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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 2/7] x86/traps: Poison unused stack pointers in the TSS



>>> On 03.05.17 at 15:29, <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> This is for additional defence-in-depth following LDT/GDT/IDT corruption.
> 
> It causes attempted control transfers to ring 1 or 2 (via a call gate), or
> attempts to use IST 3 through 7 to yield #SS, rather than executing with a
> stack starting at the top of virtual address space.
> 
> Express the TSS setup in terms of structure assignment, which should be less
> fragile if the IST indexes need to change, and has the useful side effect of
> zeroing the reserved fields.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>

Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>



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