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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] x86/HVM: correct repeat count update in linear->phys translation
>>> On 07.09.17 at 13:15, <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On 07/09/17 11:41, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> For the insn emulator's fallback logic in REP MOVS/STOS/INS/OUTS
>> handling to work correctly, *reps must not be set to zero when
>> returning X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
>
> Why is this? In the case that X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE is returned, the
> emulator appears to override nr_reps to 1.
Where did you see that? What we have is
if ( (nr_reps > 1 || rc == X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE) && ops->rep_ins )
rc = ops->rep_ins(port, dst.mem.seg, dst.mem.off, dst.bytes,
&nr_reps, ctxt);
if ( nr_reps >= 1 && rc == X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE )
{
fail_if(!ops->read_io || !ops->write);
if ( (rc = ops->read_io(port, dst.bytes, &dst.val, ctxt)) != 0 )
goto done;
nr_reps = 0;
}
>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c
>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c
>> @@ -566,15 +566,16 @@ static int hvmemul_linear_to_phys(
>> if ( pfec & (PFEC_page_paged | PFEC_page_shared) )
>> return X86EMUL_RETRY;
>> done /= bytes_per_rep;
>> - *reps = done;
>> if ( done == 0 )
>> {
>> ASSERT(!reverse);
>> if ( npfn != gfn_x(INVALID_GFN) )
>> return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
>> + *reps = 0;
>> x86_emul_pagefault(pfec, addr & PAGE_MASK,
> &hvmemul_ctxt->ctxt);
>
> Independently to the issue at hand, this looks suspicious for the
> reverse direction.
>
> Hardware will issue a walk for the first byte of access, and optionally
> a second at the start of the subsequent page for a straddled access.
> For the reverse case, this looks like it will truncate down to the start
> of the lower linear address, which I bet isn't how hardware actually
> behaves.
Good point. Since I've played with this just now anyway, let me
see if I can get this corrected in another patch.
Jan
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