[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] amd-iommu: remove page merging code
>>> On 27.11.18 at 15:20, <Paul.Durrant@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Jan Beulich [mailto:JBeulich@xxxxxxxx] >> Sent: 27 November 2018 13:07 >> To: Paul Durrant <Paul.Durrant@xxxxxxxxxx> >> Cc: Brian Woods <brian.woods@xxxxxxx>; Suravee Suthikulpanit >> <suravee.suthikulpanit@xxxxxxx>; xen-devel <xen- >> devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> >> Subject: Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] amd-iommu: remove page merging code >> >> >>> On 26.11.18 at 18:30, <paul.durrant@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> > The page merging logic makes use of bits 1-8 and bit 63 of a PTE, which >> used >> > to be specified as ignored. However, bits 5 and 6 are now specified as >> > 'accessed' and 'dirty' bits and their use only remains safe as long as >> > the DTE 'Host Access Dirty' bits remain clear. >> >> Upon second thought - is this actually true with the XSA-275 >> changes in place? As long as the domain is not running yet, >> how would A and/or D bits get set? > > Ok, I can amend the comment. The risk is, as I say, predicated on the bits > in the DTE anyway but the tables are wired into the DTE *before* being > populated so I don't think there is anything to stop h/w DMAing whilst they > are being constructed. This way of thinking recurs: When the tables get constructed, the domain doesn't run yet, or has no device assigned yet. In both cases I can't see who/what would initiate DMA. Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
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