[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [xen-unstable test] 109326: regressions - trouble: broken/fail/pass
flight 109326 xen-unstable real [real] http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/109326/ Regressions :-( Tests which did not succeed and are blocking, including tests which could not be run: test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3 17 guest-start/win.repeat fail REGR. vs. 109165 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3-vcpus1 17 guest-start/win.repeat fail in 109309 REGR. vs. 109136 Tests which are failing intermittently (not blocking): test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-xsm 3 host-install(3) broken pass in 109309 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3 16 guest-stop fail in 109309 pass in 109326 test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 13 guest-localmigrate fail pass in 109309 test-armhf-armhf-xl-credit2 15 guest-start/debian.repeat fail pass in 109309 test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3 16 guest-stop fail pass in 109309 Tests which did not succeed, but are not blocking: test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-winxpsp3 16 guest-stop fail in 109309 like 109112 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 15 guest-localmigrate/x10 fail in 109309 like 109165 test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-xsm 12 migrate-support-check fail in 109309 never pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 16 guest-stop fail like 109091 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 16 guest-stop fail like 109112 test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-xsm 13 saverestore-support-check fail like 109165 test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 16 guest-stop fail like 109165 test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-raw 12 saverestore-support-check fail like 109165 test-armhf-armhf-libvirt 13 saverestore-support-check fail like 109165 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3-vcpus1 16 guest-stop fail like 109165 test-armhf-armhf-xl-rtds 15 guest-start/debian.repeat fail like 109165 test-amd64-amd64-xl-rtds 9 debian-install fail like 109165 test-amd64-i386-libvirt 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt-xsm 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-arm64-arm64-xl-multivcpu 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-arm64-arm64-xl-multivcpu 13 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-arm64-arm64-libvirt 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-arm64-arm64-libvirt 13 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-arm64-arm64-xl-xsm 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-arm64-arm64-xl-xsm 13 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-arm64-arm64-xl 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-arm64-arm64-xl 13 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-arm64-arm64-xl-credit2 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-arm64-arm64-xl-credit2 13 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm 10 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-arndale 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-arndale 13 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-arm64-arm64-xl-rtds 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-arm64-arm64-xl-rtds 13 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm 10 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-arm64-arm64-libvirt-qcow2 11 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-arm64-arm64-libvirt-qcow2 12 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-vhd 11 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-qemuu-nested-amd 16 debian-hvm-install/l1/l2 fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-credit2 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-credit2 13 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-cubietruck 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl 13 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-cubietruck 13 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-xsm 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-multivcpu 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-multivcpu 13 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-raw 11 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-rtds 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-rtds 13 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-arm64-arm64-libvirt-xsm 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-arm64-arm64-libvirt-xsm 13 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-xsm 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-xsm 13 saverestore-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt 12 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-vhd 11 migrate-support-check fail never pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-vhd 12 saverestore-support-check fail never pass version targeted for testing: xen 0d1a96043a75b067498a33619e99df1276f4c1b1 baseline version: xen 8839be5c1fe339a1310b4e05e88c5a0230b7959d Last test of basis 109165 2017-05-08 07:17:46 Z 4 days Failing since 109186 2017-05-08 19:20:10 Z 3 days 7 attempts Testing same since 109269 2017-05-10 16:45:58 Z 1 days 3 attempts ------------------------------------------------------------ People who touched revisions under