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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [PATCH 4/4] x86/vvmx: Don't handle unknown nested vmexit reasons at L0
This is very dangerous from a security point of view, because a missing entry
will cause L2's action to be interpreted as L1's action.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
CC: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dyasli@xxxxxxxxxx>
CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>
CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx>
CC: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@xxxxxxxxx>
CC: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@xxxxxxxxx>
---
xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c
index d1c8a41..817d85f 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c
@@ -2609,8 +2609,9 @@ int nvmx_n2_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_user_regs *regs,
nvcpu->nv_vmexit_pending = 1;
break;
default:
- gprintk(XENLOG_ERR, "Unexpected nested vmexit: reason %u\n",
+ gprintk(XENLOG_ERR, "Unhandled nested vmexit: reason %u\n",
exit_reason);
+ domain_crash(v->domain);
}
return ( nvcpu->nv_vmexit_pending == 1 );
--
2.1.4
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