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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 2/2] xentoolcore_restrict_all: Implement for libxenevtchn



On 10/16/2017 11:55 AM, Ian Jackson wrote:
Ross Lagerwall writes ("[PATCH v2 2/2] xentoolcore_restrict_all: Implement for 
libxenevtchn"):
Signed-off-by: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@xxxxxxxxxx>
...
  int osdep_evtchn_open(xenevtchn_handle *xce);
diff --git a/tools/libs/toolcore/include/xentoolcore.h 
b/tools/libs/toolcore/include/xentoolcore.h
index be6c570..ef9c670 100644
--- a/tools/libs/toolcore/include/xentoolcore.h
+++ b/tools/libs/toolcore/include/xentoolcore.h
@@ -31,11 +31,6 @@
   * Arranges that Xen library handles (fds etc.) which are currently held
   * by Xen libraries, can no longer be used other than to affect domid.
   *
- * Does not prevent effects that amount only to
- *   - denial of service, possibly host-wide, by resource exhaustion etc.
- *   - leak of not-very-interesting metainformation about other domains
- *     eg, specifically, event channel signals relating to other domains

Are we sure that all possible resource exhaustion attacks are now
excluded ?


No, I'm not sure. I'll keep the first point for now.

--
Ross Lagerwall

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