Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] Libxc: fix xc_translate_foreign_address()

[Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>]

On 04/04/17 17:45, Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
> On 04/04/2017 07:08 PM, Tamas K Lengyel wrote:
>>
>> On Tue, Apr 4, 2017 at 9:58 AM, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx
>> <mailto:andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>> wrote:
>>
>>     On 04/04/17 16:39, Tamas K Lengyel wrote:
>>>
>>>     On Tue, Apr 4, 2017 at 9:11 AM, Andrew Cooper
>>>     <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx <mailto:andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>> wrote:
>>>
>>>         On 04/04/17 13:14, Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
>>>         > Currently xc_translate_foreign_address only checks for PSE
>>>         bit only on
>>>         > level 2 entries (that's 2 MB pages on x64 and 32-bit with
>>>         PAE, and 4 MB
>>>         > pages on 32-bit). But linux kernel sometimes uses 1 GB
>>>         pages. This patch
>>>         > fixes that, and checks the PSE bit on level 3 entries if the
>>>         guest has 4
>>>         > translation levels (that means 64-bit guests only).
>>>         >
>>>         > Signed-off-by: Cristian-Bogdan Sirb <csirb@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>>>         <mailto:csirb@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>>
>>>
>>>         This function is in a rather tragic state.  Lucky it isn't
>>>         used by code
>>>         covered by Xen's security statement.
>>>
>>>         This patch reintroduces XSA-176, and the existing code doesn't
>>>         work for
>>>         4M superpages, or guests using PSE36.  (I might be acutely
>>>         aware of
>>>         pagetable issues, following c/s
>>>         4c5d78a10dc89).  Furthermore, the map/unmap overhead must be a
>>>         large
>>>         overhead.
>>>
>>>
>>>     Indeed it is, that's why in LibVMI there is actually a cache
>>>     implemented for mapped pages so we throw them away only after they
>>>     have been idle for a while.
>>>      
>>>
>>>
>>>         How often is this used by introspection?  To properly walk the
>>>         pagetables, you need access to the CPUID information (as well
>>>         as the
>>>         control register state), and that isn't yet available to the
>>>         toolstack
>>>         in Xen.
>>>
>>>
>>>     Control register state is certainly available.
>>>      
>>>
>>>
>>>         I'm wondering whether it might be better to have a way of
>>>         asking Xen to
>>>         perform a virtual to linear translation in the context of a
>>>         specific
>>>         vcpu.  My gut feeling is that it might be quicker than running
>>>         this
>>>         logic, and is definitely more simple than trying to fix this
>>>         code not to
>>>         have vulnerabilities in it.
>>>
>>>
>>>     I don't think it would be necessary. IMHO doing this in Xen
>>>     wouldn't really net us much performance-wise. Furthermore, there
>>>     are certain PTE bits that are OS specific and Xen wouldn't
>>>     necessary have the required information to do the translation
>>>     properly (ie. present bit unset but transition bits used for
>>>     Windows guests).
>>     Ok.  Xen needs to care only about the behaviour of real pointers in
>>     guest context, and whether they raise #PF.
>>
>>     It sounds like the best thing to do is to provide userspace with all
>>     information it needs to actually perform the walk safely, and let
>>     the library apply guest-specific knowledge if it wants.
>>
>>     Off the top of my head, the control information needed is:
>>
>>     Hap/Shadow, hardwares views towards page1gb and pse36, whether
>>     EFER.NX is leaked from Xen, EFER.NX, CR0.{PG,WP},
>>     CR4.{PAE,PSE,PCID,SMEP,SMAP,PKE}, and the PDPTRs for the 32bit PAE
>>     case, because the translation in use isn't necessary the value you
>>     would read by following CR3 in memory.
>>
>>
>> The userspace already has access to these informations and we use them
>> in LibVMI already (see
>> https://github.com/libvmi/libvmi/blob/master/libvmi/memory.c#L37). It's
>> only this libxc function that has not really been touched in a long time
>> because I don't think anyone uses it..
> Should it then be removed altogether, or at least be marked with a
> #warning or a comment?

Removing it entirely will break the gdbsx build.

As its current user is only for debugging, I think this functional fix
as proposed is fine, as long as it also adds a comment at the top
indicating that the use of this function is hazardous for your health in
production scenarios.

~Andrew

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