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Re: [Xen-devel] [kernel-hardening] Re: x86: PIE support and option to extend KASLR randomization
- To: Boris Lukashev <blukashev@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- From: Christopher Lameter <cl@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Fri, 25 Aug 2017 10:38:18 -0500 (CDT)
- Cc: Nicolas Pitre <nicolas.pitre@xxxxxxxxxx>, Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@xxxxxxxxx>, Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>, Len Brown <len.brown@xxxxxxxxx>, Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@xxxxxxxxxx>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@xxxxxxx>, Christopher Li <sparse@xxxxxxxxxxx>, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@xxxxxxxxxx>, David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>, Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Pavel Machek <pavel@xxxxxx>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@xxxxxxxxx>, Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>, Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>, the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@xxxxxxxxxx>, Herbert Xu <herbert@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Daniel Borkmann <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Peter Foley <pefoley2@xxxxxxxxxxx>, Joerg Roedel <joro@xxxxxxxxxx>, "Rafael J . Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@xxxxxxxxx>, Daniel Micay <danielmicay@xxxxxxxxx>, xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, linux-sparse@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@xxxxxxxxxxxx>, linux-arch <linux-arch@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Waiman Long <longman@xxxxxxxxxx>, Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>, Markus Trippelsdorf <markus@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>, Rik van Riel <riel@xxxxxxxxxx>, Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@xxxxxxxxxxxx>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@xxxxxxxx>, Linux PM list <linux-pm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Brian Gerst <brgerst@xxxxxxxxx>, "H . J . Lu" <hjl.tools@xxxxxxxxx>, Steven Rostedt <rostedt@xxxxxxxxxxx>, Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@xxxxxxxxxx>, Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxxxxx>, Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>, Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx>, Dou Liyang <douly.fnst@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Paul Bolle <pebolle@xxxxxxxxxx>, "Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>, Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, kvm list <kvm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>, "Rafael J . Wysocki" <rjw@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, LKML <linux-kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, "David S . Miller" <davem@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Kyle Huey <me@xxxxxxxxxxxx>, Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Rob Landley <rob@xxxxxxxxxxx>, Tejun Heo <tj@xxxxxxxxxx>, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>, Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@xxxxxxxxxx>, "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Delivery-date: Fri, 25 Aug 2017 15:38:33 +0000
- List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xen.org>
On Thu, 17 Aug 2017, Boris Lukashev wrote:
> Is the expectation then to have security functions also decrease size
> and operational latency? Seems a bit unrealistic if so.
> 1-2% performance hit on systems which have become at least several
> hundred % faster over recent years is not a significant performance
> regression compared to the baseline before.
Where do you get these fantastic numbers? Where can I buy a system like
that? Commonly we see regressions with single threaded integer
performance on most newer processor generations.
These hundreds of percent improvement can only come from floating point
performance using specialized instructions. There are only a very limited
number of applications that can make use of it.
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