|
[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 2/5] x86/msr: add VMX MSRs into HVM_max domain policy
Currently, when nested virt is enabled, the set of L1 VMX features
is fixed and calculated by nvmx_msr_read_intercept() as an intersection
between the full set of Xen's supported L1 VMX features, the set of
actual H/W features and, for MSR_IA32_VMX_EPT_VPID_CAP, the set of
features that Xen uses.
Add calculate_hvm_max_vmx_policy() which will save the end result of
nvmx_msr_read_intercept() on current H/W into HVM_max domain policy.
There will be no functional change to what L1 sees in VMX MSRs. But the
actual use of HVM_max domain policy will happen later, when VMX MSRs
are handled by guest_rd/wrmsr().
Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dyasli@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
v5 --> v6:
- Replaced !cpu_has_vmx check with !hvm_max_cpuid_policy.basic.vmx
- Added a TODO reminder
- Added brackets around bit or expressions
---
xen/arch/x86/msr.c | 135 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 135 insertions(+)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/msr.c b/xen/arch/x86/msr.c
index 87239e151e..01a5b52f95 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/msr.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/msr.c
@@ -106,6 +106,139 @@ static void __init calculate_host_policy(void)
dp->plaform_info.cpuid_faulting = cpu_has_cpuid_faulting;
}
+static void vmx_clear_policy(struct msr_domain_policy *dp)
+{
+ memset(dp->vmx.raw, 0, sizeof(dp->vmx.raw));
+ dp->vmx_procbased_ctls2.raw = 0;
+ dp->vmx_ept_vpid_cap.raw = 0;
+ memset(dp->vmx_true_ctls.raw, 0, sizeof(dp->vmx_true_ctls.raw));
+ dp->vmx_vmfunc.raw = 0;
+}
+
+static void __init calculate_hvm_max_vmx_policy(struct msr_domain_policy *dp)
+{
+ const struct msr_domain_policy *hp = &host_msr_domain_policy;
+ uint32_t supported;
+
+ if ( !hvm_max_cpuid_policy.basic.vmx )
+ return;
+
+ vmx_clear_policy(dp);
+
+ /* TODO: actually make vmx features selection sane */
+ dp->vmx.basic.raw = hp->vmx.basic.raw;
+
+ dp->vmx.pinbased_ctls.allowed_0.raw = VMX_PINBASED_CTLS_DEFAULT1;
+ dp->vmx.pinbased_ctls.allowed_1.raw = VMX_PINBASED_CTLS_DEFAULT1;
+ supported = (PIN_BASED_EXT_INTR_MASK |
+ PIN_BASED_NMI_EXITING |
+ PIN_BASED_PREEMPT_TIMER);
+ dp->vmx.pinbased_ctls.allowed_1.raw |= supported;
+ dp->vmx.pinbased_ctls.allowed_1.raw &= hp->vmx.pinbased_ctls.allowed_1.raw;
+
+ dp->vmx.procbased_ctls.allowed_0.raw = VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS_DEFAULT1;
+ dp->vmx.procbased_ctls.allowed_1.raw = VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS_DEFAULT1;
+ supported = (CPU_BASED_HLT_EXITING |
+ CPU_BASED_VIRTUAL_INTR_PENDING |
+ CPU_BASED_CR8_LOAD_EXITING |
+ CPU_BASED_CR8_STORE_EXITING |
+ CPU_BASED_INVLPG_EXITING |
+ CPU_BASED_MONITOR_EXITING |
+ CPU_BASED_MWAIT_EXITING |
+ CPU_BASED_MOV_DR_EXITING |
+ CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_IO_BITMAP |
+ CPU_BASED_USE_TSC_OFFSETING |
+ CPU_BASED_UNCOND_IO_EXITING |
+ CPU_BASED_RDTSC_EXITING |
+ CPU_BASED_MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG |
+ CPU_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMI_PENDING |
+ CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_MSR_BITMAP |
+ CPU_BASED_PAUSE_EXITING |
+ CPU_BASED_RDPMC_EXITING |
+ CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW |
+ CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS);
+ dp->vmx.procbased_ctls.allowed_1.raw |= supported;
