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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 2/6] x86/shadow: Fixes to hvm_emulate_insn_fetch()



Hi,

At 16:12 +0100 on 21 Jun (1498061548), Andrew Cooper wrote:
> Zero-legnth reads are jump-target segmentation checks; never serve them from
> the cache.

Why not?  If the target is in the cached range, then it has passed the
segmentation check.  (Or if that's not true then the normal fetch path
needs to be fixed too).

> Force insn_off to a single byte, as offset can wrap around or truncate with
> respect to sh_ctxt->insn_buf_eip under a number of normal circumstances.

Wouldn't it be better to detect that and fall through?  Otherwise we
might return cached bytes by mistake.

Tim.

> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> CC: Tim Deegan <tim@xxxxxxx>
> CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>
> ---
>  xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c | 10 +++++++---
>  1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
> index 2e64a77..deea03a 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
> @@ -235,12 +235,16 @@ hvm_emulate_insn_fetch(enum x86_segment seg,
>  {
>      struct sh_emulate_ctxt *sh_ctxt =
>          container_of(ctxt, struct sh_emulate_ctxt, ctxt);
> -    unsigned int insn_off = offset - sh_ctxt->insn_buf_eip;
> +    /* Careful, as offset can wrap or truncate WRT insn_buf_eip. */
> +    uint8_t insn_off = offset - sh_ctxt->insn_buf_eip;
>  
>      ASSERT(seg == x86_seg_cs);
>  
> -    /* Fall back if requested bytes are not in the prefetch cache. */
> -    if ( unlikely((insn_off + bytes) > sh_ctxt->insn_buf_bytes) )
> +    /*
> +     * Fall back if requested bytes are not in the prefetch cache, but always
> +     * perform the zero-length read for segmentation purposes.
> +     */
> +    if ( !bytes || unlikely((insn_off + bytes) > sh_ctxt->insn_buf_bytes) )
>          return hvm_read(seg, offset, p_data, bytes,
>                          hvm_access_insn_fetch, sh_ctxt);
>  
> -- 
> 2.1.4
> 

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