[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] mm: fix LLVM code-generation issue
On Thu, Nov 22, 2018 at 04:22:34PM +0000, Andrew Cooper wrote: > On 22/11/2018 16:07, Roger Pau Monné wrote: > > On Thu, Nov 22, 2018 at 03:23:41PM +0000, Andrew Cooper wrote: > >> On 22/11/2018 15:20, Roger Pau Monné wrote: > >>> On Thu, Nov 22, 2018 at 02:03:55PM +0000, Julien Grall wrote: > >>>> Hi Jan, > >>>> > >>>> On 11/22/18 1:36 PM, Jan Beulich wrote: > >>>>>>>> On 22.11.18 at 14:31, <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > >>>>>> I think Julien's point is that without explicitly barriers, CPU0's > >>>>>> update to system_state may not be visible on CPU1, even though the > >>>>>> mappings have been shot down. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Therefore, from the processors point of view, it did everything > >>>>>> correctly, and hit a real pagefault. > >>>>> Boot time updates of system_state should be of no interest here, > >>>>> as at that time the APs are all idling. > >>>> That's probably true today. But this code looks rather fragile as you > >>>> don't > >>>> know how this is going to be used in the future. > >>>> > >>>> If you decide to gate init code with system_state, then you need a > >>>> barrier > >>>> to ensure the code is future proof. > >>> Wouldn't it be enough to declare system_state as volatile? > >> No. volatility (or lack thereof) is a compiler level construct. > >> > >> ARM has weaker cache coherency than x86, so a write which has completed > >> on one CPU0 in the past may legitimately not be visible on CPU1 yet. > >> > >> If you need guarantees about the visibility of updated, you must use > >> appropriate barriers. > > Right. There's some differences between ARM and x86, ARM sets > > SYS_STATE_active and continues to make use of init functions. In any > > case I have the following diff: > > > > diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/setup.c b/xen/arch/arm/setup.c > > index e83221ab79..cf50d05620 100644 > > --- a/xen/arch/arm/setup.c > > +++ b/xen/arch/arm/setup.c > > @@ -966,6 +966,7 @@ void __init start_xen(unsigned long boot_phys_offset, > > serial_endboot(); > > > > system_state = SYS_STATE_active; > > + smp_wmb(); > > > > create_domUs(); > > > > diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c > > index 9cbff22fb3..41044c0b6f 100644 > > --- a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c > > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c > > @@ -593,6 +593,7 @@ static void noinline init_done(void) > > unsigned long start, end; > > > > system_state = SYS_STATE_active; > > + smp_wmb(); > > > > domain_unpause_by_systemcontroller(dom0); > > > > > > I'm afraid that that won't do anything to help at all. > > smp_{wmb,rmb}() must be in matched pairs, and mb() must be matched with > itself. Then I'm not sure about whether our previous plan still stands, are we OK with using ACCESS_ONCE here and forgetting about the memory barriers given the current usage? If we have to add memory barriers I think I prefer to just make opt_bootscrub non-init. Roger. _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
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