[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 4/6] xsm: flask: change the interface and default policy for xsm_map_gmfn_foregin
Hi Stefano, 2017-08-23 3:58 GMT+08:00 Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>: > On Wed, 23 Aug 2017, Zhongze Liu wrote: >> The original xsm_map_gmfn_foregin policy checks if source domain has the >> proper >> privileges over the target domain. Under this policy, it's not allowed if a >> Dom0 >> wants to map pages from one DomU to another, this restricts some useful yet >> not >> dangerous usages of the API, such as sharing pages among DomU's by calling >> XENMEM_add_to_physmap from Dom0. >> >> Change the policy to: IIF current domain has the proper privilege on the > ^ IFF > > >> target domain and source domain, grant the access. >> >> References to this xsm check have also been updated to pass the current >> domain as a new parameter. >> >> This is for the proposal "Allow setting up shared memory areas between VMs >> from xl config file" (see [1]). >> >> [1] >> https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2017-07/msg03047.html >> >> Signed-off-by: Zhongze Liu <blackskygg@xxxxxxxxx> >> >> Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx> >> Cc: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx> >> Cc: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> >> Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> >> Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> >> Cc: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> >> Cc: xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx >> --- >> xen/arch/arm/mm.c | 2 +- >> xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c | 2 +- >> xen/include/xsm/dummy.h | 6 ++++-- >> xen/include/xsm/xsm.h | 7 ++++--- >> xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c | 6 ++++-- >> 5 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/mm.c b/xen/arch/arm/mm.c >> index a810a056d7..9ec78d8c03 100644 >> --- a/xen/arch/arm/mm.c >> +++ b/xen/arch/arm/mm.c >> @@ -1284,7 +1284,7 @@ int xenmem_add_to_physmap_one( >> return -EINVAL; >> } >> >> - rc = xsm_map_gmfn_foreign(XSM_TARGET, d, od); >> + rc = xsm_map_gmfn_foreign(XSM_TARGET, current->domain, d, od); >> if ( rc ) >> { >> rcu_unlock_domain(od); >> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c >> index e8a57d118c..a547fd00c0 100644 >> --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c >> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c >> @@ -2545,7 +2545,7 @@ int p2m_add_foreign(struct domain *tdom, unsigned long >> fgfn, >> if ( tdom == fdom ) >> goto out; >> >> - rc = xsm_map_gmfn_foreign(XSM_TARGET, tdom, fdom); >> + rc = xsm_map_gmfn_foreign(XSM_TARGET, current->domain, tdom, fdom); >> if ( rc ) >> goto out; >> >> diff --git a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h >> index 62fcea6f04..28dbc6f2a2 100644 >> --- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h >> +++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h >> @@ -525,10 +525,12 @@ static XSM_INLINE int >> xsm_remove_from_physmap(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d1, >> return xsm_default_action(action, d1, d2); >> } >> >> -static XSM_INLINE int xsm_map_gmfn_foreign(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain >> *d, struct domain *t) >> +static XSM_INLINE int xsm_map_gmfn_foreign(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain >> *cd, >> + struct domain *d, struct domain >> *t) >> { >> XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_TARGET); >> - return xsm_default_action(action, d, t); >> + return xsm_default_action(action, cd, d) || >> + xsm_default_action(action, cd, t); > > We need to preserve the returned errors: > > rc = xsm_default_action(action, cd, d); > if (rc) return rc; > return xsm_default_action(action, cd, t); OK, will correct this. > > > >> } >> >> static XSM_INLINE int xsm_hvm_param(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, >> unsigned long op) >> diff --git a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h >> index 60c0fd6a62..a20654a803 100644 >> --- a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h >> +++ b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h >> @@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ struct xsm_operations { >> int (*memory_pin_page) (struct domain *d1, struct domain *d2, struct >> page_info *page); >> int (*add_to_physmap) (struct domain *d1, struct domain *d2); >> int (*remove_from_physmap) (struct domain *d1, struct domain *d2); >> - int (*map_gmfn_foreign) (struct domain *d, struct domain *t); >> + int (*map_gmfn_foreign) (struct domain *cd, struct domain *d, struct >> domain *t); >> int (*claim_pages) (struct domain *d); >> >> int (*console_io) (struct domain *d, int cmd); >> @@ -372,9 +372,10 @@ static inline int xsm_remove_from_physmap(xsm_default_t >> def, struct domain *d1, >> return xsm_ops->remove_from_physmap(d1, d2); >> } >> >> -static inline int xsm_map_gmfn_foreign (xsm_default_t def, struct domain >> *d, struct domain *t) >> +static inline int xsm_map_gmfn_foreign (xsm_default_t def, struct domain >> *cd, >> + struct domain *d, struct domain *t) >> { >> - return xsm_ops->map_gmfn_foreign(d, t); >> + return xsm_ops->map_gmfn_foreign(cd, d, t); >> } >> >> static inline int xsm_claim_pages(xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d) >> diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c >> index 91146275bb..3408b6b9e1 100644 >> --- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c >> +++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c >> @@ -1165,9 +1165,11 @@ static int flask_remove_from_physmap(struct domain >> *d1, struct domain *d2) >> return domain_has_perm(d1, d2, SECCLASS_MMU, MMU__PHYSMAP); >> } >> >> -static int flask_map_gmfn_foreign(struct domain *d, struct domain *t) >> +static int flask_map_gmfn_foreign(struct domain *cd, >> + struct domain *d, struct domain *t) >> { >> - return domain_has_perm(d, t, SECCLASS_MMU, MMU__MAP_READ | >> MMU__MAP_WRITE); >> + return domain_has_perm(cd, d, SECCLASS_MMU, MMU__MAP_READ | >> MMU__MAP_WRITE) || >> + domain_has_perm(cd, t, SECCLASS_MMU, MMU__MAP_READ | >> MMU__MAP_WRITE); >> } > > Same here: > > rc = domain_has_perm(cd, d, SECCLASS_MMU, MMU__MAP_READ | MMU__MAP_WRITE); > if (rc) return rc; > return domain_has_perm(cd, t, SECCLASS_MMU, MMU__MAP_READ | MMU__MAP_WRITE); > > Also, I just want to point out that in the regular case cd and d are one > and the same. The code assumes that domain_has_perm returns 0 in that > case. I think that is correct, but I don't know enough about XSM to be > sure about it. I also assume that domain_has_perm returns 0 when cd == d, but let's wait for other maintainers' comments. Cheers, Zhongze Liu _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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