[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] Removing PVHv1 code (was: Re: [linux-linus bisection] complete) test-amd64-amd64-xl-pvh-intel
On Mon, Feb 20, 2017 at 12:20:10AM +0000, Andrew Cooper wrote: > From > http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/105917/test-amd64-amd64-xl-pvh-intel/serial-fiano0.log > around Feb 19 23:12:06.269706 > > (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.9-unstable x86_64 debug=y Not tainted ]---- > (XEN) CPU: 2 > (XEN) RIP: e008:[<ffff82d08016795a>] > domain.c#__context_switch+0x1a3/0x3e3 > (XEN) RFLAGS: 0000000000010046 CONTEXT: hypervisor (d1v0) > (XEN) rax: 0000000000000000 rbx: 0000000000000002 rcx: 0000000000000000 > (XEN) rdx: 00000031fd44b600 rsi: 0000000000000003 rdi: ffff83007de27000 > (XEN) rbp: ffff83027d78fdb0 rsp: ffff83027d78fd60 r8: 0000000000000000 > (XEN) r9: 0000005716f6126f r10: 0000000000007ff0 r11: 0000000000000246 > (XEN) r12: ffff83007de27000 r13: ffff83027fb74000 r14: ffff83007dafd000 > (XEN) r15: ffff83027d7c8000 cr0: 000000008005003b cr4: 00000000001526e0 > (XEN) cr3: 000000007dd05000 cr2: 0000000000000008 > (XEN) ds: 002b es: 002b fs: 0000 gs: 0000 ss: e010 cs: e008 > (XEN) Xen code around <ffff82d08016795a> > (domain.c#__context_switch+0x1a3/0x3e3): > (XEN) 85 68 07 00 00 4c 89 e7 <ff> 50 08 4c 89 ef e8 36 e1 02 00 41 80 > bd 78 08 > (XEN) Xen stack trace from rsp=ffff83027d78fd60: > (XEN) ffff83027d78ffff 0000000000000003 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > (XEN) 0000000000000000 ffff83007de27000 ffff83007dafd000 ffff83027fb74000 > (XEN) 0000000000000002 ffff83027d7c8000 ffff83027d78fe20 ffff82d08016bf1f > (XEN) ffff82d080131ae2 ffff83027d78fde0 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > (XEN) 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff83027d78fe20 ffff83007dafd000 > (XEN) ffff83007de27000 0000005716f5e5da ffff83027d796148 0000000000000001 > (XEN) ffff83027d78feb0 ffff82d08012def9 ffff83027d7955a0 ffff83027d796160 > (XEN) 0000000200000004 ffff83027d796140 ffff83027d78fe70 ffff82d08014af39 > (XEN) ffff83027d78fe70 ffff83007de27000 0000000001c9c380 ffff82d0801bf800 > (XEN) 000000107dafd000 ffff82d080322b80 ffff82d080322a80 ffffffffffffffff > (XEN) ffff83027d78ffff ffff83027d780000 ffff83027d78fee0 ffff82d08013128f > (XEN) ffff83027d78ffff ffff83007dd4c000 ffff83027d7c8000 00000000ffffffff > (XEN) ffff83027d78fef0 ffff82d0801312e4 ffff83027d78ff10 ffff82d080167582 > (XEN) ffff82d0801312e4 ffff83007dafd000 ffff83027d78fdc8 0000000000000000 > (XEN) 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > (XEN) 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > (XEN) 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > (XEN) ffffffff82374000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffffffff81f59180 > (XEN) 0000000000000000 0000000000000200 ffffffff82390000 0000000000000000 > (XEN) 0000000000000000 02ffff8000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 > (XEN) Xen call trace: > (XEN) [<ffff82d08016795a>] domain.c#__context_switch+0x1a3/0x3e3 > (XEN) [<ffff82d08016bf1f>] context_switch+0x147/0xf0d > (XEN) [<ffff82d08012def9>] schedule.c#schedule+0x5ba/0x615 > (XEN) [<ffff82d08013128f>] softirq.c#__do_softirq+0x7f/0x8a > (XEN) [<ffff82d0801312e4>] do_softirq+0x13/0x15 > (XEN) [<ffff82d080167582>] domain.c#idle_loop+0x55/0x62 > (XEN) > (XEN) Pagetable walk from 0000000000000008: > (XEN) L4[0x000] = 000000027d7cd063 ffffffffffffffff > (XEN) L3[0x000] = 000000027d7cc063 ffffffffffffffff > (XEN) L2[0x000] = 000000027d7cb063 ffffffffffffffff > (XEN) L1[0x000] = 0000000000000000 ffffffffffffffff > (XEN) > (XEN) **************************************** > (XEN) Panic on CPU 2: > (XEN) FATAL PAGE FAULT > (XEN) [error_code=0000] > (XEN) Faulting linear address: 0000000000000008 > (XEN) **************************************** > (XEN) > > We have followed the ->to() hook on a domain with a NULL ctxt_switch > pointer (confirmed by the disassembly). n is derived from current, > which is d1v0, but that would mean we are trying to schedule a vcpu > before its domain structure has been fully constructed. > > The problem is with hvm_domain_initialise() > > int hvm_domain_initialise(struct domain *d) > { > ... > if ( is_pvh_domain(d) ) > { > register_portio_handler(d, 0, 0x10003, handle_pvh_io); > return 0; > } > ... > rc = hvm_funcs.domain_initialise(d); > ... > } > > So PVH domains exit hvm_domain_initialise() earlier than when we call > the vendor-specific initialisation hooks. > > Rather than fixing this specific issue, can I suggest we properly kill > PVH v1 at this point? Given what else it skips in > hvm_domain_initialise(), it clearly hasn't functioned properly in the past. I'm completely fine with that. I'm currently in the middle of something else, but I can hopefully prepare a patch either later today or tomorrow. Roger. _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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