[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 1/2] x86/pv: Fix bugs with the handling of int80_bounce
>>> On 08.05.17 at 12:04, <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > Testing has revealed two issues: > > 1) Passing a NULL handle to set_trap_table() is intended to flush the entire > table. The 64bit guest case (and 32bit guest on 32bit Xen, when it > existed) called init_int80_direct_trap() to reset int80_bounce, but c/s > cda335c279 which introduced the 32bit guest on 64bit Xen support omitted > this step. Previously therefore, it was impossible for a 32bit guest to > reset its registered int80_bounce details. > > 2) init_int80_direct_trap() doesn't honour the guests request to have > interrupts disabled on entry. PVops Linux requests that interrupts are > disabled, but Xen currently leaves them enabled when following the int80 > fastpath. > > Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> with a remark: > --- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/traps.c > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/traps.c > @@ -427,12 +427,13 @@ void init_int80_direct_trap(struct vcpu *v) > struct trap_info *ti = &v->arch.pv_vcpu.trap_ctxt[0x80]; > struct trap_bounce *tb = &v->arch.pv_vcpu.int80_bounce; > > - tb->flags = TBF_EXCEPTION; > tb->cs = ti->cs; > tb->eip = ti->address; > > if ( null_trap_bounce(v, tb) ) > tb->flags = 0; > + else > + tb->flags = TBF_EXCEPTION | (TI_GET_IF(ti) ? TBF_INTERRUPT : 0); > } This certainly is a correct change to make, but it's not without risk: If some guest relies on previous buggy behavior (wrongly setting the flag but expecting interrupts to be on), ugly misbehavior in the guest could result. Initially I was afraid XenoLinux might be affected, but I've checked and it isn't. Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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