[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] x86/XPTI: fix S3 resume (and CPU offlining in general)
>>> On 24.05.18 at 17:10, <simon@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > Jan Beulich: >>>>> On 24.05.18 at 16:14, <simon@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>> Jan Beulich: >>>>>>> On 24.05.18 at 16:00, <simon@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>>> Jan Beulich: >>>>>> In commit d1d6fc97d6 ("x86/xpti: really hide almost all of Xen image") >>>>>> I've failed to remember the fact that multiple CPUs share a stub >>>>>> mapping page. Therefore it is wrong to unconditionally zap the mapping >>>>>> when bringing down a CPU; it may only be unmapped when no other online >>>>>> CPU uses that same page. >>>>>> >>>>>> Reported-by: Simon Gaiser <simon@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> >>>>>> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> >>>>>> >>>>>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c >>>>>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c >>>>>> @@ -876,7 +876,21 @@ static void cleanup_cpu_root_pgt(unsigne >>>>>> >>>>>> free_xen_pagetable(rpt); >>>>>> >>>>>> - /* Also zap the stub mapping for this CPU. */ >>>>>> + /* >>>>>> + * Also zap the stub mapping for this CPU, if no other online one >>>>>> uses >>>>>> + * the same page. >>>>>> + */ >>>>>> + if ( stub_linear ) >>>>>> + { >>>>>> + unsigned int other; >>>>>> + >>>>>> + for_each_online_cpu(other) >>>>>> + if ( !((per_cpu(stubs.addr, other) ^ stub_linear) >> >>>>>> PAGE_SHIFT) > ) >>>>>> + { >>>>>> + stub_linear = 0; >>>>>> + break; >>>>>> + } >>>>>> + } >>>>>> if ( stub_linear ) >>>>>> { >>>>>> l3_pgentry_t *l3t = l4e_to_l3e(common_pgt); >>>>> >>>>> Tried this on-top of staging (fc5805daef) and I still get the same >>>>> double fault. >>>> >>>> Hmm, it worked for me offlining (and later re-onlining) several pCPU-s. >>>> What >>>> size a system are you testing on? Mine has got only 12 CPUs, i.e. all stubs >>>> are in the same page (and I'd never unmap anything here at all). >>> >>> 4 cores + HT, so 8 CPUs from Xen's PoV. >> >> May I ask you to do two things: >> 1) confirm that you can offline CPUs successfully using xen-hptool, >> 2) add a printk() to the code above making clear whether/when any >> of the mappings actually get zapped? > > There seem to be two failure modes now. It seems that both can be > triggered either by offlining a cpu or by suspend. Using cpu offlining > below since during suspend I often loose part of the serial output. > > Failure mode 1, the double fault as before: > > root@localhost:~# xen-hptool cpu-offline 3 > Prepare to offline CPU 3 > (XEN) Broke affinity for irq 9 > (XEN) Broke affinity for irq 29 > (XEN) dbg: stub_linear't1 = 18446606431818858880 > (XEN) dbg: first stub_linear if > (XEN) dbg: stub_linear't2 = 18446606431818858880 > (XEN) dbg: second stub_linear if > CPU 3 offlined successfully > root@localhost:~# (XEN) *** DOUBLE FAULT *** > (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.11-rc x86_64 debug=y Not tainted ]---- > (XEN) CPU: 0 > (XEN) RIP: e008:[<ffff82d08037b964>] handle_exception+0x9c/0xff > (XEN) RFLAGS: 0000000000010006 CONTEXT: hypervisor > (XEN) rax: ffffc90040cdc0a8 rbx: 0000000000000000 rcx: 0000000000000006 > (XEN) rdx: 0000000000000000 rsi: 0000000000000000 rdi: 0000000000000000 > (XEN) rbp: 000036ffbf323f37 rsp: ffffc90040cdc000 r8: 0000000000000000 > (XEN) r9: 0000000000000000 r10: 0000000000000000 r11: 0000000000000000 > (XEN) r12: 0000000000000000 r13: 0000000000000000 r14: ffffc90040cdffff > (XEN) r15: 0000000000000000 cr0: 000000008005003b cr4: 0000000000042660 > (XEN) cr3: 0000000128109000 cr2: ffffc90040cdbff8 > (XEN) fsb: 00007fc01c3c6dc0 gsb: ffff88021e700000 gss: 0000000000000000 > (XEN) ds: 002b es: 002b fs: 0000 gs: 0000 ss: e010 cs: e008 > (XEN) Xen code around <ffff82d08037b964> (handle_exception+0x9c/0xff): > (XEN) 00 f3 90 0f ae e8 eb f9 <e8> 07 00 00 00 f3 90 0f ae e8 eb f9 83 e9 01 > 75 > (XEN) Current stack base ffffc90040cd8000 differs from expected > ffff8300cec88000 > (XEN) Valid stack range: ffffc90040cde000-ffffc90040ce0000, > sp=ffffc90040cdc000, tss.rsp0=ffff8300cec8ffa0 > (XEN) No stack overflow detected. Skipping stack trace. > (XEN) > (XEN) **************************************** > (XEN) Panic on CPU 0: > (XEN) DOUBLE FAULT -- system shutdown > (XEN) **************************************** > (XEN) > (XEN) Reboot in five seconds... Oh, so CPU 0 gets screwed by offlining CPU 3. How about this alternative (but so far untested) patch: --- unstable.orig/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c +++ unstable/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c @@ -874,7 +874,7 @@ static void cleanup_cpu_root_pgt(unsigne l2_pgentry_t *l2t = l3e_to_l2e(l3t[l3_table_offset(stub_linear)]); l1_pgentry_t *l1t = l2e_to_l1e(l2t[l2_table_offset(stub_linear)]); - l1t[l2_table_offset(stub_linear)] = l1e_empty(); + l1t[l1_table_offset(stub_linear)] = l1e_empty(); } } Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
|
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |