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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 1/2] x86/svm: Add SVME checking for SVM intercepts
On 12/21/2017 10:26 AM, Brian Woods wrote:
> Checks the hvm EFER.SVME bit to make sure the EFER.SVME bit it high
s/it/is
> before allowing nested SVM intercepts to be handled successfully. On
> SVME being low, it generates a #UD as per the AMD APM vol2 15.4.
>
> Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Brian Woods <brian.woods@xxxxxxx>
> ---
> xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
> index 2e62b9bb6d..2d0a82ae77 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
> @@ -2587,6 +2587,35 @@ void svm_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
> eventinj.fields.vector) )
> vmcb->eventinj = eventinj;
>
> + /*
> + * Making sure SVME is enabled see AMD APM vol2 section 15.4
> + * Nested Xen needs VMMCALL to boot. It hasn't set SVME by the time
> + * it uses it, therefore it isn't checked
> + */
> + switch ( exit_reason )
> + {
> + case VMEXIT_VMRUN:
> + case VMEXIT_VMLOAD:
> + case VMEXIT_VMSAVE:
> + case VMEXIT_CLGI:
> + case VMEXIT_INVLPGA:
> + if ( !(nestedhvm_enabled(v->domain) &&
> + nsvm_efer_svm_enabled(v)) )
I haven't checked all of them but at least for the first two
(svm_vmexit_do_vmrun() and smv_vmexit_do_vmload()) we check EFER and
print a similar error message. So it seems they can be handled in the
switch statement below.
-boris
> + {
> + gdprintk(XENLOG_ERR, "nestedhvm nested/SVME disabled, injecting
> #UD\n");
> + hvm_inject_hw_exception(TRAP_invalid_op, X86_EVENT_NO_EC);
> + goto out;
> + }
> + case VMEXIT_STGI:
> + case VMEXIT_SKINIT:
> + if ( !nestedhvm_enabled(v->domain) )
> + {
> + gdprintk(XENLOG_ERR, "nestedhvm nested disabled, injecting
> #UD\n");
> + hvm_inject_hw_exception(TRAP_invalid_op, X86_EVENT_NO_EC);
> + goto out;
> + }
> + }
> +
> switch ( exit_reason )
> {
> case VMEXIT_INTR:
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