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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 1/4] x86: stop handling MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS save/restore in implementation code
Saving and restoring the value of this MSR is currently handled by
implementation-specific code despite it being architectural. This patch
moves handling of accesses to this MSR from hvm.c into the msr.c, thus
allowing the common MSR save/restore code to handle it.
NOTE: Because vmx_get/set_guest_bndcfgs() call vmx_vmcs_enter(), the
struct vcpu pointer passed in, and hence the vcpu pointer passed to
guest_rdmsr() cannot be const.
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@xxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@xxxxxxxxx>
---
Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: "Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@xxxxxxxxx>
v2:
- Addressed comments from Jan by largely removing hunks
- Keeping Kevin's R-b since remaining hunks in vmx.c are as before
---
xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 14 ++------------
xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c | 19 -------------------
xen/arch/x86/msr.c | 16 +++++++++++++++-
xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c | 2 +-
xen/include/asm-x86/msr.h | 2 +-
5 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
index 8adbb61b57..e566d83f8b 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
@@ -1303,6 +1303,7 @@ static int hvm_load_cpu_xsave_states(struct domain *d,
hvm_domain_context_t *h)
static const uint32_t msrs_to_send[] = {
MSR_SPEC_CTRL,
MSR_INTEL_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES,
+ MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS,
MSR_AMD64_DR0_ADDRESS_MASK,
MSR_AMD64_DR1_ADDRESS_MASK,
MSR_AMD64_DR2_ADDRESS_MASK,
@@ -1440,6 +1441,7 @@ static int hvm_load_cpu_msrs(struct domain *d,
hvm_domain_context_t *h)
case MSR_SPEC_CTRL:
case MSR_INTEL_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES:
+ case MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS:
case MSR_AMD64_DR0_ADDRESS_MASK:
case MSR_AMD64_DR1_ADDRESS_MASK ... MSR_AMD64_DR3_ADDRESS_MASK:
rc = guest_wrmsr(v, ctxt->msr[i].index, ctxt->msr[i].val);
@@ -3467,12 +3469,6 @@ int hvm_msr_read_intercept(unsigned int msr, uint64_t
*msr_content)
*msr_content = v->arch.hvm.msr_xss;
break;
- case MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS:
- if ( !d->arch.cpuid->feat.mpx ||
- !hvm_get_guest_bndcfgs(v, msr_content) )
- goto gp_fault;
- break;
-
case MSR_K8_ENABLE_C1E:
case MSR_AMD64_NB_CFG:
/*
@@ -3619,12 +3615,6 @@ int hvm_msr_write_intercept(unsigned int msr, uint64_t
msr_content,
v->arch.hvm.msr_xss = msr_content;
break;
- case MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS:
- if ( !d->arch.cpuid->feat.mpx ||
- !hvm_set_guest_bndcfgs(v, msr_content) )
- goto gp_fault;
- break;
-
case MSR_AMD64_NB_CFG:
/* ignore the write */
break;
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 725dd88c13..42232dbb37 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -805,17 +805,6 @@ static unsigned int __init vmx_init_msr(void)
static void vmx_save_msr(struct vcpu *v, struct hvm_msr *ctxt)
{
- vmx_vmcs_enter(v);
-
- if ( cpu_has_mpx && cpu_has_vmx_mpx )
- {
- __vmread(GUEST_BNDCFGS, &ctxt->msr[ctxt->count].val);
- if ( ctxt->msr[ctxt->count].val )
- ctxt->msr[ctxt->count++].index = MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS;
- }
-
- vmx_vmcs_exit(v);
-
if ( cpu_has_xsaves && cpu_has_vmx_xsaves )
{
ctxt->msr[ctxt->count].val = v->arch.hvm.msr_xss;
@@ -835,14 +824,6 @@ static int vmx_load_msr(struct vcpu *v, struct hvm_msr
*ctxt)
{
switch ( ctxt->msr[i].index )
{
- case MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS:
- if ( cpu_has_mpx && cpu_has_vmx_mpx &&
- is_canonical_address(ctxt->msr[i].val) &&
- !(ctxt->msr[i].val & IA32_BNDCFGS_RESERVED) )
- __vmwrite(GUEST_BNDCFGS, ctxt->msr[i].val);
- else if ( ctxt->msr[i].val )
- err = -ENXIO;
- break;
case MSR_IA32_XSS:
if ( cpu_has_xsaves && cpu_has_vmx_xsaves )
v->arch.hvm.msr_xss = ctxt->msr[i].val;
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/msr.c b/xen/arch/x86/msr.c
index 9bb38b6d66..3c24ee7ba3 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/msr.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/msr.c
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ int init_vcpu_msr_policy(struct vcpu *v)
return 0;
}
-int guest_rdmsr(const struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t *val)
+int guest_rdmsr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t *val)
{
const struct vcpu *curr = current;
const struct domain *d = v->domain;
@@ -158,6 +158,13 @@ int guest_rdmsr(const struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr,
uint64_t *val)
ret = guest_rdmsr_x2apic(v, msr, val);
break;
+ case MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS:
+ if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) || !cp->feat.mpx ||
+ !hvm_get_guest_bndcfgs(v, val) )
+ goto gp_fault;
+
+ break;
+
case 0x40000000 ... 0x400001ff:
if ( is_viridian_domain(d) )
{
@@ -319,6 +326,13 @@ int guest_wrmsr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t val)
ret = guest_wrmsr_x2apic(v, msr, val);
break;
+ case MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS:
+ if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) || !cp->feat.mpx ||
+ !hvm_set_guest_bndcfgs(v, val) )
+ goto gp_fault;
+
+ break;
+
case 0x40000000 ... 0x400001ff:
if ( is_viridian_domain(d) )
{
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c b/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c
index 3746e2ad54..0dcb7f726e 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c
@@ -819,7 +819,7 @@ static inline bool is_cpufreq_controller(const struct
domain *d)
static int read_msr(unsigned int reg, uint64_t *val,
struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
- const struct vcpu *curr = current;
+ struct vcpu *curr = current;
const struct domain *currd = curr->domain;
bool vpmu_msr = false;
int ret;
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr.h
index a7244793bf..c3107f8542 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr.h
@@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ int init_vcpu_msr_policy(struct vcpu *v);
* These functions are also used by the migration logic, so need to cope with
* being used outside of v's context.
*/
-int guest_rdmsr(const struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t *val);
+int guest_rdmsr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t *val);
int guest_wrmsr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t val);
#endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
--
2.20.1
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