test: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx> Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@xxxxxxxxx> Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx> Mohit Gambhir <mohit.gambhir@xxxxxxxxxx> Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Robin Lee <robinlee.sysu@xxxxxxxxx> Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx> jobs: build-amd64-xsm pass build-arm64-xsm pass build-armhf-xsm pass build-i386-xsm pass build-amd64-xtf pass build-amd64 pass build-arm64 pass build-armhf pass build-i386 pass build-amd64-libvirt pass build-arm64-libvirt pass build-armhf-libvirt pass build-i386-libvirt pass build-amd64-oldkern pass build-i386-oldkern pass build-amd64-prev pass build-i386-prev pass build-amd64-pvops pass build-arm64-pvops pass build-armhf-pvops pass build-i386-pvops pass build-amd64-rumprun pass build-i386-rumprun pass test-xtf-amd64-amd64-1 pass test-xtf-amd64-amd64-2 pass test-xtf-amd64-amd64-3 pass test-xtf-amd64-amd64-4 pass test-xtf-amd64-amd64-5 pass test-amd64-amd64-xl pass test-arm64-arm64-xl pass test-armhf-armhf-xl pass test-amd64-i386-xl pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-stubdom-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-stubdom-debianhvm-amd64-xsm pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-xsm broken test-arm64-arm64-libvirt-xsm pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-xsm pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt-xsm pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-xsm pass test-arm64-arm64-xl-xsm pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-xsm pass test-amd64-i386-xl-xsm pass test-amd64-amd64-qemuu-nested-amd fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-pvh-amd pass test-amd64-i386-qemut-rhel6hvm-amd pass test-amd64-i386-qemuu-rhel6hvm-amd pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-debianhvm-amd64 pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-debianhvm-amd64 pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64 pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64 pass test-amd64-i386-freebsd10-amd64 pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-ovmf-amd64 pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-ovmf-amd64 pass test-amd64-amd64-rumprun-amd64 pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 fail test-armhf-armhf-xl-arndale pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-credit2 pass test-arm64-arm64-xl-credit2 pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-credit2 fail test-armhf-armhf-xl-cubietruck pass test-amd64-i386-freebsd10-i386 pass test-amd64-i386-rumprun-i386 pass test-amd64-amd64-qemuu-nested-intel pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-pvh-intel pass test-amd64-i386-qemut-rhel6hvm-intel pass test-amd64-i386-qemuu-rhel6hvm-intel pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt pass test-arm64-arm64-libvirt pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt pass test-amd64-amd64-migrupgrade pass test-amd64-i386-migrupgrade pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-multivcpu pass test-arm64-arm64-xl-multivcpu pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-multivcpu pass test-amd64-amd64-pair pass test-amd64-i386-pair pass test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-pair pass test-amd64-i386-libvirt-pair pass test-amd64-amd64-amd64-pvgrub pass test-amd64-amd64-i386-pvgrub pass test-amd64-amd64-pygrub pass test-arm64-arm64-libvirt-qcow2 pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qcow2 pass test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-raw pass test-amd64-i386-xl-raw pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-rtds fail test-arm64-arm64-xl-rtds pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-rtds fail test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-winxpsp3-vcpus1 pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3-vcpus1 fail test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-vhd pass test-armhf-armhf-xl-vhd pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-winxpsp3 pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-winxpsp3 pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3 fail ------------------------------------------------------------ sg-report-flight on osstest.test-lab.xenproject.org logs: /home/logs/logs images: /home/logs/images Logs, config files, etc. are available at http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs Explanation of these reports, and of osstest in general, is at http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=osstest.git;a=blob;f=README.email;hb=master http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=osstest.git;a=blob;f=README;hb=master Test harness code can be found at http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb?p=osstest.git;a=summary broken-step test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-xsm host-install(3) Not pushing. ------------------------------------------------------------ commit 0d1a96043a75b067498a33619e99df1276f4c1b1 Author: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Wed May 10 12:51:09 2017 +0100 libxenforeignmemory: bump minor version number Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Release-acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx> commit cbcaccb5e991155a4ae85a032e990614c3dc6960 Author: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Fri May 5 17:38:19 2017 +0100 x86/pv: Align %rsp before pushing the failsafe stack frame Architecturally, all 64bit stacks are aligned on a 16 byte boundary before an exception frame is pushed. The failsafe frame should not special in this regard. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Release-acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx> commit 55ab172a1f286742d918947ecb9b257ce31cc253 Author: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Fri May 5 17:38:19 2017 +0100 x86/pv: Fix bugs with the handling of int80_bounce Testing has revealed two issues: 1) Passing a NULL handle to set_trap_table() is intended to flush the entire table. The 64bit guest case (and 32bit guest on 32bit Xen, when it existed) called init_int80_direct_trap() to reset int80_bounce, but c/s cda335c279 which introduced the 32bit guest on 64bit Xen support omitted this step. Previously therefore, it was impossible for a 32bit guest to reset its registered int80_bounce details. 2) init_int80_direct_trap() doesn't honour the guests request to have interrupts disabled on entry. PVops Linux requests that interrupts are disabled, but Xen currently leaves them enabled when following the int80 fastpath. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Release-acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx> commit baf2950213e6a50801940643e2549a5baa21ad71 Author: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx> Date: Fri May 5 15:30:36 2017 +0100 xen/arm: Survive unknown traps from guests Currently we crash Xen if we see an ESR_EL2.EC value we don't recognise. As configurable disables/enables are added to the architecture (controlled by RES1/RESO bits respectively), with associated synchronous exceptions, it may be possible for a guest to trigger exceptions with classes that we don't recognise. While we can't service these exceptions in a manner useful to the guest, we can avoid bringing down the host. Per ARM DDI 0487A.k_iss10775, page D7-1937, EC values within the range 0x00 - 0x2c are reserved for future use with synchronous exceptions, and EC within the range 0x2d - 0x3f may be used for either synchronous or asynchronous exceptions. The patch makes Xen handle any unknown EC by injecting an UNDEFINED exception into the guest, with a corresponding (ratelimited) warning in the log. This patch is based on Linux commit f050fe7a9164 "arm: KVM: Survive unknown traps from the guest". Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx> Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx> commit 5a0ed9a09ebb32b620d9217875bb5206d5ccf4d7 Author: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx> Date: Fri May 5 15:30:35 2017 +0100 xen/arm: do_trap_hypervisor: Separate hypervisor and guest traps The function do_trap_hypervisor is currently handling both trap coming from the hypervisor and the guest. This makes difficult to get specific behavior when a trap is coming from either the guest or the hypervisor. Split the function into two parts: - do_trap_guest_sync to handle guest traps - do_trap_hyp_sync to handle hypervisor traps On AArch32, the Hyp Trap Exception provides the standard mechanism for trapping Guest OS functions to the hypervisor (see B1.14.1 in ARM DDI 0406C.c). It cannot be generated when generated when the processor is in Hyp Mode, instead other exception will be used. So it is fine to replace the call to do_trap_hypervisor by do_trap_guest_sync. For AArch64, there are two distincts exception depending whether the exception was taken from the current level (hypervisor) or lower level (guest). Note that the unknown traps from guests will lead to panic Xen. This is already behavior and is left unchanged for simplicy. A follow-up patch will address that. Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx> commit 1f92dd7e8867f605fb02b1e67ecf0de389a6c816 Author: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx> Date: Fri May 5 15:30:34 2017 +0100 xen/arm: arm32: Rename the trap to the correct name Per Table B1-3 in ARM DDI 0406C.c, the vector 0x8 for hyp is called "Hypervisor Call". Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx> commit 933f966bcdf4f4255b432071fc12c9ee2efb05ef Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Mon May 8 17:48:32 2017 +0200 x86/mm: add temporary debugging code to get_page_from_gfn_p2m() See the code comment. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> Release-acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx> commit 03350f1ce7398a5b2d54802efe21659bd8d03772 Author: Robin Lee <robinlee.sysu@xxxxxxxxx> Date: Sat May 6 03:02:32 2017 +0800 libxl: u.hvm.usbdevice_list is checked for emptiness Currently usbdevice_list is only checked for nullity. But the OCaml binding will convert empty list to a pointer to NULL, instead of a NULL pointer. That means the OCaml binding will fail to disable USB. This patch will check emptiness of usbdevice_list. And NULL is still a valid empty list. Signed-off-by: Robin Lee <robinlee.sysu@xxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Release-acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx> commit a0a9095432f6f8b7c83e779dad5debc81c552583 Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Mon May 8 14:56:14 2017 +0200 x86: correct boot time page table setup While using alloc_domheap_pages() and assuming the allocated memory is directly accessible is okay at boot time (as we run on the idle page tables there), memory hotplug code too assumes it can access the resulting page tables without using map_domain_page() or alike, and hence we need to obtain memory suitable for ordinary page table use here. