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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 11/14] x86: add iommu_op to enable modification of IOMMU mappings
>>> On 23.08.18 at 11:47, <paul.durrant@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> This patch adds an iommu_op which checks whether it is possible or
> safe for a domain to modify its own IOMMU mappings and, if so, creates
> a rangeset to track modifications.
Now this can surely grow pretty big?
> --- a/xen/common/iommu_op.c
> +++ b/xen/common/iommu_op.c
> @@ -78,6 +78,51 @@ static int iommu_op_query_reserved(struct
> xen_iommu_op_query_reserved *op)
> return 0;
> }
>
> +static int iommu_op_enable_modification(
> + struct xen_iommu_op_enable_modification *op)
> +{
> + struct domain *currd = current->domain;
> + struct domain_iommu *iommu = dom_iommu(currd);
> + const struct iommu_ops *ops = iommu->platform_ops;
> +
> + if ( op->cap || op->pad )
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + /*
> + * XEN_IOMMU_CAP_per_device_mappings is not supported yet so we can
> + * leave op->cap alone.
> + */
> +
> + /* Has modification already been enabled? */
> + if ( iommu->iommu_op_ranges )
> + return 0;
I don't recall there being any synchronization around the check
here until ...
> + /*
> + * The IOMMU mappings cannot be modified if:
> + * - the IOMMU is not enabled or,
> + * - the current domain is dom0 and tranlsation is disabled or,
> + * - HAP is enabled and the IOMMU shares the mappings.
> + */
> + if ( !iommu_enabled ||
> + (is_hardware_domain(currd) && iommu_passthrough) ||
> + iommu_use_hap_pt(currd) )
> + return -EACCES;
> +
> + /*
> + * The IOMMU implementation must provide the lookup method if
> + * modification of the mappings is to be supported.
> + */
> + if ( !ops->lookup_page )
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +
> + iommu->iommu_op_ranges = rangeset_new(currd, NULL, 0);
... the assignment here. In which case this is a (multi-vCPU) guest
controllable leak.
> --- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c
> +++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c
> @@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ static void iommu_dump_p2m_table(unsigned char key);
>
> unsigned int __read_mostly iommu_dev_iotlb_timeout = 1000;
> integer_param("iommu_dev_iotlb_timeout", iommu_dev_iotlb_timeout);
> -
> /*
> * The 'iommu' parameter enables the IOMMU. Optional comma separated
> * value may contain:
Stray change?
> --- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
> +++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
> @@ -1460,7 +1460,7 @@ static int assign_device(struct domain *d, u16 seg, u8
> bus, u8 devfn, u32 flag)
> }
>
> done:
> - if ( !has_arch_pdevs(d) && has_iommu_pt(d) )
> + if ( !has_arch_pdevs(d) && has_iommu_pt(d) && !hd->iommu_op_ranges )
> iommu_teardown(d);
> pcidevs_unlock();
>
> @@ -1510,7 +1510,7 @@ int deassign_device(struct domain *d, u16 seg, u8 bus,
> u8 devfn)
>
> pdev->fault.count = 0;
>
> - if ( !has_arch_pdevs(d) && has_iommu_pt(d) )
> + if ( !has_arch_pdevs(d) && has_iommu_pt(d) && !hd->iommu_op_ranges )
> iommu_teardown(d);
These additions are pretty un-obvious, and hence at least need
comments. But I'm also unclear about the intended behavior: For
a guest not meaning to play with its mappings, why would you
keep the tables around (and the memory uselessly allocated)?
> --- a/xen/include/public/iommu_op.h
> +++ b/xen/include/public/iommu_op.h
> @@ -61,6 +61,25 @@ struct xen_iommu_op_query_reserved {
> XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_iommu_reserved_range_t) ranges;
> };
>
> +/*
> + * XEN_IOMMUOP_enable_modification: Enable operations that modify IOMMU
> + * mappings.
> + */
> +#define XEN_IOMMUOP_enable_modification 2
> +
> +struct xen_iommu_op_enable_modification {
> + /*
> + * OUT - On successful return this is set to the bitwise OR of
> capabilities
> + * defined below. On entry this must be set to zero.
> + */
> + unsigned int cap;
> + unsigned int pad;
uint32_t
> --- a/xen/include/xlat.lst
> +++ b/xen/include/xlat.lst
> @@ -79,6 +79,7 @@
> ? vcpu_hvm_x86_64 hvm/hvm_vcpu.h
> ! iommu_op iommu_op.h
> ! iommu_op_buf iommu_op.h
> +! iommu_op_enable_modification iommu_op.h
The structure above looks to be 32-/64-bit agnostic. Why is this !
instead of ? ?
Jan
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