[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [Bug 198497] handle_mm_fault / xen_pmd_val / radix_tree_lookup_slot Null pointer
On 20/04/18 17:20, Jason Andryuk wrote: > Adding xen-devel and the Linux Xen maintainers. > > Summary: Some Xen users (and maybe others) are hitting a BUG in > __radix_tree_lookup() under do_swap_page() - example backtrace is > provided at the end. Matthew Wilcox provided a band-aid patch that > prints errors like the following instead of triggering the bug. > > Skylake 32bit PAE Dom0: > Bad swp_entry: 80000000 > mm/swap_state.c:683: bad pte d3a39f1c(8000000400000000) > > Ivy Bridge 32bit PAE Dom0: > Bad swp_entry: 40000000 > mm/swap_state.c:683: bad pte d3a05f1c(8000000200000000) > > Other 32bit DomU: > Bad swp_entry: 4000000 > mm/swap_state.c:683: bad pte e2187f30(8000000200000000) > > Other 32bit: > Bad swp_entry: 2000000 > mm/swap_state.c:683: bad pte ef3a3f38(8000000100000000) > > The Linux bugzilla has more info > https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198497 > > This may not be exclusive to Xen Linux, but most of the reports are on > Xen. Matthew wonders if Xen might be stepping on the upper bits of a > pte. > > On Fri, Apr 20, 2018 at 9:39 AM, Matthew Wilcox <willy@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> On Fri, Apr 20, 2018 at 09:10:11AM -0400, Jason Andryuk wrote: >>>> Given that this is happening on Xen, I wonder if Xen is using some of the >>>> bits in the page table for its own purposes. >>> >>> The backtraces include do_swap_page(). While I have a swap partition >>> configured, I don't think it's being used. Are we somehow >>> misidentifying the page as a swap page? I'm not familiar with the >>> code, but is there an easy way to query global swap usage? That way >>> we can see if the check for a swap page is bogus. >>> >>> My system works with the band-aid patch. When that patch sets page = >>> NULL, does that mean userspace is just going to get a zero-ed page? >>> Userspace still works AFAICT, which makes me think it is a >>> mis-identified page to start with. >> >> Here's how this code works. > > Thanks for the description. > >> When we swap out an anonymous page (a page which is not backed by a >> file; could be from a MAP_PRIVATE mapping, could be brk()), we write it >> to the swap cache. In order to be able to find it again, we store a >> cookie (called a swp_entry_t) in the process' page table (marked with >> the 'present' bit clear, so the CPU will fault on it). When we get a >> fault, we look up the cookie in a radix tree and bring that page back >> in from swap. >> >> If there's no page found in the radix tree, we put a freshly zeroed >> page into the process's address space. That's because we won't find >> a page in the swap cache's radix tree for the first time we fault. >> It's not an indication of a bug if there's no page to be found. > > Is "no page found" the case for a lazy, un-allocated MAP_ANONYMOUS page? > >> What we're seeing for this bug is page table entries of the format >> 0x8000'0004'0000'0000. That would be a zeroed entry, except for the >> fact that something's stepped on the upper bits. > > Does a totally zero-ed entry correspond to an un-allocated MAP_ANONYMOUS page? > >> What is worrying is that potentially Xen might be stepping on the upper >> bits of either a present entry (leading to the process loading a page >> that belongs to someone else) or an entry which has been swapped out, >> leading to the process getting a zeroed page when it should be getting >> its page back from swap. > > There was at least one report