[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2] viridian: fix assertion failure
Whilst attempting to crash an apparently wedged Windows domain using 'xen-hvmcrash' I managed to trigger the following ASSERT: (XEN) Assertion '!vp->ptr' failed at viridian.c:607 with stack: (XEN) [<ffff82d08032c55d>] viridian_map_guest_page+0x1b4/0x1b6 (XEN) [<ffff82d08032b1db>] viridian_synic_load_vcpu_ctxt+0x39/0x3b (XEN) [<ffff82d08032b90d>] viridian.c#viridian_load_vcpu_ctxt+0x93/0xcc (XEN) [<ffff82d0803096d6>] hvm_load+0x10e/0x19e (XEN) [<ffff82d080274c6d>] arch_do_domctl+0xb74/0x25b4 (XEN) [<ffff82d0802068ab>] do_domctl+0x16f7/0x19d8 This happened because viridian_map_guest_page() was not written to cope with being called multiple times, but this is unfortunately exactly what happens when xen-hvmcrash re-loads the domain context (having clobbered the values of RIP). This patch simply makes viridian_map_guest_page() return immediately if it finds the page already mapped (i.e. vp->ptr != NULL). Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@xxxxxxxxxx> --- Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx> Cc: "Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> v2: - Stop leaking page references --- xen/arch/x86/hvm/viridian/viridian.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/viridian/viridian.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/viridian/viridian.c index 7d73f41de6..c78b2918d9 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/viridian/viridian.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/viridian/viridian.c @@ -602,10 +602,12 @@ void viridian_map_guest_page(struct vcpu *v, struct viridian_page *vp) { struct domain *d = v->domain; unsigned long gmfn = vp->msr.fields.pfn; - struct page_info *page = get_page_from_gfn(d, gmfn, NULL, P2M_ALLOC); + struct page_info *page; - ASSERT(!vp->ptr); + if ( vp->ptr ) + return; + page = get_page_from_gfn(d, gmfn, NULL, P2M_ALLOC); if ( !page ) goto fail; -- 2.11.0 _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
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