[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] Ping: [PATCH 0/4] x86: further L1TF / XSA-289 guards
>>> On 31.01.19 at 15:07, wrote: > This goes alongside Norbert's series, dealing with a few more > places where I happened to know (without any analysis tools) > guest controlled array accesses sit. I've additionally also > checked emul-i8254.c, and I think no adjustments are needed > there (there are a few possible overruns by one, but just like > is the case in patch 2 I don't think they are actual issues). > > 1: x86emul: avoid speculative out of bounds accesses There was a v2 of this sent separately. Jan > 2: x86/vMSI: avoid speculative out of bounds accesses > 3: x86/vPIC: avoid speculative out of bounds accesses > 4: x86/vLAPIC: avoid speculative out of bounds accesses > > Jürgen, I've copied you anyway, but I assume your general > Rab-until-RC3 would apply to this series (and perhaps to > further ones, should anyone find time) as much as to Norbert's. > > Jan > > _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
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