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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v4 18/24] x86/shadow: Avoid raising faults behind the emulators back
On 02/12/16 11:37, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
>> @@ -3373,18 +3373,36 @@ static int sh_page_fault(struct vcpu *v,
>>
>> r = x86_emulate(&emul_ctxt.ctxt, emul_ops);
>>
>> - /*
>> - * The previous lack of inject_{sw,hw}*() hooks caused exceptions raised
>> - * by the emulator itself to become X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE. Such
>> exceptions
>> - * now set event_pending instead. Exceptions raised behind the back of
>> - * the emulator don't yet set event_pending.
>> - *
>> - * For now, cause such cases to return to the X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE path,
>> - * for no functional change from before. Future patches will fix this
>> - * properly.
>> - */
>> if ( r == X86EMUL_EXCEPTION && emul_ctxt.ctxt.event_pending )
>> - r = X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
>> + {
>> + /*
>> + * This emulation covers writes to shadow pagetables. We tolerate
>> #PF
>> + * (from accesses spanning pages, concurrent paging updated from
>> + * vcpus, etc) and #GP[0]/#SS[0] (from segmentation errors).
>> Anything
>> + * else is an emulation bug, or a guest playing with the instruction
>> + * stream under Xen's feet.
>> + */
>> + if ( emul_ctxt.ctxt.event.type == X86_EVENTTYPE_HW_EXCEPTION &&
>> + ((emul_ctxt.ctxt.event.vector == TRAP_page_fault) ||
>> + (((emul_ctxt.ctxt.event.vector == TRAP_gp_fault) ||
>> + (emul_ctxt.ctxt.event.vector == TRAP_stack_error)) &&
>> + emul_ctxt.ctxt.event.error_code == 0)) )
>> + {
>> + if ( has_hvm_container_domain(d) )
>> + hvm_inject_event(&emul_ctxt.ctxt.event);
>> + else
>> + pv_inject_event(&emul_ctxt.ctxt.event);
>> +
>> + goto emulate_done;
>> + }
>> + else
> ... the else following a goto is kind of pointless and imo makes the
> code slightly harder to follow.
Oh - good point. This is actually a slight behavioural change, as it
skips the trace. I will drop the goto.
~Andrew
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