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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 12/13] x86/sysctl: Implement XEN_SYSCTL_get_cpu_policy


  • To: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>, Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dyasli@xxxxxxxxxx>
  • From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Tue, 17 Jul 2018 17:50:44 +0100
  • Autocrypt: addr=andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx; prefer-encrypt=mutual; keydata= xsFNBFLhNn8BEADVhE+Hb8i0GV6mihnnr/uiQQdPF8kUoFzCOPXkf7jQ5sLYeJa0cQi6Penp VtiFYznTairnVsN5J+ujSTIb+OlMSJUWV4opS7WVNnxHbFTPYZVQ3erv7NKc2iVizCRZ2Kxn srM1oPXWRic8BIAdYOKOloF2300SL/bIpeD+x7h3w9B/qez7nOin5NzkxgFoaUeIal12pXSR Q354FKFoy6Vh96gc4VRqte3jw8mPuJQpfws+Pb+swvSf/i1q1+1I4jsRQQh2m6OTADHIqg2E ofTYAEh7R5HfPx0EXoEDMdRjOeKn8+vvkAwhviWXTHlG3R1QkbE5M/oywnZ83udJmi+lxjJ5 YhQ5IzomvJ16H0Bq+TLyVLO/VRksp1VR9HxCzItLNCS8PdpYYz5TC204ViycobYU65WMpzWe LFAGn8jSS25XIpqv0Y9k87dLbctKKA14Ifw2kq5OIVu2FuX+3i446JOa2vpCI9GcjCzi3oHV e00bzYiHMIl0FICrNJU0Kjho8pdo0m2uxkn6SYEpogAy9pnatUlO+erL4LqFUO7GXSdBRbw5 gNt25XTLdSFuZtMxkY3tq8MFss5QnjhehCVPEpE6y9ZjI4XB8ad1G4oBHVGK5LMsvg22PfMJ ISWFSHoF/B5+lHkCKWkFxZ0gZn33ju5n6/FOdEx4B8cMJt+cWwARAQABzSlBbmRyZXcgQ29v cGVyIDxhbmRyZXcuY29vcGVyM0BjaXRyaXguY29tPsLBegQTAQgAJAIbAwULCQgHAwUVCgkI CwUWAgMBAAIeAQIXgAUCWKD95wIZAQAKCRBlw/kGpdefoHbdD/9AIoR3k6fKl+RFiFpyAhvO 59ttDFI7nIAnlYngev2XUR3acFElJATHSDO0ju+hqWqAb8kVijXLops0gOfqt3VPZq9cuHlh IMDquatGLzAadfFx2eQYIYT+FYuMoPZy/aTUazmJIDVxP7L383grjIkn+7tAv+qeDfE+txL4 SAm1UHNvmdfgL2/lcmL3xRh7sub3nJilM93RWX1Pe5LBSDXO45uzCGEdst6uSlzYR/MEr+5Z JQQ32JV64zwvf/aKaagSQSQMYNX9JFgfZ3TKWC1KJQbX5ssoX/5hNLqxMcZV3TN7kU8I3kjK mPec9+1nECOjjJSO/h4P0sBZyIUGfguwzhEeGf4sMCuSEM4xjCnwiBwftR17sr0spYcOpqET ZGcAmyYcNjy6CYadNCnfR40vhhWuCfNCBzWnUW0lFoo12wb0YnzoOLjvfD6OL3JjIUJNOmJy RCsJ5IA/Iz33RhSVRmROu+TztwuThClw63g7+hoyewv7BemKyuU6FTVhjjW+XUWmS/FzknSi dAG+insr0746cTPpSkGl3KAXeWDGJzve7/SBBfyznWCMGaf8E2P1oOdIZRxHgWj0zNr1+ooF /PzgLPiCI4OMUttTlEKChgbUTQ+5o0P080JojqfXwbPAyumbaYcQNiH1/xYbJdOFSiBv9rpt TQTBLzDKXok86M7BTQRS4TZ/ARAAkgqudHsp+hd82UVkvgnlqZjzz2vyrYfz7bkPtXaGb9H4 Rfo7mQsEQavEBdWWjbga6eMnDqtu+FC+qeTGYebToxEyp2lKDSoAsvt8w82tIlP/EbmRbDVn 7bhjBlfRcFjVYw8uVDPptT0TV47vpoCVkTwcyb6OltJrvg/QzV9f07DJswuda1JH3/qvYu0p vjPnYvCq4NsqY2XSdAJ02HrdYPFtNyPEntu1n1KK+gJrstjtw7KsZ4ygXYrsm/oCBiVW/OgU g/XIlGErkrxe4vQvJyVwg6YH653YTX5hLLUEL1NS4TCo47RP+wi6y+TnuAL36UtK/uFyEuPy wwrDVcC4cIFhYSfsO0BumEI65yu7a8aHbGfq2lW251UcoU48Z27ZUUZd2Dr6O/n8poQHbaTd 6bJJSjzGGHZVbRP9UQ3lkmkmc0+XCHmj5WhwNNYjgbbmML7y0fsJT5RgvefAIFfHBg7fTY/i kBEimoUsTEQz+N4hbKwo1hULfVxDJStE4sbPhjbsPCrlXf6W9CxSyQ0qmZ2bXsLQYRj2xqd1 bpA+1o1j2N4/au1R/uSiUFjewJdT/LX1EklKDcQwpk06Af/N7VZtSfEJeRV04unbsKVXWZAk uAJyDDKN99ziC0Wz5kcPyVD1HNf8bgaqGDzrv3TfYjwqayRFcMf7xJaL9xXedMcAEQEAAcLB XwQYAQgACQUCUuE2fwIbDAAKCRBlw/kGpdefoG4XEACD1Qf/er8EA7g23HMxYWd3FXHThrVQ HgiGdk5Yh632vjOm9L4sd/GCEACVQKjsu98e8o3ysitFlznEns5EAAXEbITrgKWXDDUWGYxd pnjj2u+GkVdsOAGk0kxczX6s+VRBhpbBI2PWnOsRJgU2n10PZ3mZD4Xu9kU2IXYmuW+e5KCA vTArRUdCrAtIa1k01sPipPPw6dfxx2e5asy21YOytzxuWFfJTGnVxZZSCyLUO83sh6OZhJkk b9rxL9wPmpN/t2IPaEKoAc0FTQZS36wAMOXkBh24PQ9gaLJvfPKpNzGD8XWR5HHF0NLIJhgg 4ZlEXQ2fVp3XrtocHqhu4UZR4koCijgB8sB7Tb0GCpwK+C4UePdFLfhKyRdSXuvY3AHJd4CP 4JzW0Bzq/WXY3XMOzUTYApGQpnUpdOmuQSfpV9MQO+/jo7r6yPbxT7CwRS5dcQPzUiuHLK9i nvjREdh84qycnx0/6dDroYhp0DFv4udxuAvt1h4wGwTPRQZerSm4xaYegEFusyhbZrI0U9tJ B8WrhBLXDiYlyJT6zOV2yZFuW47VrLsjYnHwn27hmxTC/7tvG3euCklmkn9Sl9IAKFu29RSo d5bD8kMSCYsTqtTfT6W4A3qHGvIDta3ptLYpIAOD2sY3GYq2nf3Bbzx81wZK14JdDDHUX2Rs 6+ahAA==
  • Cc: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Daniel de Graaf <dgdegra@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Xen-devel <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx>, Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>
  • Delivery-date: Tue, 17 Jul 2018 16:51:00 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>
  • Openpgp: preference=signencrypt

