Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH for-4.9] livepatch: Declare live patching as a supported feature

[George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx>]

On 06/28/2017 05:18 PM, Ross Lagerwall wrote:
> On 06/27/2017 10:17 AM, George Dunlap wrote:
>> On 26/06/17 18:30, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>>> On 26/06/17 18:00, George Dunlap wrote:
>>>> On 26/06/17 16:36, Ross Lagerwall wrote:
> ...
>>>
>>> We absolutely cannot be in the position of issuing XSAs for situations
>>> like this, because there are too many ways where it definitely will go
>>> wrong, and we'd end up issuing XSAs saying "remember to clean your
>>> working tree before building a livepatch".  This is of course absurd.
>>
>> Your argument is that because we do not issue XSAs for *user mistakes*,
>> that therefore we should not issue XSAs for *bugs in the tool*.
>>
>> That is of course absurd.  We do not issue XSAs for user mistakes in
>> building the hypervisor either (for instance, switching gcc versions
>> without cleaning the hypervisor tree), and yet we still issue XSAs for
>> bugs in the hypervisor itself.
>>
>>> IMO, The only viable option is to exclude livepatch-build-tools entirely
>>> from security scope.  It is already the case that people producing
>>> livepatches need to check the resulting livepatch binary for sanity, and
>>> test it suitably in a development environment before use in production.
>>
>> Look, it sounds like right now you are going through all the livepatches
>> with a fine-tooth comb *because* the tools are (or recently have been)
>> unreliable.  But at some point in the future, the patch generation
>> mechanism will become more reliable.  After 20 XSAs over six months in
>> which the livepatch tool created the correct patch, you will become more
>> complacent.  You won't look as closely; it's human nature.
>>
>> You seem to be simply refusing to use your imagination.  Step back.
>> Imagine yourself in one year.  You come to the office and find an e-mail
>> on security@ which says, "Livepatch tools open a security hole when
>> compiling with gcc x.yy".  You realize that XenVerson ${LATEST-2} uses
>> gcc x.yy, so you take a closer look at that livepatch, only to discover
>> that the livepatches generated actually do contain the bug, but you
>> missed it because ${LATEST-[0,1]} were perfectly fine (since they used
>> newer versions of gcc), the difference was subtle, and it passed all the
>> functional tests.
>>
>> Now all of the customers that have applied those patches are vulnerable.
>>
>> Do you:
>>
>> 1. Tell the reporter to post it publicly to xen-devel immediately, since
>> livepatch tools are not security supported -- thus "zero-day"-ing all
>> your customers (as well as anyone else who happens to have used x.yy to
>> build a hypervisor)?
>>
>> 2. Secretly take advantage of Citrix' privileged position on the
>> security list, and try to get an update out to your customers before it
>> gets announced (but allowing everyone *else* using gcc x.yy to
>> experience a zero-day)?
>>
>> 3. Issue an XSA so that everyone has the opportunity to fix things up
>> before making a public announcement, and so that anyone not on the
>> embargo list gets an alert, so they know to either update their own
>> livepatches, or look for updates from their software provider?
>>
>> I think #3 is the only possible choice.
>>
>>   -George
>>
> 
> The issue here is that any bug in livepatch-build-tools which still
> results in output being generated would be a security issue, because
> someone might have used it to patch a security issue.
> livepatch-build-tools is certainly not stable enough yet (ever?) to be
> treated in this fashion.

You didn't answer my question.  If the situation described happens, what
position do you want Andrew to be put in?  (If I missed a potential
action, let me know.)

 -George


_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel