[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v4 4/6] xen/x86: Allow stubdom access to irq created for msi.
On Thu, Feb 07, 2019 at 02:21:27PM +0100, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote: > On Thu, Feb 07, 2019 at 10:57:19AM +0100, Roger Pau Monné wrote: > > On Thu, Feb 07, 2019 at 01:07:47AM +0100, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote: > > > From: Simon Gaiser <simon@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > > > > > > Stubdomains need to be given sufficient privilege over the guest which it > > > provides emulation for in order for PCI passthrough to work correctly. > > > When a HVM domain try to enable MSI, QEMU in stubdomain calls > > > PHYSDEVOP_map_pirq, but later it needs to call XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq as > > > part of xc_domain_update_msi_irq. Allow for that as part of > > > PHYSDEVOP_map_pirq. > > > > > > This is not needed for PCI INTx, because IRQ in that case is known > > > beforehand and the stubdomain is given permissions over this IRQ by > > > libxl__device_pci_add (there's a do_pci_add against the stubdomain). > > > > > > Based on > > > https://github.com/OpenXT/xenclient-oe/blob/5e0e7304a5a3c75ef01240a1e3673665b2aaf05e/recipes-extended/xen/files/stubdomain-msi-irq-access.patch > > > by Eric Chanudet <chanudete@xxxxxxxxxxxx>. > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Simon Gaiser <simon@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > > > Signed-off-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki > > > <marmarek@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > > > --- > > > Changes in v3: > > > - extend commit message > > > Changes in v4: > > > - add missing destroy_irq on error path > > > > > > With this patch, stubdomain will be able to create and map multiple irq > > > (DoS possibility?), as only target domain is validated in practice. Is > > > that ok? If not, what additional limits could be applied here? > > > In INTx case the problem doesn't apply, because toolstack grant access > > > to particular IRQ and no allocation happen on stubdomain request. But in > > > MSI case, it isn't that easy as IRQ number isn't known before (as > > > explained in the commit message). > > > --- > > > xen/arch/x86/irq.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ > > > xen/arch/x86/physdev.c | 9 +++++++++ > > > 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+) > > > > > > diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/irq.c b/xen/arch/x86/irq.c > > > index 8b44d6c..5e5dcac 100644 > > > --- a/xen/arch/x86/irq.c > > > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/irq.c > > > @@ -2674,6 +2674,22 @@ int allocate_and_map_msi_pirq(struct domain *d, > > > int index, int *pirq_p, > > > { > > > case MAP_PIRQ_TYPE_MULTI_MSI: > > > irq = create_irq(NUMA_NO_NODE); > > > + if ( !(irq < nr_irqs_gsi || irq >= nr_irqs) && > > > + current->domain->target == d ) > > > + { > > > + ret = irq_permit_access(current->domain, irq); > > > + if ( ret ) { > > > + dprintk(XENLOG_G_ERR, > > > + "dom%d: can't grant it's stubdom (%d) access > > > to " > > > + "irq %d for msi: %d!\n", > > > + d->domain_id, > > > + current->domain->domain_id, > > > + irq, > > > + ret); > > > + destroy_irq(irq); > > > + return ret; > > > > I'm afraid his won't work for devices that support multiple MSI vectors. > > Note that map_domain_pirq also has a call to create_irq, and you are > > not adding the sutbdom permissions there. > > > > IMO, the safer way to fix this would be to modify create_irq and > > destroy_irq so that you give permissions to the subtdomain in the same > > place that hardware domain permissions are given. Note that you will > > have to change the function to take an extra domain parameter > > AFAICT. > > That may be a good idea, I'll try. Hmm, looking at the code, wouldn't it make sense to give device model domain access to the IRQ _instead of_ hardware domain? If stubdomain is in use, I don't see why dom0 would need access to that irq. Simply provide what the device model domain is as parameter - either hardware_domain, or stubdomain. Something like: create_irq(..., current->domain->target == d ? current->domain : hardware_domain); -- Best Regards, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki Invisible Things Lab A: Because it messes up the order in which people normally read text. Q: Why is top-posting such a bad thing? Attachment:
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