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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 2/3 v2] x86emul: conditionally clear BNDn for branches
>>> On 04.01.17 at 22:11, <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On 12/12/16 10:00, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> @@ -1791,6 +1795,34 @@ static int inject_swint(enum x86_swint_t
>> generate_exception(fault_type, error_code);
>> }
>>
>> +static void clear_bnd(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
>> + const struct x86_emulate_ops *ops, enum vex_pfx pfx)
>
> As with register_address_adjust(), this would be better as adjust_bnd()
> as we don't necessarily clear them.
Okay.
>> +{
>> + uint64_t bndcfg;
>> + int rc;
>> +
>> + if ( pfx == vex_f2 || !vcpu_has_mpx() )
>
> This is an awkward edgecase of the rules concerning the host_ variants,
> but we will take a fault from xsave/xrstor for using XSTATE_BND* if the
> host doesn't support MPX.
Right. For now the implication is that guest available MPX implies
host support.
>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/xstate.c
>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/xstate.c
>> @@ -723,6 +741,66 @@ int handle_xsetbv(u32 index, u64 new_bv)
>> return 0;
>> }
>>
>> +uint64_t read_bndcfgu(void)
>> +{
>> + unsigned long cr0 = read_cr0();
>> + struct xsave_struct *xstate
>> + = idle_vcpu[smp_processor_id()]->arch.xsave_area;
>> + const struct xstate_bndcsr *bndcsr;
>> +
>> + ASSERT(cpu_has_mpx);
>> + clts();
>> +
>> + if ( cpu_has_xsavec )
>> + {
>> + asm ( ".byte 0x0f,0xc7,0x27\n" /* xsavec */
>> + : "=m" (*xstate)
>> + : "a" (XSTATE_BNDCSR), "d" (0), "D" (xstate) );
>> +
>> + bndcsr = (void *)(xstate + 1);
>> + }
>> + else
>> + {
>> + alternative_io(".byte 0x0f,0xae,0x27\n", /* xsave */
>> + ".byte 0x0f,0xae,0x37\n", /* xsaveopt */
>> + X86_FEATURE_XSAVEOPT,
>> + "=m" (*xstate),
>> + "a" (XSTATE_BNDCSR), "d" (0), "D" (xstate));
>
> I am not certain this is safe. xsaveopt has an extra optimisation to do
> with whether the state has been internally modified. Because we use an
> xsave area from the idle vcpu, I can't see anything which prevents the
> LAXA (linear address of XSAVE area) optimisation kicking in, causing us
> to observe a zero in xstate_bv despite BNDCSR having a non-zero value
> loaded in hardware.
True - I've dropped the alternative now as well as the use of XSAVEC.
>> +void xstate_set_init(uint64_t mask)
>> +{
>> + unsigned long cr0 = read_cr0();
>> + unsigned long xcr0 = this_cpu(xcr0);
>> + struct vcpu *v = idle_vcpu[smp_processor_id()];
>> + struct xsave_struct *xstate = v->arch.xsave_area;
>> +
>> + if ( ~xfeature_mask & mask )
>> + return;
>
> As the function is void, this should be an ASSERT or BUG. IMO, it is a
> caller error to ask for a feature to be reset for hardware which doesn't
> support the requested state.
ASSERT() then - no reason to bring down a production system
here.
>> +
>> + if ( (~xcr0 & mask) && !set_xcr0(xcr0 | mask) )
>> + return;
>> +
>> + clts();
>> +
>> + memset(&xstate->xsave_hdr, 0, sizeof(xstate->xsave_hdr));
>> + xrstor(v, mask);
>> +
>> + if ( cr0 & X86_CR0_TS )
>> + write_cr0(cr0);
>> +
>> + if ( ~xcr0 & mask )
>> + xsetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK, xcr0);
>
> Shouldn't this be set_xcr0() again, to undo the possible clobbering of
> this_cpu(xcr0) ?
Of course - I think early on it was xsetbv() in both places, and I've
later (wrongly) changed only one.
Jan
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