Re: [Xen-devel] [RFC v2 3/6] xen/arm: Allow platform_hvc to handle guest SMC calls

[Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>]

On Thu, 9 Feb 2017, Tamas K Lengyel wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 9, 2017 at 11:22 AM, Stefano Stabellini
> <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > On Thu, 9 Feb 2017, Edgar E. Iglesias wrote:
> >> On Thu, Feb 09, 2017 at 10:12:41AM +0100, Edgar E. Iglesias wrote:
> >> > On Wed, Feb 08, 2017 at 05:20:44PM -0800, Stefano Stabellini wrote:
> >> > > On Thu, 9 Feb 2017, Julien Grall wrote:
> >> > > > On 08/02/2017 23:28, Tamas K Lengyel wrote:
> >> > > > > On Wed, Feb 8, 2017 at 3:04 PM, Julien Grall 
> >> > > > > <julien.grall@xxxxxxx> wrote:
> >> > > > > > Hi Tamas,
> >> > > > > >
> >> > > > > > Can you please try to configure your e-mail client to use '>' 
> >> > > > > > rather than
> >> > > > > > '
> >> > > > > > '? It makes quite hard to read the e-mail.
> >> > > > >
> >> > > > > Hm, not sure why it switched but should be fine now.
> >> > > > >
> >> > > > > > On 08/02/2017 20:15, Tamas K Lengyel wrote:
> >> > > > > > >
> >> > > > > > >
> >> > > > > > >
> >> > > > > > > On Wed, Feb 8, 2017 at 12:40 PM, Edgar E. Iglesias
> >> > > > > > > <edgar.iglesias@xxxxxxxxx <mailto:edgar.iglesias@xxxxxxxxx>> 
> >> > > > > > > wrote:
> >> > > > > > >     On Wed, Feb 08, 2017 at 06:29:13PM +0100, Edgar E. 
> >> > > > > > > Iglesias wrote:
> >> > > > > >
> >> > > > > >
> >> > > > > > >     If platform_hvc() consumes an SMC, it's considered part of 
> >> > > > > > > the Xen
> >> > > > > > > API.
> >> > > > > > >     Visible but not filterable by a monitor.
> >> > > > > > >
> >> > > > > > >
> >> > > > > > >     Platforms can then dictate which SMC calls are better 
> >> > > > > > > handled within
> >> > > > > > >     Xen and
> >> > > > > > >     which ones can be exposed to dom0 user-space.
> >> > > > > > >
> >> > > > > > >     In addition, there could be a hypercall to disable 
> >> > > > > > > platform specific
> >> > > > > > >     handling
> >> > > > > > >     in Xen alltogether for a given guest. Then everything goes 
> >> > > > > > > to dom0
> >> > > > > > >     user-space.
> >> > > > > > >
> >> > > > > > >     It's a little messy...
> >> > > > > > >
> >> > > > > > >
> >> > > > > > >
> >> > > > > > > That is messy and I would not want any SMCs reaching the 
> >> > > > > > > firmware when
> >> > > > > > > the monitor application is in use. The monitor interface is 
> >> > > > > > > disabled by
> >> > > > > > > default and there aren't any known usecases where the SMC has 
> >> > > > > > > to reach
> >> > > > > > > both the firmware and the monitor application as well. So I 
> >> > > > > > > think it is
> >> > > > > > > safe to just make the two things mutually exclusive.
> >> > > > > >
> >> > > > > >
> >> > > > > > If you look at the SMC Calling Convention [1] both HVC and SMC 
> >> > > > > > are
> >> > > > > > considered a conduit for service call to the secure firmware or
> >> > > > > > hypervisor.
> >> > > > > > It would be up to the hypervisor deciding what to do.
> >> > > > > >
> >> > > > > > Lets imagine the guest is deciding to use HVC to access the 
> >> > > > > > secure
> >> > > > > > firmware
> >> > > > > > (AFAIU this patch series is adding that), are you going to 
> >> > > > > > monitor all the
> >> > > > > > HVCs (including hypercall)?
> >> > > > >
> >> > > > > There are some fundamental differences between HVC and SMC calls
> >> > > > > though. An HVC can only land in the hypervisor, so as a hypercall, 
> >> > > > > I
> >> > > > > would expect it to be something I can deny via XSM. That is a
> >> > > > > sufficient option for now to block the path to the firmware. If we 
> >> > > > > end
> >> > > > > up needing to support an application that uses that hypercall for
> >> > > > > something critical, then yes, it would also need to be hooked into 
