[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] VT-d/RMRR: Avoid memory corruption in add_user_rmrr()
>>> On 01.02.17 at 10:44, <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>> On 31.01.17 at 18:00, <venu.busireddy@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> That brings up this question. Do we want to disable VT-d if the PCIe >> device specified via ACPI cannot be detected? We do so if the address >> range is incorrectly specified. If the answer is yes, then returning >> -EINVAL may be acceptable, and that will be the only change needed. If >> not, we will have to make changes to acpi_parse_dmar() also to deal >> with the non-zero return value from register_one_rmrr() for failure to >> detect the device. > > Part of the issue is that you appear to think only in terms of a single > device. The logic, however, is such that initialization failure is being > avoided as long as at least one of the (possibly many) listed devices > can be successfully probed. Actually I was wrong here (one of the rare cases where replying without looking at the code another time would have been better): An RMRR is being ignored when none of the devices can be successfully probed; normal processing results if at least one device can be confirmed to be there. The conclusion, though, is the same - we don't want such (apparently) pointless RMRRs result in VT-d initialization failure, since as long as the RMRR really is there for no reason, nothing will break by us using the IOMMU(s). Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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