On 16/07/18 12:54, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>> On 13.07.18 at 22:03, <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> @@ -322,6 +323,76 @@ long arch_do_sysctl(
>>          break;
>>      }
>>  
>> +    case XEN_SYSCTL_get_cpu_policy:
>> +    {
>> +        const struct cpu_policy *policy;
>> +
>> +        /* Bad policy index? */
>> +        if ( sysctl->u.cpu_policy.index >= ARRAY_SIZE(system_policies) )
>> +        {
>> +            ret = -EINVAL;
>> +            break;
>> +        }
>> +        policy = &system_policies[
>> +            array_index_nospec(sysctl->u.cpu_policy.index,
>> +                               ARRAY_SIZE(system_policies))];
>> +
>> +        /* Request for maximum number of leaves/MSRs? */
>> +        if ( guest_handle_is_null(sysctl->u.cpu_policy.cpuid_policy) )
>> +        {
>> +            sysctl->u.cpu_policy.nr_leaves = CPUID_MAX_SERIALISED_LEAVES;
>> +            if ( __copy_field_to_guest(u_sysctl, sysctl,
>> +                                       u.cpu_policy.nr_leaves) )
>> +            {
>> +                ret = -EFAULT;
>> +                break;
>> +            }
> Could I talk you into avoiding the redundancy here and fold this
> copying with ...
>
>> +        }
>> +        if ( guest_handle_is_null(sysctl->u.cpu_policy.msr_policy) )
>> +        {
>> +            sysctl->u.cpu_policy.nr_msrs = MSR_MAX_SERIALISED_ENTRIES;
>> +            if ( __copy_field_to_guest(u_sysctl, sysctl,
>> +                                       u.cpu_policy.nr_msrs) )
>> +            {
>> +                ret = -EFAULT;
>> +                break;
>> +            }
>> +        }
>> +
>> +        /* Serialise the information the caller wants. */
>> +        if ( !guest_handle_is_null(sysctl->u.cpu_policy.cpuid_policy) )
>> +        {
>> +            if ( (ret = x86_cpuid_copy_to_buffer(
>> +                      policy->cpuid,
>> +                      sysctl->u.cpu_policy.cpuid_policy,
>> +                      &sysctl->u.cpu_policy.nr_leaves)) )
>> +                break;
>> +
>> +            if ( __copy_field_to_guest(u_sysctl, sysctl,
>> +                                       u.cpu_policy.nr_leaves)  )
>> +            {
>> +                ret = -EFAULT;
>> +                break;
>> +            }
> ... this (and the MSR ones respectively), by moving both out of and
> past their outer if()-s? This would the also call for two if/else-if pairs
> instead of four if()-s.