> >> > > > > the
> >> > > > > monitor system. At the moment this is not necessary.
> >> > > >
> >> > > > My point is not about what is necessary at the moment. But what is 
> >> > > > right
> >> > > > things to do. If you look at the spec, HVC are not only for 
> >> > > > hypercall, but any
> >> > > > other kind of services. Why would you deny something that is valid 
> >> > > > from the
> >> > > > specification (see 5.2.1)?
> >> > > >
> >> > > > "The SMC calling convention, however, does not specify which 
> >> > > > instruction
> >> > > > (either SMC or HVC) to use to invoke a
> >> > > > particular service."
> >> > >
> >> > > To have a generic solution, we need a way to specify a set of HVC/SMC
> >> > > calls that get monitored and a set that get handled in Xen (platform
> >> > > specific or otherwise). I think it is OK not to do both, at least at 
> >> > > the
> >> > > beginning, but we might want to add that feature in the future.
> >> > >
> >> > > As much as I would like to see that, in respect to this series, I don't
> >> > > think we should ask Edgar to introduce such a mechanism. However, we do
> >> > > need to decide what Xen should do when platform_hvc is implemented and
> >> > > monitor is also enabled.
> >> > >
> >> > > I think the default should be to only call platform_hvc, because there
> >> > > are many valid monitoring use-cases which don't require those few
> >> > > platform specific SMC/HVC calls to be forwarded to the monitor.
> >> > >
> >> > > However, if we did that, we would break Tamas' scenario. Thus, I 
> >> > > suggest
> >> > > we also introduce a simple compile time option or Xen command line
> >> > > option to forward all platform_hvc calls to the monitor instead of
> >> > > implementing them in Xen. Something like "MONITOR_OVERRIDE". In the
> >> > > future, we can replace it with a more generic framework to dynamically
> >> > > configure at runtime which SMC/HVC calls get forwarded.
> >> > >
> >> > > What do you think?
> >> >
> >> > This could work in some scenarios, but for example on the ZynqMP,
> >> > dom0 needs access to Firmware as it boots, otherwise a lot of I/O
> >> > will end up non-functional (with recent kernels). Anyway, I think it
> >> > would give us a path forward. Future patches could either implement
> >> > finer control or something else.
> >>
> >> Actually, MONITOR_OVERRIDE could allow dom0 full access to the Firmware
> >> and only block guests. That would work better on the ZynqMP. I probably
> >> overlooked this in your suggestion.
> >
> > Yes, the intention is to allow Dom0 full access to the firmware by
> > default, even when memory introspection is enabled. The MONITOR_OVERRIDE
> > tunable would change that, but would need to be explicitly enabled.
> 
> In principle I have nothing against a command line option, but I don't
> really follow how that would help. The monitor system is disabled by
> default for all domains, so there is no problem with dom0 booting or
> any other domain needing to access the firmware. You specifically have
> to enable the monitoring for domains. Why is it a problem to have it
> be exclusive for just those domains where it is enabled?

I am suggesting this solution because I expect many use-cases for memory
introspection that don't actually require any platform_hvc events to be
monitored at all. On the other end, I expect that on platforms where
platform_hvc is implemented, such as the ZynqMP, those calls are
important and should be handled in Xen in most cases.

Looking at the code, does monitor.privileged_call_enabled only cover
SMC? Is monitor.privileged_call_enabled disabled by default?
If so, monitor.privileged_call_enabled could be the tunable I was
talking about. As long as enabling memory introspection doesn't
automatically forward platform_hvc events to the monitor, I am fine with
it.

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