+ dp->vmx.procbased_ctls.allowed_1.raw &=
+ hp->vmx.procbased_ctls.allowed_1.raw;
+
+ dp->vmx.exit_ctls.allowed_0.raw = VMX_EXIT_CTLS_DEFAULT1;
+ dp->vmx.exit_ctls.allowed_1.raw = VMX_EXIT_CTLS_DEFAULT1;
+ supported = (VM_EXIT_ACK_INTR_ON_EXIT |
+ VM_EXIT_IA32E_MODE |
+ VM_EXIT_SAVE_PREEMPT_TIMER |
+ VM_EXIT_SAVE_GUEST_PAT |
+ VM_EXIT_LOAD_HOST_PAT |
+ VM_EXIT_SAVE_GUEST_EFER |
+ VM_EXIT_LOAD_HOST_EFER |
+ VM_EXIT_LOAD_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL);
+ dp->vmx.exit_ctls.allowed_1.raw |= supported;
+ dp->vmx.exit_ctls.allowed_1.raw &= hp->vmx.exit_ctls.allowed_1.raw;
+
+ dp->vmx.entry_ctls.allowed_0.raw = VMX_ENTRY_CTLS_DEFAULT1;
+ dp->vmx.entry_ctls.allowed_1.raw = VMX_ENTRY_CTLS_DEFAULT1;
+ supported = (VM_ENTRY_LOAD_GUEST_PAT |
+ VM_ENTRY_LOAD_GUEST_EFER |
+ VM_ENTRY_LOAD_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL |
+ VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE);
+ dp->vmx.entry_ctls.allowed_1.raw |= supported;
+ dp->vmx.entry_ctls.allowed_1.raw &= hp->vmx.entry_ctls.allowed_1.raw;
+
+ dp->vmx.misc.raw = hp->vmx.misc.raw;
+ /* Do not support CR3-target feature now */
+ dp->vmx.misc.cr3_target = false;
+
+ /* PG, PE bits must be 1 in VMX operation */
+ dp->vmx.cr0_fixed0.allowed_0.pe = true;
+ dp->vmx.cr0_fixed0.allowed_0.pg = true;
+
+ /* allow 0-settings for all bits */
+ dp->vmx.cr0_fixed1.allowed_1.raw = 0xffffffff;
+
+ /* VMXE bit must be 1 in VMX operation */
+ dp->vmx.cr4_fixed0.allowed_0.vmxe = true;
+
+ /*
+ * Allowed CR4 bits will be updated during domain creation by
+ * hvm_cr4_guest_valid_bits()
+ */
+ dp->vmx.cr4_fixed1.allowed_1.raw = hp->vmx.cr4_fixed1.allowed_1.raw;
+
+ /* The max index of VVMCS encoding is 0x1f. */
+ dp->vmx.vmcs_enum.max_encoding = 0x1f;
+
+ if ( vmx_procbased_ctls2_available(dp) )
+ {
+ supported = (SECONDARY_EXEC_DESCRIPTOR_TABLE_EXITING |
+ SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES |
+ SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID |
+ SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST |
+ SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT);
+ dp->vmx_procbased_ctls2.allowed_1.raw |= supported;
+ dp->vmx_procbased_ctls2.allowed_1.raw &=
+ hp->vmx_procbased_ctls2.allowed_1.raw;
+ }
+
+ if ( vmx_ept_vpid_cap_available(dp) )
+ dp->vmx_ept_vpid_cap.raw = nept_get_ept_vpid_cap();
+
+ if ( vmx_true_ctls_available(dp) )
+ {
+ dp->vmx_true_ctls.pinbased.raw = dp->vmx.pinbased_ctls.raw;
+
+ dp->vmx_true_ctls.procbased.raw = dp->vmx.procbased_ctls.raw;
+ supported = (CPU_BASED_CR3_LOAD_EXITING |
+ CPU_BASED_CR3_STORE_EXITING);
+ dp->vmx_true_ctls.procbased.raw |= supported;
+ dp->vmx_true_ctls.procbased.raw &= hp->vmx_true_ctls.procbased.raw;
+
+ dp->vmx_true_ctls.exit.raw = dp->vmx.exit_ctls.raw;
+
+ dp->vmx_true_ctls.entry.raw = dp->vmx.entry_ctls.raw;
+ }
+
+ /* MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC is N/A */
+}
+
static void __init calculate_hvm_max_policy(void)
{
struct msr_domain_policy *dp = &hvm_max_msr_domain_policy;
@@ -127,6 +260,8 @@ static void __init calculate_hvm_max_policy(void)
/* 0x00000140 MSR_INTEL_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES */
vp->misc_features_enables.available = dp->plaform_info.cpuid_faulting;
+
+ calculate_hvm_max_vmx_policy(dp);
}
static void __init calculate_pv_max_policy(void)
--
2.14.1
_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
|
 |
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |