[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v5 4/9] spec: add l1tf-barrier
>>> On 06.02.19 at 14:02, <nmanthey@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On 2/5/19 15:43, Jan Beulich wrote: >>>>> On 05.02.19 at 15:23, <nmanthey@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>> On 1/31/19 17:35, Jan Beulich wrote: >>>>>>> On 29.01.19 at 15:43, <nmanthey@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>>> + /* >>>>> * We do not disable HT by default on affected hardware. >>>>> * >>>>> * Firstly, if the user intends to use exclusively PV, or HVM shadow >>>> Furthermore, as per the comment and logic here and below a >>>> !HVM configuration ought to be safe too, unless "pv-l1tf=" was >>>> used (in which case we defer to the admin anyway), so it's >>>> questionable whether the whole logic should be there in the >>>> first place in this case. This would then in particular keep all >>>> of this out for the PV shim. >>> For the PV shim, I could add pv-shim to my check before enabling the CPU >>> flag. >> But the PV shim is just a special case. I'd like this code to be >> compiled out for all !HVM configurations. > > The that introduces the evaluate_nospec macro does that already. Based > on defined(CONFIG_HVM) lfence patching is disabled there. Oh, right. > Do you want me to wrap this command line option into CONFIG_HVM checks > as well? That would be nice; I have a patch for post-4.12 where I do something similar to opt_xpti_*. Therefore if you didn't do it here, I'd probably submit a fixup patch down the road. Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
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