[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3
On 6/8/2017 5:01 PM, Andrew Cooper wrote: On 08/06/2017 22:17, Boris Ostrovsky wrote:On 06/08/2017 05:02 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote:On 6/8/2017 3:51 PM, Boris Ostrovsky wrote:What may be needed is making sure X86_FEATURE_SME is not set for PV guests.And that may be something that Xen will need to control through either CPUID or MSR support for the PV guests.Only on newer versions of Xen. On earlier versions (2-3 years old) leaf 0x80000007 is passed to the guest unchanged. And so is MSR_K8_SYSCFG.The SME feature is in leaf 0x8000001f, is that leaf passed to the guest unchanged?Oh, I misread the patch where X86_FEATURE_SME is defined. Then all versions, including the current one, pass it unchanged. All that's needed is setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SME) in xen_init_capabilities().AMD processors still don't support CPUID Faulting (or at least, I couldn't find any reference to it in the latest docs), so we cannot actually hide SME from a guest which goes looking at native CPUID. Furthermore, I'm not aware of any CPUID masking support covering that leaf. However, if Linux is using the paravirtual cpuid hook, things are slightly better. On Xen 4.9 and later, no guests will see the feature. On earlier versions of Xen (before I fixed the logic), plain domUs will not see the feature, while dom0 will. For safely, I'd recommend unilaterally clobbering the feature as Boris suggested. There is no way SME will be supportable on a per-PV guest That may be too late. Early boot support in head_64.S will make calls to check for the feature (through CPUID and MSR), set the sme_me_mask and encrypt the kernel in place. Is there another way to approach this? basis, although (as far as I am aware) Xen as a whole would be able to encompass itself and all of its PV guests inside one single SME instance. Yes, that is correct. Thanks, Tom ~Andrew _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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