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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v9 07/11] x86/boot: Calculate the most appropriate BTI mitigation to use
>>> On 18.01.18 at 16:46, <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> @@ -124,7 +186,21 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void)
> */
> if ( cpu_has_lfence_dispatch )
> thunk = THUNK_LFENCE;
> + /*
> + * On Intel hardware, we'd like to use retpoline in preference to
> + * IBRS, but only if it is safe on this hardware.
> + */
> + else if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB) )
> + {
> + if ( retpoline_safe() )
> + thunk = THUNK_RETPOLINE;
> + else
> + ibrs = true;
> + }
I think I had asked about this piece of code before, but maybe not
the same I'm noticing now: Why is using retpoline dependent upon
IBRSB? I.e. why not
else if ( retpoline_safe() )
thunk = THUNK_RETPOLINE;
else if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB) )
ibrs = true;
?
Jan
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