fb 48 89 04 24 <c3> 90 e8 05 00 00 00 0f ae e8 eb fb 48 89
> 0c 24
> (XEN) Xen stack trace from rsp=ffff82d080827d28:
> (XEN) c2c2c2c2c2c2c2c2 ffff82d080207588 ffff82d080827d68 0000000000000000
> <snip>
> (XEN) Xen call trace:
> (XEN) [<ffff82d08038f66e>] __x86_indirect_thunk_rax+0xe/0x10
> (XEN) [<ffff82d0806078a9>] setup_system_domains+0x18/0xab
> (XEN) [<ffff82d08062d9c8>] __start_xen+0x1ea9/0x2935
> (XEN) [<ffff82d0802000f3>] __high_start+0x53/0x55
> (XEN)
> (XEN) ****************************************
> (XEN) Panic on CPU 0:
> (XEN) GENERAL PROTECTION FAULT
> (XEN) [error_code=0000]
> (XEN) ****************************************
>
> UBSAN (which I happened to have active in my build at the time) identifies the
> problem explicitly:
>
> (XEN) Using APIC driver default
> (XEN)
> ================================================================================
> (XEN) UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in
> /local/xen.git/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h:309:19
> (XEN) member access within null pointer of type 'struct xsm_operations'
> (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.13-unstable x86_64 debug=y Not tainted ]----
>
> "adjust system domain creation (and call it earlier on x86)" didn't account
> for the fact that domain_create() depends on XSM already being set up. There
> is nothing very interesting which xsm_multiboot_init() more than allocating
> memory, which means it is safe to move earlier during boot.
Oh - perhaps it is worth pointing out that we end up following the NULL
function pointer xsm_ops->alloc_security_domain() and execute part of
the 16bit IVT until we end up with the retpoline explosion.
~Andrew
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