[Xen-devel] [PATCH v3 14/17] SUPPORT.md: Add statement on PCI passthrough

[George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx>]

Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
Changes since v2:
- Separate PV and HVM passthrough (excluding PVH by implication)
- + not compatible with PoD
- 'will be' -> 'are'

NB that we don't seem to have the referenced file yet; left as a reference.

CC: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxx>
CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx>
CC: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
CC: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
CC: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>
CC: Konrad Wilk <konrad.wilk@xxxxxxxxxx>
CC: Tim Deegan <tim@xxxxxxx>
CC: Rich Persaud <persaur@xxxxxxxxx>
CC: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
CC: Christopher Clark <christopher.w.clark@xxxxxxxxx>
CC: James McKenzie <james.mckenzie@xxxxxxxxxxx>
---
 SUPPORT.md | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/SUPPORT.md b/SUPPORT.md
index 63f6a6d127..c8fec4daa8 100644
--- a/SUPPORT.md
+++ b/SUPPORT.md
@@ -486,9 +486,23 @@ but has no xl support.
 
 ## Security
 
+### Driver Domains
+
+    Status: Supported, with caveats
+
+"Driver domains" means allowing non-Domain 0 domains
+with access to physical devices to act as back-ends.
+
+See the appropriate "Device Passthrough" section
+for more information about security support.
+
 ### Device Model Stub Domains
 
-    Status: Supported
+    Status: Supported, with caveats
+
+Vulnerabilities of a device model stub domain
+to a hostile driver domain (either compromised or untrusted)
+are excluded from security support.
 
 ### KCONFIG Expert
 
@@ -559,6 +573,26 @@ Virtual Performance Management Unit for HVM guests
 Disabled by default (enable with hypervisor command line option).
 This feature is not security supported: see 
http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-163.html
 
+### x86/PCI Device Passthrough
+
+    Status, x86 PV: Supported, with caveats
+    Status, x86 HVM: Supported, with caveats
+
+Only systems using IOMMUs are supported.
+
+Not compatible with migration, populate-on-demand, altp2m,
+introspection, memory sharing, or memory paging.
+
+Because of hardware limitations
+(affecting any operating system or hypervisor),
+it is generally not safe to use this feature
+to expose a physical device to completely untrusted guests.
+However, this feature can still confer significant security benefit
+when used to remove drivers and backends from domain 0
+(i.e., Driver Domains).
+
+XXX See docs/PCI-IOMMU-bugs.txt for more information.
+
 ### ARM/Non-PCI device passthrough
 
     Status: Supported, not security supported
-- 
2.15.0


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