[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [PATCH for-next 7/7] x86: clean up traps.c
Delete all trailing white spaces. Replace bool_t with bool. No functional change. Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx> --- xen/arch/x86/traps.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c index 351bb950d8..4481615e2c 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c @@ -1,18 +1,18 @@ /****************************************************************************** * arch/x86/traps.c - * + * * Modifications to Linux original are copyright (c) 2002-2004, K A Fraser - * + * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or * (at your option) any later version. - * + * * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the * GNU General Public License for more details. - * + * * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License * along with this program; If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. */ @@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ void (*ioemul_handle_quirk)( static int debug_stack_lines = 20; integer_param("debug_stack_lines", debug_stack_lines); -static bool_t opt_ler; +static bool opt_ler; boolean_param("ler", opt_ler); #define stack_words_per_line 4 @@ -525,7 +525,7 @@ void vcpu_show_execution_state(struct vcpu *v) } static cpumask_t show_state_mask; -static bool_t opt_show_all; +static bool opt_show_all; boolean_param("async-show-all", opt_show_all); static int nmi_show_execution_state(const struct cpu_user_regs *regs, int cpu) @@ -548,7 +548,7 @@ static int nmi_show_execution_state(const struct cpu_user_regs *regs, int cpu) * are disabled). In such situations we can't do much that is safe. We try to * print out some tracing and then we just spin. */ -void fatal_trap(const struct cpu_user_regs *regs, bool_t show_remote) +void fatal_trap(const struct cpu_user_regs *regs, bool show_remote) { static DEFINE_PER_CPU(char, depth); unsigned int trapnr = regs->entry_vector; @@ -978,7 +978,7 @@ void do_int3(struct cpu_user_regs *regs) { debugger_trap_fatal(TRAP_int3, regs); return; - } + } pv_inject_guest_trap(TRAP_int3, regs); } @@ -1328,9 +1328,9 @@ void do_page_fault(struct cpu_user_regs *regs) /* * Early #PF handler to print CR2, error code, and stack. - * + * * We also deal with spurious faults here, even though they should never happen - * during early boot (an issue was seen once, but was most likely a hardware + * during early boot (an issue was seen once, but was most likely a hardware * problem). */ void __init do_early_page_fault(struct cpu_user_regs *regs) @@ -1374,7 +1374,7 @@ void do_general_protection(struct cpu_user_regs *regs) /* * Cunning trick to allow arbitrary "INT n" handling. - * + * * We set DPL == 0 on all vectors in the IDT. This prevents any INT <n> * instruction from trapping to the appropriate vector, when that might not * be expected by Xen or the guest OS. For example, that entry might be for @@ -1382,12 +1382,12 @@ void do_general_protection(struct cpu_user_regs *regs) * expect an error code on the stack (which a software trap never * provides), or might be a hardware interrupt handler that doesn't like * being called spuriously. - * + * * Instead, a GPF occurs with the faulting IDT vector in the error code. - * Bit 1 is set to indicate that an IDT entry caused the fault. Bit 0 is + * Bit 1 is set to indicate that an IDT entry caused the fault. Bit 0 is * clear (which got already checked above) to indicate that it's a software * fault, not a hardware one. - * + * * NOTE: Vectors 3 and 4 are dealt with from their own handler. This is * okay because they can only be triggered by an explicit DPL-checked * instruction. The DPL specified by the guest OS for these vectors is NOT @@ -1586,14 +1586,14 @@ static int dummy_nmi_callback(const struct cpu_user_regs *regs, int cpu) { return 0; } - + static nmi_callback_t *nmi_callback = dummy_nmi_callback; void do_nmi(const struct cpu_user_regs *regs) { unsigned int cpu = smp_processor_id(); unsigned char reason; - bool_t handle_unknown = 0; + bool handle_unknown = false; ++nmi_count(cpu); @@ -1602,7 +1602,7 @@ void do_nmi(const struct cpu_user_regs *regs) if ( (nmi_watchdog == NMI_NONE) || (!nmi_watchdog_tick(regs) && watchdog_force) ) - handle_unknown = 1; + handle_unknown = true; /* Only the BSP gets external NMIs from the system. */ if ( cpu == 0 ) @@ -1982,28 +1982,28 @@ long set_debugreg(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int reg, unsigned long value) switch ( reg ) { - case 0: + case 0: if ( !access_ok(value, sizeof(long)) ) return -EPERM; - if ( v == curr ) + if ( v == curr ) write_debugreg(0, value); break; - case 1: + case 1: if ( !access_ok(value, sizeof(long)) ) return -EPERM; - if ( v == curr ) + if ( v == curr ) write_debugreg(1, value); break; - case 2: + case 2: if ( !access_ok(value, sizeof(long)) ) return -EPERM; - if ( v == curr ) + if ( v == curr ) write_debugreg(2, value); break; case 3: if ( !access_ok(value, sizeof(long)) ) return -EPERM; - if ( v == curr ) + if ( v == curr ) write_debugreg(3, value); break; case 6: @@ -2013,7 +2013,7 @@ long set_debugreg(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int reg, unsigned long value) */ value &= ~DR_STATUS_RESERVED_ZERO; /* reserved bits => 0 */ value |= DR_STATUS_RESERVED_ONE; /* reserved bits => 1 */ - if ( v == curr ) + if ( v == curr ) write_debugreg(6, value); break; case 7: -- 2.11.0 _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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