Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 14/16] SUPPORT.md: Add statement on PCI passthrough

[Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxxxxx>]

Hi George,

On 13/11/17 15:41, George Dunlap wrote:
> Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> CC: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxx>
> CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx>
> CC: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
> CC: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
> CC: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>
> CC: Konrad Wilk <konrad.wilk@xxxxxxxxxx>
> CC: Tim Deegan <tim@xxxxxxx>
> CC: Rich Persaud <persaur@xxxxxxxxx>
> CC: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> CC: Christopher Clark <christopher.w.clark@xxxxxxxxx>
> CC: James McKenzie <james.mckenzie@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
>   SUPPORT.md | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>   1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/SUPPORT.md b/SUPPORT.md
> index 3e352198ce..a8388f3dc5 100644
> --- a/SUPPORT.md
> +++ b/SUPPORT.md
> @@ -454,9 +454,23 @@ there is currently no xl support.
>   
>   ## Security
>   
> +### Driver Domains
> +
> +    Status: Supported, with caveats
> +
> +"Driver domains" means allowing non-Domain 0 domains
> +with access to physical devices to act as back-ends.
> +
> +See the appropriate "Device Passthrough" section
> +for more information about security support.
> +
>   ### Device Model Stub Domains
>   
> -    Status: Supported
> +    Status: Supported, with caveats
> +
> +Vulnerabilities of a device model stub domain
> +to a hostile driver domain (either compromised or untrusted)
> +are excluded from security support.
>   
>   ### KCONFIG Expert
>   
> @@ -522,6 +536,23 @@ Virtual Performance Management Unit for HVM guests
>   Disabled by default (enable with hypervisor command line option).
>   This feature is not security supported: see 
> http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-163.html
>   
> +### x86/PCI Device Passthrough
> +
> +    Status: Supported, with caveats
> +
> +Only systems using IOMMUs will be supported.
> +
> +Not compatible with migration, altp2m, introspection, memory sharing, or 
> memory paging.
> +
> +Because of hardware limitations
> +(affecting any operating system or hypervisor),
> +it is generally not safe to use this feature
> +to expose a physical device to completely untrusted guests.
> +However, this feature can still confer significant security benefit
> +when used to remove drivers and backends from domain 0
> +(i.e., Driver Domains).
> +See docs/PCI-IOMMU-bugs.txt for more information.
Where can I find this file? Is it in staging?

Cheers,

--
Julien Grall

_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel