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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [xen-4.6-testing baseline-only test] 71541: regressions - FAIL
This run is configured for baseline tests only. flight 71541 xen-4.6-testing real [real] http://osstest.xs.citrite.net/~osstest/testlogs/logs/71541/ Regressions :-( Tests which did not succeed and are blocking, including tests which could not be run: test-xtf-amd64-amd64-3 20 xtf/test-hvm32-invlpg~shadow fail REGR. vs. 71335 test-xtf-amd64-amd64-3 33 xtf/test-hvm32pae-invlpg~shadow fail REGR. vs. 71335 test-xtf-amd64-amd64-3 44 xtf/test-hvm64-invlpg~shadow fail REGR. vs. 71335 test-armhf-armhf-xl-multivcpu 16 guest-start.2 fail REGR. vs. 71335 test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-raw 14 guest-start/debian.repeat fail REGR. vs. 71335 Regressions which are regarded as allowable (not blocking): test-xtf-amd64-amd64-2 20 xtf/test-hvm32-invlpg~shadow fail like 71335 test-xtf-amd64-amd64-2 33 xtf/test-hvm32pae-invlpg~shadow fail like 71335 test-xtf-amd64-amd64-2 44 xtf/test-hvm64-invlpg~shadow fail like 71335 test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-xsm 13 saverestore-support-check fail like 71335 test-armhf-armhf-libvirt 13 saverestore-support-check fail like 71335 test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-raw 12 saverestore-support-check fail like 71335 test-amd64-amd64-qemuu-nested-intel 13 xen-boot/l1 fail like 71335 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 16 guest-stop fail like 71335 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 16 guest-stop fail like 71335 test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-winxpsp3 9 windows-install fail like 71335 Tests which did not succeed, but are not blocking: test-xtf-amd64-amd64-1 65 xtf/test-pv32pae-xsa-194 fail never pass test-xtf-amd64-amd64-5 65 xtf/test-pv32pae-xsa-194 fail never pass test-xtf-amd64-amd64-3 65 xtf/test-pv32pae-xsa-194 fail never pass test-xtf-amd64-amd64-2 65 xtf/test-pv32pae-xsa-194 fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-multivcpu 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-multivcpu 13 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-xtf-amd64-amd64-4 65 xtf/test-pv32pae-xsa-194 fail never pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-xsm 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-credit2 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-credit2 13 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-xsm 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-pvh-intel 11 guest-start fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-xsm 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-xsm 13 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-midway 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-midway 13 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl 13 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-pvh-amd 11 guest-start fail never pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt-xsm 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-rtds 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-rtds 13 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-raw 11 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm 10 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-vhd 11 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-vhd 12 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm 10 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-vhd 11 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-qemuu-nested-amd 16 debian-hvm-install/l1/l2 fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 16 guest-stop fail never pass version targeted for testing: xen 314915cb4aa3865c8623516b65216b974a7d4e9a baseline version: xen 7496924db24a7946b0a81e20344920b4ac55921a Last test of basis 71335 2017-05-17 13:46:54 Z 25 days Testing same since 71541 2017-06-11 09:13:50 Z 0 days 1 attempts ------------------------------------------------------------ People who touched revisions under test: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxxxxx> George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> Gregory Herrero <gregory.herrero@xxxxxxxxxx> Igor Druzhinin <igor.druzhinin@xxxxxxxxxx> Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@xxxxxxxxx> Mohit Gambhir <mohit.gambhir@xxxxxxxxxx> Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Tim Deegan <tim@xxxxxxx> jobs: build-amd64-xsm pass build-armhf-xsm pass build-i386-xsm pass build-amd64-xtf pass build-amd64 pass build-armhf pass build-i386 pass build-amd64-libvirt pass build-armhf-libvirt pass build-i386-libvirt pass build-amd64-prev pass build-i386-prev pass build-amd64-pvops pass build-armhf-pvops pass build-i386-pvops pass build-amd64-rumprun pass build-i386-rumprun pass test-xtf-amd64-amd64-1 pass test-xtf-amd64-amd64-2 pass test-xtf-amd64-amd64-3 pass test-xtf-amd64-amd64-4 pass test-xtf-amd64-amd64-5 pass test-amd64-amd64-xl pass test-armhf-armhf-xl pass test-amd64-i386-xl pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-stubdom-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-stubdom-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-xsm pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-xsm pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt-xsm pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-xsm pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-xsm pass test-amd64-i386-xl-xsm pass test-amd64-amd64-qemuu-nested-amd fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-pvh-amd fail test-amd64-i386-qemut-rhel6hvm-amd pass test-amd64-i386-qemuu-rhel6hvm-amd pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-debianhvm-amd64 pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-debianhvm-amd64 pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64 pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64 pass test-amd64-i386-freebsd10-amd64 pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-ovmf-amd64 pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-ovmf-amd64 pass test-amd64-amd64-rumprun-amd64 pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-credit2 pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-credit2 pass test-amd64-i386-freebsd10-i386 pass test-amd64-i386-rumprun-i386 pass test-amd64-amd64-qemuu-nested-intel fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-pvh-intel fail test-amd64-i386-qemut-rhel6hvm-intel pass test-amd64-i386-qemuu-rhel6hvm-intel pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-midway pass test-amd64-amd64-migrupgrade pass test-amd64-i386-migrupgrade pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-multivcpu pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-multivcpu fail test-amd64-amd64-pair pass test-amd64-i386-pair pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-pair pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt-pair pass test-amd64-amd64-amd64-pvgrub pass test-amd64-amd64-i386-pvgrub pass test-amd64-amd64-pygrub pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qcow2 pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-raw fail test-amd64-i386-xl-raw pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-rtds pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-rtds pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-winxpsp3-vcpus1 pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3-vcpus1 pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-vhd pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-vhd pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-winxpsp3 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-winxpsp3 pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3 pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3 pass ------------------------------------------------------------ sg-report-flight on osstest.xs.citrite.net logs: /home/osstest/logs images: /home/osstest/images Logs, config files, etc. are available at http://osstest.xs.citrite.net/~osstest/testlogs/logs Test harness code can be found at http://xenbits.xensource.com/gitweb?p=osstest.git;a=summary Push not applicable. ------------------------------------------------------------ commit 314915cb4aa3865c8623516b65216b974a7d4e9a Author: Gregory Herrero <gregory.herrero@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Fri Jun 9 13:58:57 2017 +0200 stop_machine: fill fn_result only in case of error When stop_machine_run() is called with NR_CPUS as last argument, fn_result member must be filled only if an error happens since it is shared across all cpus. Assume CPU1 detects an error and set fn_result to -1, then CPU2 doesn't detect an error and set fn_result to 0. The error detected by CPU1 will be ignored. Note that in case multiple failures occur on different CPUs, only the last error will be reported. Signed-off-by: Gregory Herrero <gregory.herrero@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx> master commit: d8b833d78f6bfde9855a949b5e6d3790d78c0fb7 master date: 2017-06-01 10:53:04 +0200 commit 866b2b274dd7dbe54bae0b27b07e150dd0c7233d Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Fri Jun 9 13:58:40 2017 +0200 arm: fix build with gcc 7 The compiler dislikes duplicate "const", and the ones it complains about look like they we in fact meant to be placed differently. Also fix array_access_okay() (just like on x86), despite the construct being unused on ARM: -Wint-in-bool-context, enabled by default in gcc 7, doesn't like multiplication in conditional operators. "Hide" it, at the risk of the next compiler version becoming smarter and recognizing even that. (The hope is that added smartness then would also better deal with legitimate cases like the one here.) The change could have been done in access_ok(), but I think we better keep it at the place the compiler is actually unhappy about. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx> master commit: 9d3011bd1cd29f8f3841bf1b64d5ead9ed1434e8 master date: 2017-05-19 10:12:08 +0200 commit 7a46badcf4eaa337070a6e7dda61698fd5a32cb3 Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Fri Jun 9 13:58:11 2017 +0200 x86: fix build with gcc 7 -Wint-in-bool-context, enabled by default in gcc 7, doesn't like multiplication in conditional operators. "Hide" them, at the risk of the next compiler version becoming smarter and recognizing even those. (The hope is that added smartness then would also better deal with legitimate cases like the ones here.) The change could have been done in access_ok(), but I think we better keep it at the places the compiler is actually unhappy about. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> master commit: f32400e90c046a9fd76c8917a60d34ade9c02ea2 master date: 2017-05-19 10:11:36 +0200 commit 38e8ab9e1c4f1f876481c2f2ebaf463c31fa7475 Author: Igor Druzhinin <igor.druzhinin@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Fri Jun 9 13:57:34 2017 +0200 x86/mm: fix incorrect unmapping of 2MB and 1GB pages The same set of functions is used to set as well as to clean P2M entries, except that for clean operations INVALID_MFN (~0UL) is passed as a parameter. Unfortunately, when calculating an appropriate target order for a particular mapping INVALID_MFN is not taken into account which leads to 4K page target order being set each time even for 2MB and 1GB mappings. This eventually breaks down an EPT structure irreversibly into 4K mappings which prevents consecutive high order mappings to this area. Signed-off-by: Igor Druzhinin <igor.druzhinin@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@xxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> x86/NPT: deal with fallout from 2Mb/1Gb unmapping change Commit efa9596e9d ("x86/mm: fix incorrect unmapping of 2MB and 1GB pages") left the NPT code untouched, as there is no explicit alignment check matching the one in EPT code. However, the now more widespread storing of INVALID_MFN into PTEs requires adjustments: - calculations when shattering large pages may spill into the p2m type field (converting p2m_populate_on_demand to p2m_grant_map_rw) - use OR instead of PLUS, - the use of plain l{2,3}e_from_pfn() in p2m_pt_set_entry() results in all upper (flag) bits being clobbered - introduce and use p2m_l{2,3}e_from_pfn(), paralleling the existing L1 variant. Reported-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Tested-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> master commit: efa9596e9d167c8fb7d1c4446c10f7ca30453646 master date: 2017-05-17 17:23:15 +0200 master commit: 83520cb4aa39ebeb4eb1a7cac2e85b413e75a336 master date: 2017-06-06 14:32:54 +0200 commit 13e84e665dccd908900043b7e2887a211bc08dfc Author: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Fri Jun 9 13:57:06 2017 +0200 x86/pv: Align %rsp before pushing the failsafe stack frame Architecturally, all 64bit stacks are aligned on a 16 byte boundary before an exception frame is pushed. The failsafe frame should not special in this regard. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> master commit: cbcaccb5e991155a4ae85a032e990614c3dc6960 master date: 2017-05-09 19:00:20 +0100 commit ff3f674fa25116f68f24ae43ed2f44ed86d8ca71 Author: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Fri Jun 9 13:56:40 2017 +0200 x86/pv: Fix bugs with the handling of int80_bounce Testing has revealed two issues: 1) Passing a NULL handle to set_trap_table() is intended to flush the entire table. The 64bit guest case (and 32bit guest on 32bit Xen, when it existed) called init_int80_direct_trap() to reset int80_bounce, but c/s cda335c279 which introduced the 32bit guest on 64bit Xen support omitted this step. Previously therefore, it was impossible for a 32bit guest to reset its registered int80_bounce details. 2) init_int80_direct_trap() doesn't honour the guests request to have interrupts disabled on entry. PVops Linux requests that interrupts are disabled, but Xen currently leaves them enabled when following the int80 fastpath. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> master commit: 55ab172a1f286742d918947ecb9b257ce31cc253 master date: 2017-05-09 19:00:04 +0100 commit 267bf9f3ae9c0e0e7d0c103a8b826ce8f59bd0b1 Author: Mohit Gambhir <mohit.gambhir@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Fri Jun 9 13:56:07 2017 +0200 x86/vpmu_intel: fix hypervisor crash by masking PC bit in MSR_P6_EVNTSEL Setting Pin Control (PC) bit (19) in MSR_P6_EVNTSEL results in a General Protection Fault and thus results in a hypervisor crash. This behavior has been observed on two generations of Intel processors namely, Haswell and Broadwell. Other Intel processor generations were not tested. However, it does seem to be a possible erratum that hasn't yet been confirmed by Intel. To fix the problem this patch masks PC bit and returns an error in case any guest tries to write to it on any Intel processor. In addition to the fact that setting this bit crashes the hypervisor on Haswell and Broadwell, the PC flag bit toggles a hardware pin on the physical CPU every time the programmed event occurs and the hardware behavior in response to the toggle is undefined in the SDM, which makes this bit unsafe to be used by guests and hence should be masked on all machines. Signed-off-by: Mohit Gambhir <mohit.gambhir@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@xxxxxxxxx> master commit: 8bf68dca65e2d61f4dfc6715cca51ad3dd5aadf1 master date: 2017-05-08 13:37:17 +0200 commit 6fe723ef8c49dee3aea424d966f102429be745e4 Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Fri Jun 9 13:55:12 2017 +0200 hvm: fix hypervisor crash in hvm_save_one() hvm_save_cpu_ctxt() returns success without writing any data into hvm_domain_context_t when all VCPUs are offline. This can then crash the hypervisor (with FATAL PAGE FAULT) in hvm_save_one() via the "off < (ctxt.cur - sizeof(*desc))" for() test, where ctxt.cur remains 0, causing an underflow which leads the hypervisor to go off the end of the ctxt buffer. This has been broken since Xen 4.4 (c/s e019c606f59). It has happened in practice with an HVM Linux VM (Debian 8) queried around shutdown: (XEN) hvm.c:1595:d3v0 All CPUs offline -- powering off. (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.9-rc x86_64 debug=y Not tainted ]---- (XEN) CPU: 5 (XEN) RIP: e008:[<ffff82d0802496d2>] hvm_save_one+0x145/0x1fd (XEN) RFLAGS: 0000000000010286 CONTEXT: hypervisor (d0v2) (XEN) rax: ffff830492cbb445 rbx: 0000000000000000 rcx: ffff83039343b400 (XEN) rdx: 00000000ff88004d rsi: fffffffffffffff8 rdi: 0000000000000000 (XEN) rbp: ffff8304103e7c88 rsp: ffff8304103e7c48 r8: 0000000000000001 (XEN) r9: deadbeefdeadf00d r10: 0000000000000000 r11: 0000000000000282 (XEN) r12: 00007f43a3b14004 r13: 00000000fffffffe r14: 0000000000000000 (XEN) r15: ffff830400c41000 cr0: 0000000080050033 cr4: 00000000001526e0 (XEN) cr3: 0000000402e13000 cr2: ffff830492cbb447 (XEN) ds: 0000 es: 0000 fs: 0000 gs: 0000 ss: e010 cs: e008 (XEN) Xen code around <ffff82d0802496d2> (hvm_save_one+0x145/0x1fd): (XEN) 00 00 48 01 c8 83 c2 08 <66> 39 58 02 75 64 eb 08 48 89 c8 ba 08 00 00 00 (XEN) Xen stack trace from rsp=ffff8304103e7c48: (XEN) 0000041000000000 ffff83039343b400 ffff8304103e7c70 ffff8304103e7da8 (XEN) ffff830400c41000 00007f43a3b13004 ffff8304103b7000 ffffffffffffffea (XEN) ffff8304103e7d48 ffff82d0802683d4 ffff8300d19fd000 ffff82d0802320d8 (XEN) ffff830400c41000 0000000000000000 ffff8304103e7cd8 ffff82d08026ff3d (XEN) 0000000000000000 ffff8300d19fd000 ffff8304103e7cf8 ffff82d080232142 (XEN) 0000000000000000 ffff8300d19fd000 ffff8304103e7d28 ffff82d080207051 (XEN) ffff8304103e7d18 ffff830400c41000 0000000000000202 ffff830400c41000 (XEN) 0000000000000000 00007f43a3b13004 0000000000000000 deadbeefdeadf00d (XEN) ffff8304103e7e68 ffff82d080206c47 0700000000000000 ffff830410375bd0 (XEN) 0000000000000296 ffff830410375c78 ffff830410375c80 0000000000000003 (XEN) ffff8304103e7e68 ffff8304103b67c0 ffff8304103b7000 ffff8304103b67c0 (XEN) 0000000d00000037 0000000000000003 0000000000000002 00007f43a3b14004 (XEN) 00007ffd5d925590 0000000000000000 0000000100000000 0000000000000000 (XEN) 00000000ea8f8000 0000000000000000 00007ffd00000000 0000000000000000 (XEN) 00007f43a276f557 0000000000000000 00000000ea8f8000 0000000000000000 (XEN) 00007ffd5d9255e0 00007f43a23280b2 00007ffd5d926058 ffff8304103e7f18 (XEN) ffff8300d19fe000 0000000000000024 ffff82d0802053e5 deadbeefdeadf00d (XEN) ffff8304103e7f08 ffff82d080351565 010000003fffffff 00007f43a3b13004 (XEN) deadbeefdeadf00d deadbeefdeadf00d deadbeefdeadf00d deadbeefdeadf00d (XEN) ffff8800781425c0 ffff88007ce94300 ffff8304103e7ed8 ffff82d0802719ec (XEN) Xen call trace: (XEN) [<ffff82d0802496d2>] hvm_save_one+0x145/0x1fd (XEN) [<ffff82d0802683d4>] arch_do_domctl+0xa7a/0x259f (XEN) [<ffff82d080206c47>] do_domctl+0x1862/0x1b7b (XEN) [<ffff82d080351565>] pv_hypercall+0x1ef/0x42c (XEN) [<ffff82d080355106>] entry.o#test_all_events+0/0x30 (XEN) (XEN) Pagetable walk from ffff830492cbb447: (XEN) L4[0x106] = 00000000dbc36063 ffffffffffffffff (XEN) L3[0x012] = 0000000000000000 ffffffffffffffff (XEN) (XEN) **************************************** (XEN) Panic on CPU 5: (XEN) FATAL PAGE FAULT (XEN) [error_code=0000] (XEN) Faulting linear address: ffff830492cbb447 (XEN) **************************************** At the same time pave the way for having zero-length records. Inspired by an earlier patch from Andrew and Razvan. Reported-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Diagnosed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Tested-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> master commit: ed719d7ca6e8df6384a2ecbe9a78977e32586478 master date: 2017-05-04 15:05:26 +0200 commit d48df033095afadd82435e591ce66433bc6d3be2 Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Fri Jun 9 13:54:27 2017 +0200 x86/32on64: properly honor add-to-physmap-batch's size Commit 407a3c00ff ("compat/memory: fix build with old gcc") "fixed" a build issue by switching to the use of uninitialized data. Due to - the bounding of the uninitialized data item - the accessed area being outside of Xen space - arguments being properly verified by the native hypercall function this is not a security issue. Reported-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> master commit: 144aec4140515c53bb1676df71a469f3e285c557 master date: 2017-04-26 09:48:45 +0200 (qemu changes not included) _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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