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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [PATCH 2/3] libx86: introduce a helper to deserialise msr_policy objects
From: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dyasli@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>
CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx>
CC: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>
CC: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dyasli@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
xen/include/xen/lib/x86/msr.h | 21 ++++++++++++++
xen/lib/x86/msr.c | 67 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 88 insertions(+)
diff --git a/xen/include/xen/lib/x86/msr.h b/xen/include/xen/lib/x86/msr.h
index e2cfbb1..6236622 100644
--- a/xen/include/xen/lib/x86/msr.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/lib/x86/msr.h
@@ -48,6 +48,27 @@ typedef xen_msr_entry_t msr_entry_buffer_t[];
int x86_msr_copy_to_buffer(const struct msr_policy *policy,
msr_entry_buffer_t msrs, uint32_t *nr_entries);
+/**
+ * Unserialise an msr_policy object from an array of msrs.
+ *
+ * @param policy The msr_policy object to unserialise into.
+ * @param msrs The array of msrs to unserialise from.
+ * @param nr_entries The number of entries in 'msrs'.
+ * @param err_msr Optional hint filled on error.
+ * @returns -errno
+ *
+ * Reads at most MSR_MAX_SERIALISED_ENTRIES. May fail for a number of reasons
+ * based on the content in an individual 'msrs' entry, including the MSR index
+ * not being valid in the policy, the flags field being nonzero, or if the
+ * value provided would truncate when stored in the policy. In such cases,
+ * the optional err_* pointer is filled in to aid diagnostics.
+ *
+ * No content validation is performed on the data stored in the policy object.
+ */
+int x86_msr_copy_from_buffer(struct msr_policy *policy,
+ const msr_entry_buffer_t msrs, uint32_t
nr_entries,
+ uint32_t *err_msr);
+
#endif /* !XEN_LIB_X86_MSR_H */
/*
diff --git a/xen/lib/x86/msr.c b/xen/lib/x86/msr.c
index 60fb567..e498124 100644
--- a/xen/lib/x86/msr.c
+++ b/xen/lib/x86/msr.c
@@ -47,6 +47,73 @@ int x86_msr_copy_to_buffer(const struct msr_policy *p,
return 0;
}
+int x86_msr_copy_from_buffer(struct msr_policy *p,
+ const msr_entry_buffer_t msrs, uint32_t
nr_entries,
+ uint32_t *err_msr)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ xen_msr_entry_t data;
+ int rc;
+
+ /*
+ * A well formed caller is expected pass an array with entries in order,
+ * and without any repetitions. However, due to per-vendor differences,
+ * and in the case of upgrade or levelled scenarios, we typically expect
+ * fewer than MAX entries to be passed.
+ *
+ * Detecting repeated entries is prohibitively complicated, so we don't
+ * bother. That said, one way or another if more than MAX entries are
+ * passed, something is wrong.
+ */
+ if ( nr_entries > MSR_MAX_SERIALISED_ENTRIES )
+ return -E2BIG;
+
+ for ( i = 0; i < nr_entries; i++ )
+ {
+ if ( copy_from_buffer_offset(&data, msrs, i, 1) )
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if ( data.flags ) /* .flags MBZ */
+ {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ switch ( data.idx )
+ {
+ /*
+ * Assign data.val to 'field', checking for truncation if the
+ * backing storage for 'field' is smaller than uint64_t
+ */
+#define ASSIGN(field) \
+({ \
+ if ( (typeof(field))data.val != data.val ) \
+ { \
+ rc = -EOVERFLOW; \
+ goto err; \
+ } \
+ field = data.val; \
+})
+
+ case MSR_INTEL_PLATFORM_INFO: ASSIGN(p->plaform_info.raw); break;
+
+#undef ASSIGN
+
+ default:
+ rc = -ERANGE;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+ err:
+ if ( err_msr )
+ *err_msr = data.idx;
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
/*
* Local variables:
* mode: C
--
2.1.4
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