[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] xen: remove size limit of privcmd-buf mapping interface
Ping? Jan's remark regarding de-privileged qemu is no issue as the hypercall node is being closed by the de-privilege library function. Juergen On 01/11/2018 13:33, Juergen Gross wrote: > Currently the size of hypercall buffers allocated via > /dev/xen/hypercall is limited to a default of 64 memory pages. For live > migration of guests this might be too small as the page dirty bitmask > needs to be sized according to the size of the guest. This means > migrating a 8GB sized guest is already exhausting the default buffer > size for the dirty bitmap. > > There is no sensible way to set a sane limit, so just remove it > completely. The device node's usage is limited to root anyway, so there > is no additional DOS scenario added by allowing unlimited buffers. > > While at it make the error path for the -ENOMEM case a little bit > cleaner by setting n_pages to the number of successfully allocated > pages instead of the target size. > > Fixes: c51b3c639e01f2 ("xen: add new hypercall buffer mapping device") > Cc: <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> #4.18 > Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx> > --- > drivers/xen/privcmd-buf.c | 22 ++++------------------ > 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/drivers/xen/privcmd-buf.c b/drivers/xen/privcmd-buf.c > index df1ed37c3269..de01a6d0059d 100644 > --- a/drivers/xen/privcmd-buf.c > +++ b/drivers/xen/privcmd-buf.c > @@ -21,15 +21,9 @@ > > MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); > > -static unsigned int limit = 64; > -module_param(limit, uint, 0644); > -MODULE_PARM_DESC(limit, "Maximum number of pages that may be allocated by " > - "the privcmd-buf device per open file"); > - > struct privcmd_buf_private { > struct mutex lock; > struct list_head list; > - unsigned int allocated; > }; > > struct privcmd_buf_vma_private { > @@ -60,13 +54,10 @@ static void privcmd_buf_vmapriv_free(struct > privcmd_buf_vma_private *vma_priv) > { > unsigned int i; > > - vma_priv->file_priv->allocated -= vma_priv->n_pages; > - > list_del(&vma_priv->list); > > for (i = 0; i < vma_priv->n_pages; i++) > - if (vma_priv->pages[i]) > - __free_page(vma_priv->pages[i]); > + __free_page(vma_priv->pages[i]); > > kfree(vma_priv); > } > @@ -146,8 +137,7 @@ static int privcmd_buf_mmap(struct file *file, struct > vm_area_struct *vma) > unsigned int i; > int ret = 0; > > - if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) || count > limit || > - file_priv->allocated + count > limit) > + if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)) > return -EINVAL; > > vma_priv = kzalloc(sizeof(*vma_priv) + count * sizeof(void *), > @@ -155,19 +145,15 @@ static int privcmd_buf_mmap(struct file *file, struct > vm_area_struct *vma) > if (!vma_priv) > return -ENOMEM; > > - vma_priv->n_pages = count; > - count = 0; > - for (i = 0; i < vma_priv->n_pages; i++) { > + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { > vma_priv->pages[i] = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO); > if (!vma_priv->pages[i]) > break; > - count++; > + vma_priv->n_pages++; > } > > mutex_lock(&file_priv->lock); > > - file_priv->allocated += count; > - > vma_priv->file_priv = file_priv; > vma_priv->users = 1; > > _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
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