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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 25/34] x86/mm/shadow: make it build with !CONFIG_HVM
>>> On 17.08.18 at 17:12, <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> @@ -423,6 +426,10 @@ const struct x86_emulate_ops *shadow_init_emulation(
> ? sizeof(sh_ctxt->insn_buf) : 0;
>
> return &hvm_shadow_emulator_ops;
> +#else
> + BUG();
> + return NULL;
> +#endif
> }
The sole invocation of the function sits right _after_ an is_hvm_...()
conditional (which is odd enough, but presumably a result of the
history of the code). Leaving aside a couple of labels (the goto-s to
which are, I think, provable to be HVM-only as well), that is
preceded by a shadow_mode_refcounts() check (right at the
"emulate" label). I think shadow_mode_refcounts() wants to
become constant false for !HVM, at which point the is_hvm_...()
could even go away (but there's no strict need for this to happen
right away).
Bottom line - once again the entire function (not just its body) should
be put inside the #ifdef, and then of course the same for
shadow_continue_emulation().
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
> @@ -2926,18 +2926,25 @@ static int sh_page_fault(struct vcpu *v,
> }
> else
> {
> +#if CONFIG_HVM
> /* Magic MMIO marker: extract gfn for MMIO address */
> ASSERT(sh_l1e_is_mmio(sl1e));
> + ASSERT(is_hvm_vcpu(v));
> gpa = (((paddr_t)(gfn_x(sh_l1e_mmio_get_gfn(sl1e))))
> << PAGE_SHIFT)
> | (va & ~PAGE_MASK);
> + perfc_incr(shadow_fault_fast_mmio);
> + SHADOW_PRINTK("fast path mmio %#"PRIpaddr"\n", gpa);
> + sh_reset_early_unshadow(v);
> + trace_shadow_gen(TRC_SHADOW_FAST_MMIO, va);
> + return handle_mmio_with_translation(va, gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT,
> + access)
> + ? EXCRET_fault_fixed : 0;
> +#else
> + /* When HVM is not enabled, there shouldn't be MMIO marker */
> + BUG();
At the example of this, while I agree we shouldn't reach here for PV,
can this nevertheless be the less impactful domain_crash() please?
Jan
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