[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v7 01/12] x86/mm: allow a privileged PV domain to map guest mfns
> -----Original Message----- > From: Jan Beulich [mailto:JBeulich@xxxxxxxx] > Sent: 27 September 2017 13:47 > To: Paul Durrant <Paul.Durrant@xxxxxxxxxx> > Cc: Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>; xen- > devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > Subject: RE: [PATCH v7 01/12] x86/mm: allow a privileged PV domain to map > guest mfns > > >>> On 27.09.17 at 13:18, <Paul.Durrant@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > >> From: Jan Beulich [mailto:JBeulich@xxxxxxxx] > >> Sent: 25 September 2017 14:03 > >> >>> On 18.09.17 at 17:31, <paul.durrant@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > >> > - if ( (real_pg_owner == NULL) || (pg_owner == l1e_owner) || > >> > + if ( (real_pg_owner == NULL) || > >> > xsm_priv_mapping(XSM_TARGET, pg_owner, real_pg_owner) ) > >> > { > >> > gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, > >> > >> I'm concerned of the effect of the change on the code paths > >> which you're not really interested in: alloc_l1_table(), > >> ptwr_emulated_update(), and shadow_get_page_from_l1e() all > >> explicitly pass both domains identical, and are now suddenly able > >> to do things they weren't supposed to do. A similar concern > >> applies to __do_update_va_mapping() calling mod_l1_table(). > >> > >> I therefore wonder whether the solution to your problem > >> wouldn't rather be MMU_FOREIGN_PT_UPDATE (name subject > >> to improvement suggestions). This at the same time would > >> address my concern regarding the misleading DOMID_SELF > >> passing when really a foreign domain's page is meant. > > > > Looking at this I wonder whether a cleaner solution would be to introduce a > > new domid: DOMID_ANY. This meaning of this would be along the same > sort of > > lines as DOMID_XEN or DOMID_IO and would be used in mmu_update to > mean 'any > > page over which the caller has privilege'. Does that sound reasonable? > > Not really, no. Even if the caller has privilege over multiple domains, > it should still specify which one it means. Otherwise we may end up > with a page transferring ownership behind its back, and it doing > something to one domain which was meant to be done to another. > Ok, I'll claim the final cmd value then. Paul > Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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