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Release-acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx> commit 1c5e242e6d6e51fe6ec3553299ec7efc48938c56 Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Mon May 8 14:55:20 2017 +0200 x86: correct create_bounce_frame Commit d9b7ef209a7 ("x86: drop failsafe callback invocation from assembly") didn't go quite far enough with the cleanup it did: The changed maximum frame size should also have been reflected in the early address range check (which has now been pointed out to have been wrong anyway, using 60 instead of 0x60), and it should have updated the comment ahead of the function. Also adjust the lower bound - all is fine (for our purposes) if the initial guest kernel stack pointer points right at the hypervisor base address, as only memory _below_ that address is going to be written. Additionally limit the number of times %rsi is being adjusted to what is really needed. Finally move exception fixup code into the designated .fixup section and macroize the stores to guest stack. Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Release-acked-by: Julien grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx> commit 461f0482033b09ade2f3e38c8c33f1c15bc8defc Author: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Date: Mon May 8 14:54:00 2017 +0200 x86/vm_event: fix race between __context_switch() and vm_event_resume() The introspection agent can reply to a vm_event faster than vmx_vmexit_handler() can complete in some cases, where it is then not safe for vm_event_set_registers() to modify v->arch.user_regs. In the test scenario, we were stepping over an INT3 breakpoint by setting RIP += 1. The quick reply tended to complete before the VCPU triggering the introspection event had properly paused and been descheduled. If the reply occurs before __context_switch() happens, __context_switch() clobbers the reply by overwriting v->arch.user_regs from the stack. If we don't pass through __context_switch() (due to switching to the idle vCPU), reply data wouldn't be picked up when switching back straight to the original vCPU. This patch ensures that vm_event_resume() code only sets per-VCPU data to be used for the actual setting of registers later in hvm_do_resume() (similar to the model used to control setting of CRs and MSRs). The patch additionally removes the sync_vcpu_execstate(v) call from vm_event_resume(), which is no longer necessary, which removes the associated broadcast TLB flush (read: performance improvement). Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Release-acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx> commit 1366a0e76db67953368dc4ca85bcbb28d0f3003f Author: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Date: Mon May 8 14:52:31 2017 +0200 x86/vm_event: add hvm/vm_event.{h,c} Created arch/x86/hvm/vm_event.c and include/asm-x86/hvm/vm_event.h, where HVM-specific vm_event-related code will live. This cleans up hvm_do_resume() and ensures that the vm_event maintainers are responsible for changes to that code. Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Release-acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx> commit 8bf68dca65e2d61f4dfc6715cca51ad3dd5aadf1 Author: Mohit Gambhir <mohit.gambhir@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Mon May 8 13:37:17 2017 +0200 x86/vpmu_intel: fix hypervisor crash by masking PC bit in MSR_P6_EVNTSEL Setting Pin Control (PC) bit (19) in MSR_P6_EVNTSEL results in a General Protection Fault and thus results in a hypervisor crash. This behavior has been observed on two generations of Intel processors namely, Haswell and Broadwell. Other Intel processor generations were not tested. However, it does seem to be a possible erratum that hasn't yet been confirmed by Intel. To fix the problem this patch masks PC bit and returns an error in case any guest tries to write to it on any Intel processor. In addition to the fact that setting this bit crashes the hypervisor on Haswell and Broadwell, the PC flag bit toggles a hardware pin on the physical CPU every time the programmed event occurs and the hardware behavior in response to the toggle is undefined in the SDM, which makes this bit unsafe to be used by guests and hence should be masked on all machines. Signed-off-by: Mohit Gambhir <mohit.gambhir@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@xxxxxxxxx> Release-acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx> commit d595e126c96976d056d7877e4319b3f2f3d246b1 Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Mon May 8 13:36:28 2017 +0200 VMX: constrain vmx_intr_assist() debugging code to debug builds This is because that code, added by commit 997382b771 ("y86/vmx: dump PIR and vIRR before ASSERT()"), was meant to be removed by the time we finalize 4.9, but the root cause of the ASSERT() wrongly(?) triggering still wasn't found. Take the opportunity and also correct the format specifiers, which I had got wrong when editing said change while committing. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@xxxxxxxxx> Release-Acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx> (qemu changes not included) _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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