of non-Xen 32bit being affected. There > was no backtrace, so it could be something else. One report doesn't > have any swap configured. > >> Defending against this kind of corruption would take adding a parity >> bit to the page tables. That's not a project I have time for right now. > > Understood. Thanks for the response. > > Regards, > Jason > > > [ 2234.939079] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at > 00000008 > [ 2234.942154] IP: __radix_tree_lookup+0xe/0xa0 > [ 2234.945176] *pdpt = 0000000008cd5027 *pde = 0000000000000000 > [ 2234.948382] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP > [ 2234.951410] Modules linked in: hp_wmi sparse_keymap rfkill wmi_bmof > pcspkr i915 wmi hp_accel lis3lv02d input_polldev drm_kms_helper > syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops drm hp_wireless > i2c_algo_bit hid_multitouch sha256_generic xen_netfront v4v(O) psmouse > ecb xts hid_generic xhci_pci xhci_hcd ohci_pci ohci_hcd uhci_hcd > ehci_pci ehci_hcd usbhid hid tpm_tis tpm_tis_core tpm > [ 2234.960816] CPU: 1 PID: 2338 Comm: xenvm Tainted: G O 4.14.18 > #1 > [ 2234.963991] Hardware name: Hewlett-Packard HP EliteBook Folio > 9470m/18DF, BIOS 68IBD Ver. F.40 02/01/2013 > [ 2234.967186] task: d4370980 task.stack: cf8e8000 > [ 2234.970351] EIP: __radix_tree_lookup+0xe/0xa0 > [ 2234.973520] EFLAGS: 00010286 CPU: 1 > [ 2234.976699] EAX: 00000004 EBX: b5900000 ECX: 00000000 EDX: 00000000 > [ 2234.979887] ESI: 00000000 EDI: 00000004 EBP: cf8e9dd0 ESP: cf8e9dc0 > [ 2234.983081] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0069 > [ 2234.986233] CR0: 80050033 CR2: 00000008 CR3: 08f12000 CR4: 00042660 > [ 2234.989340] Call Trace: > [ 2234.992354] radix_tree_lookup_slot+0x1d/0x50 > [ 2234.995341] ? xen_irq_disable_direct+0xc/0xc > [ 2234.998288] find_get_entry+0x1d/0x110 > [ 2235.001140] pagecache_get_page+0x1f/0x240 > [ 2235.003948] ? xen_flush_tlb_others+0x17b/0x260 > [ 2235.006784] lookup_swap_cache+0x32/0xe0 > [ 2235.009632] swap_readahead_detect+0x67/0x2c0 > [ 2235.012447] do_swap_page+0x10a/0x750 > [ 2235.015270] ? wp_page_copy+0x2c4/0x590 > [ 2235.018043] ? xen_pmd_val+0x11/0x20 > [ 2235.020729] handle_mm_fault+0x3f8/0x970 > [ 2235.023352] ? xen_smp_send_reschedule+0xa/0x10 > [ 2235.025927] ? resched_curr+0x68/0xc0 > [ 2235.028444] __do_page_fault+0x1a7/0x480 > [ 2235.030883] do_page_fault+0x33/0x110 > [ 2235.033250] ? do_fast_syscall_32+0xb3/0x200 > [ 2235.035567] ? vmalloc_sync_all+0x290/0x290 > [ 2235.037828] common_exception+0x84/0x8a > [ 2235.040011] EIP: 0xb7c8ddea > [ 2235.042111] EFLAGS: 00010202 CPU: 1 > [ 2235.044153] EAX: b7dd38d0 EBX: b7dd2780 ECX: b7dd2000 EDX: b5900010 > [ 2235.046176] ESI: 00000000 EDI: b7dd38f0 EBP: b56ff124 ESP: b56ff070 > [ 2235.048152] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0033 SS: 007b > [ 2235.050053] Code: 42 14 29 c6 89 f0 c1 f8 02 e9 71 ff ff ff e8 aa > 81 aa ff 8d 76 00 8d bc 27 00 00 00 00 55 89 e5 57 89 c7 56 53 83 ec > 04 89 4d f0 <8b> 5f 04 89 d8 83 e0 03 83 f8 01 75 67 89 d8 83 e0 fe 0f > b6 08 > [ 2235.053998] EIP: __radix_tree_lookup+0xe/0xa0 SS:ESP: 0069:cf8e9dc0 > [ 2235.055895] CR2: 0000000000000008 > Could it be we just have a race regarding pte_clear()? This will set the low part of the pte to zero first and then the hight part. In case pte_clear() is used in interrupt mode especially Xen will be rather slow as it emulates the two writes to the page table resulting in a larger window where the race might happen. Juergen _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
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