[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v5] x86/hvm: Allow guest_request vm_events coming from userspace
On Tue, Aug 08, 2017 at 11:27:35AM +0300, Alexandru Isaila wrote: > In some introspection usecases, an in-guest agent needs to communicate > with the external introspection agent. An existing mechanism is > HVMOP_guest_request_vm_event, but this is restricted to kernel usecases > like all other hypercalls. > > Introduce a mechanism whereby the introspection agent can whitelist the > use of HVMOP_guest_request_vm_event directly from userspace. > > Signed-off-by: Alexandru Isaila <aisaila@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > > --- > Changes since V4: > - Changed function mane from xc_allow_guest_userspace_event > to xc_monitor_guest_userspace_event > - Fixed guest_request_enabled check > - Delete the guest_request_sync > - Changed guest_request_userspace_event to > guest_request_userspace_enabled > - Moved guest_request_userspace_enabled flag from sched.h to > domain.h > --- > tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h | 1 + > tools/libxc/xc_monitor.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ > xen/arch/x86/hvm/hypercall.c | 5 +++++ > xen/common/monitor.c | 13 +++++++++++++ > xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h | 19 ++++++++++--------- > xen/include/public/domctl.h | 21 +++++++++++---------- > 6 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h b/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h > index bde8313..c72e12d 100644 > --- a/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h > +++ b/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h > @@ -2022,6 +2022,7 @@ int xc_monitor_descriptor_access(xc_interface *xch, > domid_t domain_id, > bool enable); > int xc_monitor_guest_request(xc_interface *xch, domid_t domain_id, > bool enable, bool sync); > +int xc_monitor_guest_userspace_event(xc_interface *xch, domid_t domain_id, > bool enable); > int xc_monitor_debug_exceptions(xc_interface *xch, domid_t domain_id, > bool enable, bool sync); > int xc_monitor_cpuid(xc_interface *xch, domid_t domain_id, bool enable); > diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_monitor.c b/tools/libxc/xc_monitor.c > index b44ce93..bd8cbcf 100644 > --- a/tools/libxc/xc_monitor.c > +++ b/tools/libxc/xc_monitor.c > @@ -161,6 +161,20 @@ int xc_monitor_guest_request(xc_interface *xch, domid_t > domain_id, bool enable, > return do_domctl(xch, &domctl); > } > > +int xc_monitor_guest_userspace_event(xc_interface *xch, domid_t domain_id, > bool enable) > +{ > + DECLARE_DOMCTL; > + > + domctl.cmd = XEN_DOMCTL_monitor_op; > + domctl.domain = domain_id; > + domctl.u.monitor_op.op = enable ? XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_OP_ENABLE > + : XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_OP_DISABLE; > + domctl.u.monitor_op.event = > XEN_DOMCTL_MONITOR_EVENT_GUEST_USERSPACE_EVENT; > + > + return do_domctl(xch, &domctl); > +} > + > + For this bit: Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx> Some nits below. > diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h > index c10522b..de02507 100644 > --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h > +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h > @@ -396,15 +396,16 @@ struct arch_domain > > /* Arch-specific monitor options */ > struct { > - unsigned int write_ctrlreg_enabled : 4; > - unsigned int write_ctrlreg_sync : 4; > - unsigned int write_ctrlreg_onchangeonly : 4; > - unsigned int singlestep_enabled : 1; > - unsigned int software_breakpoint_enabled : 1; > - unsigned int debug_exception_enabled : 1; > - unsigned int debug_exception_sync : 1; > - unsigned int cpuid_enabled : 1; > - unsigned int descriptor_access_enabled : 1; > + unsigned int write_ctrlreg_enabled : > 4; > + unsigned int write_ctrlreg_sync : > 4; > + unsigned int write_ctrlreg_onchangeonly : > 4; > + unsigned int singlestep_enabled : > 1; > + unsigned int software_breakpoint_enabled : > 1; > + unsigned int debug_exception_enabled : > 1; > + unsigned int debug_exception_sync : > 1; > + unsigned int cpuid_enabled : > 1; > + unsigned int descriptor_access_enabled : > 1; > + unsigned int guest_request_userspace_enabled : > 1; Indentation here and below seems rather excessive. _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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