I

>
>> --- a/xen/include/public/sysctl.h
>> +++ b/xen/include/public/sysctl.h
>> @@ -1075,12 +1075,25 @@ struct xen_sysctl_set_parameter {
>>   *  - Default_*: Default set of features a PV or HVM guest can use.  This is
>>   *               the security supported set.
>>   */
>> +struct xen_sysctl_cpu_policy {
>>  #define XEN_SYSCTL_cpu_policy_raw          0
>>  #define XEN_SYSCTL_cpu_policy_host         1
>>  #define XEN_SYSCTL_cpu_policy_pv_max       2
>>  #define XEN_SYSCTL_cpu_policy_hvm_max      3
>>  #define XEN_SYSCTL_cpu_policy_pv_default   4
>>  #define XEN_SYSCTL_cpu_policy_hvm_default  5
>> +    uint32_t index;       /* IN: Which policy to query? */
>> +    uint32_t nr_leaves;   /* IN/OUT: Number of leaves in/written to
>> +                           * 'cpuid_policy', or the maximum number of leaves
>> +                           * if the guest handle is NULL. */
>> +    uint32_t nr_msrs;     /* IN/OUT: Number of MSRs in/written to
>> +                           * 'msr_policy', or the maximum number of MSRs if
>> +                           * the guest handle is NULL. */
>> +    XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_64(xen_cpuid_leaf_t) cpuid_policy; /* OUT: */
>> +    XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_64(xen_msr_entry_t) msr_policy;    /* OUT: */
> Stray colons in the comments?
>
> I'm also not overly happy to see there's still no explicit padding here.
> I know you dislike it, but I think as long as we have no better
> replacement to the interface versioning, we should at least try to
> limit the number of bumps it needs, and that calls for making padding
> explicit, zeroing it for output and checking it to be zero when input,
> so that the field can be assigned meaning subsequently. Otherwise
> why did we tell others to add explicit padding over the last so many
> years, without you voicing your opinion to the contrary?

I've never (knowingly) requested padding in the unstable interface. 
I've certainly requested rearrangements for better packing, and
requested padding for bits of the stable ABI.

The sysctl structure itself is full of holes, and this is not an
appropriate time or place to be making partial changes to the ABI.

~Andrew

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